Media assets

Television: SABC1, SABC2, SABC3, SABC News

Radio: Ikwekwezi FM, Lesedi FM, Ligwalagwala FM, Lotus FM, Motsweding FM, Munghana Lonene FM, Phalaphala FM, Radio 2000, RSG, SAfm, Thobela FM, Tru FM, Ukhozi FM, Umhlobo Wenene FM, 5FM, Channel Africa, Good Hope FM, Metro FM

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

SABC’s governance is underpinned by the Broadcasting Act, as amended, which defines its structure and role. The Board of Directors—comprising non-executive members appointed by the President in consultation with Parliament—remains the highest decision-making authority. The board subsequently selects the executive team in agreement with the Minister of Communications following a public vetting process.

Despite formal safeguards, political interference remains endemic. Successive governments have attempted to pull the strings behind the scenes. A key turning point came in 2017, when a court sided with civil society group SOS: Support Public Broadcasting, ruling that government interference in board appointments was unlawful. The court ordered the broadcaster’s memorandum of incorporation to be amended, stripping the Minister of Communications of appointment powers over key executive roles—a legal firewall that remains in place.

Nevertheless, breaches of this separation have persisted. A high-profile example occurred in late 2022, when President Cyril Ramaphosa delayed appointing the incoming board by over six months. Civil society pressure eventually led to the installation of the new board in April 2023, but the episode laid bare the fragility of institutional independence.

In October 2023, the Cabinet approved a controversial new SABC Bill that sought to strengthen ministerial control, including the power to veto board decisions. The proposal drew sharp criticism from watchdogs such as Media Monitoring Africa and SOS, who argued it endangered democratic safeguards. Although the bill was ultimately shelved in March 2024, with elections looming, concerns over creeping executive control remain acute.

Source of funding and budget

SABC has been walking a financial tightrope for years. In 2022, total revenue stood at ZAR 5.04 billion (approx. US$ 292 million), yet the broadcaster posted a loss exceeding ZAR 200 million. Advertising revenue continued to be the lifeblood of the organization, accounting for over 74% of total income.

The broadcaster’s long-standing funding headache—the highly evaded television license fee—has proven increasingly unsustainable. In the 2022/2023 fiscal year, the evasion rate soared to 85%, driven by public dissatisfaction and economic hardship. The fee contributed just 16% of SABC’s revenues, down from previous years, despite being theoretically compulsory for South African households.

A proposed remedy has been circulating in policy circles. In July 2023, the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies proposed scrapping the outdated license model in favor of a ring-fenced tax, to be collected by South African Revenue Service (SARS). A revised funding model was included in the shelved October 2023 SABC Bill, which floated the idea of a household levy—but failed to specify mechanisms or timelines. Officials said a detailed funding framework would only be developed within three years of the law’s eventual adoption.

Meanwhile, the broadcaster’s financial health continued to decline. In FY 2022/2023, SABC recorded its largest loss in 23 years—a staggering ZAR 1.13 billion (US$63 million). The National Treasury rejected a ZAR 1.5 billion bailout in 2023, signaling limited political appetite for further state support. By 2022, direct government funding had shrunk to just 3% of SABC’s total revenue, compared to over 50% in 2019 following a one-time ZAR 3.2 billion subsidy.

The fiscal year 2023/2024 closed with revenue of approximately ZAR 5.1 billion, but the broadcaster still reported an estimated deficit of ZAR 590 million. For FY 2024/2025, the National Treasury forecast a substantial revenue jump to ZAR 6.95 billion, with losses narrowing dramatically to ZAR 27.5 million—a marked improvement over previous years. Projections suggest that SABC may return to profitability by 2026, with profits expected to exceed ZAR 900 million in 2026/2027, provided revenue continues to grow and structural reforms take hold.

These gains are largely attributed to enhanced advertising returns, particularly from the relaunched SABC Plus OTT platform, which has begun to attract meaningful digital ad revenue, tighter internal expenditure controls, and a marginal uptick in license fee collections—though this remains the weakest link in the revenue chain. The TV license fee system is effectively collapsing. Despite being legally mandated, public compliance is at a historic low. In 2025, fewer than 20% of households are reportedly paying the fee, underscoring its irrelevance and public resistance.

While the October 2023 bill proposing a household levy to replace the license fee was shelved in 2024 (ahead of the general election), the issue has reemerged on the post-election agenda. In early 2025, government officials have hinted at a possible levy on digital devices and streaming platforms(such as Netflix and smart TVs), but no formal bill has been tabled.

Editorial independence

On paper, SABC’s editorial mandate is firmly protected. The Broadcasting Act enshrines the broadcaster’s freedom of expression and journalistic independence, while the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) oversees compliance with license conditions. The SABC Editorial Policies, revised in 2020 after public consultations, were heralded at the time as a turning point for institutional independence.

Yet in practice, the firewall between the newsroom and political corridors is often porous. Despite legal protections, editorial capture by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has been a recurring issue. Under former President Jacob Zuma, newsroom purges and ministerial interference were routine. A 2019 internal commission concluded that “the specter of the ANC hovered over the newsroom,” with ministers routinely intruding on editorial decisions.

Post-Zuma, some progress has been made. Media Monitoring Africa noted that SABC’s coverage of the 2019 and 2021 elections was largely balanced, and more independent voices have surfaced across SABC platforms. Nonetheless, institutional independence remained partial and precarious, as confirmed by numerous interviews with South African journalists and media experts in 2024 and 2025.

SABC’s actual editorial performance in 2025 presents a more nuanced picture. The coverage of the May 2024 general elections was described by local watchdog Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) as “significantly more balanced” compared to prior electoral cycles. SABC platforms gave relatively equitable airtime to opposition parties and carried a range of critical perspectives, including debates on ANC governance and public sector corruption. Moreover, there have been no major reported incidents of journalists being fired or censored for political reasons in 2024 or early 2025.

Yet, according to interviews with journalists at SABC carried out in April-May 2025, several newsroom staff and editors remain aligned with the ruling African National Congress (ANC), a legacy of previous years of capture. Internal editorial decisions continue to be shaped by informal political loyalties and pressure from senior management. Self-censorship persists on sensitive issues, particularly regarding national security, ANC internal conflicts, or ministerial misconduct, according to interviews with current and former SABC journalists conducted by local NGOs in early 2025. Civil society organizations continue to call for greater editorial independence clauses to be legally embedded, including full depoliticization of senior appointments.

In conclusion, while there is greater pluralism and less overt censorship than during the Zuma years, SABC cannot yet be described as fully editorially independent. Its current state can best be described as partially independent, with flashes of journalistic integrity offset by enduring structural and political constraints.

We are keeping a close watch on these developments, as tangible strides in editorial independence could justify SABC’s reclassification into the ‘independent’ tier of the State Media Matrix.

June 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Newspapers: Dailies- Cape Argus, Cape Times, The Mercury, The Star, Pretoria News, Daily News, Isolezwe, Daily Voice; Weeklies- Saturday Star, Pretoria News Weekend, Sunday Independent, Weekend Argus, Post, Independent on Saturday, Sunday Tribune, Isolezwe ngo Mqibelo, Isolezwe ngo Sonto, I’solezwe lesiXhosa; Magazines- GQ Style, GQ, Glamour, Glamour Hair, House & Garden, House & Garden Gourmet, Design Directory, Personal Finance, Business Report

News portal: IOL

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed or State-Owned (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

Independent Media’s ownership is a complex web involving state-linked interests from both South Africa and China. The breakdown is as follows:

• 55% of shares are held by Sekunjalo Investments, via its subsidiary Sekunjalo Independent Media.
• The remaining 45% is divided between:
  • South Africa’s Public Investment Corporation (PIC) – 25%
  • Two Chinese state-owned entities:
    • China International Television Corporation (CITVC)
    • China Africa Development Fund (CADFund) – jointly holding 20%

CITVC is wholly owned by China Central Television (CCTV), Beijing’s main state-run broadcasting body. This strategic partnership, forged during the 2013 acquisition of Independent Media from Ireland’s Independent News & Media (INM), has shaped not only the publisher’s boardroom dynamics but also its editorial agenda.

In recent years, the shareholding structure evolved further: ownership is now channeled through Sagarmatha Technologies Ltd, a Sekunjalo Group subsidiary, and Interacom Investment Holding Ltd, jointly controlled by CITVC and CADFund.

Independent Media’s recent corporate history has been marred by protracted legal wrangling between PIC and Sekunjalo Group. The PIC sought to recover the funds—drawn from government employee pension savings—it used to bankroll Sekunjalo’s 2013 takeover.

After several years of litigation, a tentative settlement was reached in March 2023, though the full terms have not been disclosed. While this has defused tensions for now, media watchdogs continue to question the role of public funds in subsidizing a publisher that often promotes pro-Chinese and pro-government narratives.

Source of funding and budget

Independent Media is officially funded primarily through commercial revenue, largely derived from advertising and subscriptions. However, journalists within the group and media analysts assert that Chinese state support remains a significant behind-the-scenes contributor—whether directly through investment structures or indirectly via syndicated content and cooperative agreements.

As of 2025, the IOL platform, however, has expanded, partially buoyed by syndicated content partnerships with Chinese media outlets.

No publicly available financial report has been released by the group since 2022.

Several titles within the group have cut newsroom staff or reduced print frequency due to declining ad revenues and mounting debt.

Editorial independence

Independent Media’s editorial autonomy has significantly eroded over the past decade. Following the Sekunjalo-led acquisition, the group’s titles shifted toward an increasingly partisan stance, often championing the positions of South Africa’s ruling elite and, more recently, the strategic narratives of the Chinese government.

Key indicators of compromised editorial independence include regular reproduction of China Global Television Network (CGTN) and Xinhua News Agency articles across IOL and in print publications; editorials and opinion columns echoing Beijing-aligned perspectives on foreign policy, investment, and governance; and a growing absence of critical reporting on both the ANC-led government and China’s role in Africa. In May 2025, Independent Media signed a new content-sharing agreement with China Media Group, cementing its status as a conduit for Chinese state media in Southern Africa.

To date, no domestic statute safeguards editorial independence for Independent Media and no independent ombudsperson, editorial review board, or third-party oversight body has been identified to monitor its journalistic standards. Staff and freelancers have reported cases of editorial interference and pressure to align content with ownership interests.

June 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Public Sector Manager, Vuk’uzenzele

Digital portal: SA News

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

GCIS was established under the Public Service Act of 1994, as subsequently amended, and operates under the oversight of the Minister in the Presidency. While its day-to-day activities are administratively linked to the Ministry of Communications, the system ultimately reports to the Presidency, anchoring it firmly within the executive branch.

At the helm of the GCIS is the Director-General, who serves concurrently as the official spokesperson of the government. The Director-General also chairs the Executive Committee (Exco), which plays a key role in crafting national communication strategy and aligning media narratives with policy priorities.

In 2024, veteran civil servant Nomonde Mnukwa was appointed Acting Director-General following the resignation of previous DG Phumla Williams, but as of mid-2025, a permanent appointment has yet to be confirmed.

Source of funding and budget

GCIS is entirely funded by the state, reflecting its role as a public relations extension of the executive. In the 2022/2023 fiscal year, it was allocated approximately ZAR 720 million (around US$ 45.4 million), a significant increase from the ZAR 382 million (US$ 23.1 million) it received in 2016/2017.

Most of its budget is channeled into government media campaigns, publication costs for its flagship monthly newspaper Vuk’uzenzele, and strategic messaging operations tied to cabinet priorities. In addition to its baseline allocation, GCIS earns modest supplementary income through the sale of advertising space in Vuk’uzenzele and other internal publications, primarily to other public sector entities.

For the 2025/2026 financial year, National Treasury documentation suggests that the GCIS allocation will surpass ZAR 750 million, though concerns have been raised about overlapping functions with other state information services, including brand agencies and public broadcasters.

Editorial independence

By its very design, GCIS lacks editorial independence. It operates as a state communication apparatus rather than a journalistic outlet, with a clear mandate to promote government policy, report on service delivery, and amplify presidential messaging. Its content is exclusively geared toward showcasing the state’s achievements, often avoiding critical scrutiny or alternative viewpoints.

There is no domestic statute or regulatory framework mandating editorial independence for GCIS. The organization is not subject to independent oversight, and its leadership remains politically appointed. Its publications act as government mouthpieces, focusing on official narratives and ministerial campaigns.

Watchdogs and media experts have routinely flagged the lack of transparency and accountability within GCIS communications, particularly during national crises or election periods.

In February 2025, parliamentary committees questioned the cost-efficiency of GCIS’s Vuk’uzenzele newspaper, which continues to be printed and distributed nationwide despite declining public engagement. In June 2025, advocacy groups renewed calls for a public information charter that would distinguish government messaging from independent public interest journalism.

June 2025