Media assets

Television: SABC1, SABC2, SABC3, SABC News

Radio: Ikwekwezi FM, Lesedi FM, Ligwalagwala FM, Lotus FM, Motsweding FM, Munghana Lonene FM, Phalaphala FM, Radio 2000, RSG, SAfm, Thobela FM, Tru FM, Ukhozi FM, Umhlobo Wenene FM, 5FM, Channel Africa, Good Hope FM, Metro FM

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

SABC’s governance is underpinned by the Broadcasting Act, as amended, which defines its structure and role. The Board of Directors—comprising non-executive members appointed by the President in consultation with Parliament—remains the highest decision-making authority. The board subsequently selects the executive team in agreement with the Minister of Communications following a public vetting process.

Despite formal safeguards, political interference remains endemic. Successive governments have attempted to pull the strings behind the scenes. A key turning point came in 2017, when a court sided with civil society group SOS: Support Public Broadcasting, ruling that government interference in board appointments was unlawful. The court ordered the broadcaster’s memorandum of incorporation to be amended, stripping the Minister of Communications of appointment powers over key executive roles—a legal firewall that remains in place.

Nevertheless, breaches of this separation have persisted. A high-profile example occurred in late 2022, when President Cyril Ramaphosa delayed appointing the incoming board by over six months. Civil society pressure eventually led to the installation of the new board in April 2023, but the episode laid bare the fragility of institutional independence.

In October 2023, the Cabinet approved a controversial new SABC Bill that sought to strengthen ministerial control, including the power to veto board decisions. The proposal drew sharp criticism from watchdogs such as Media Monitoring Africa and SOS, who argued it endangered democratic safeguards. Although the bill was ultimately shelved in March 2024, with elections looming, concerns over creeping executive control remain acute.

Source of funding and budget

SABC has been walking a financial tightrope for years. In 2022, total revenue stood at ZAR 5.04 billion (approx. US$ 292 million), yet the broadcaster posted a loss exceeding ZAR 200 million. Advertising revenue continued to be the lifeblood of the organization, accounting for over 74% of total income.

The broadcaster’s long-standing funding headache—the highly evaded television license fee—has proven increasingly unsustainable. In the 2022/2023 fiscal year, the evasion rate soared to 85%, driven by public dissatisfaction and economic hardship. The fee contributed just 16% of SABC’s revenues, down from previous years, despite being theoretically compulsory for South African households.

A proposed remedy has been circulating in policy circles. In July 2023, the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies proposed scrapping the outdated license model in favor of a ring-fenced tax, to be collected by South African Revenue Service (SARS). A revised funding model was included in the shelved October 2023 SABC Bill, which floated the idea of a household levy—but failed to specify mechanisms or timelines. Officials said a detailed funding framework would only be developed within three years of the law’s eventual adoption.

Meanwhile, the broadcaster’s financial health continued to decline. In FY 2022/2023, SABC recorded its largest loss in 23 years—a staggering ZAR 1.13 billion (US$63 million). The National Treasury rejected a ZAR 1.5 billion bailout in 2023, signaling limited political appetite for further state support. By 2022, direct government funding had shrunk to just 3% of SABC’s total revenue, compared to over 50% in 2019 following a one-time ZAR 3.2 billion subsidy.

The fiscal year 2023/2024 closed with revenue of approximately ZAR 5.1 billion, but the broadcaster still reported an estimated deficit of ZAR 590 million. For FY 2024/2025, the National Treasury forecast a substantial revenue jump to ZAR 6.95 billion, with losses narrowing dramatically to ZAR 27.5 million—a marked improvement over previous years. Projections suggest that SABC may return to profitability by 2026, with profits expected to exceed ZAR 900 million in 2026/2027, provided revenue continues to grow and structural reforms take hold.

These gains are largely attributed to enhanced advertising returns, particularly from the relaunched SABC Plus OTT platform, which has begun to attract meaningful digital ad revenue, tighter internal expenditure controls, and a marginal uptick in license fee collections—though this remains the weakest link in the revenue chain. The TV license fee system is effectively collapsing. Despite being legally mandated, public compliance is at a historic low. In 2025, fewer than 20% of households are reportedly paying the fee, underscoring its irrelevance and public resistance.

While the October 2023 bill proposing a household levy to replace the license fee was shelved in 2024 (ahead of the general election), the issue has reemerged on the post-election agenda. In early 2025, government officials have hinted at a possible levy on digital devices and streaming platforms(such as Netflix and smart TVs), but no formal bill has been tabled.

Editorial independence

On paper, SABC’s editorial mandate is firmly protected. The Broadcasting Act enshrines the broadcaster’s freedom of expression and journalistic independence, while the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) oversees compliance with license conditions. The SABC Editorial Policies, revised in 2020 after public consultations, were heralded at the time as a turning point for institutional independence.

Yet in practice, the firewall between the newsroom and political corridors is often porous. Despite legal protections, editorial capture by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has been a recurring issue. Under former President Jacob Zuma, newsroom purges and ministerial interference were routine. A 2019 internal commission concluded that “the specter of the ANC hovered over the newsroom,” with ministers routinely intruding on editorial decisions.

Post-Zuma, some progress has been made. Media Monitoring Africa noted that SABC’s coverage of the 2019 and 2021 elections was largely balanced, and more independent voices have surfaced across SABC platforms. Nonetheless, institutional independence remained partial and precarious, as confirmed by numerous interviews with South African journalists and media experts in 2024 and 2025.

SABC’s actual editorial performance in 2025 presents a more nuanced picture. The coverage of the May 2024 general elections was described by local watchdog Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) as “significantly more balanced” compared to prior electoral cycles. SABC platforms gave relatively equitable airtime to opposition parties and carried a range of critical perspectives, including debates on ANC governance and public sector corruption. Moreover, there have been no major reported incidents of journalists being fired or censored for political reasons in 2024 or early 2025.

Yet, according to interviews with journalists at SABC carried out in April-May 2025, several newsroom staff and editors remain aligned with the ruling African National Congress (ANC), a legacy of previous years of capture. Internal editorial decisions continue to be shaped by informal political loyalties and pressure from senior management. Self-censorship persists on sensitive issues, particularly regarding national security, ANC internal conflicts, or ministerial misconduct, according to interviews with current and former SABC journalists conducted by local NGOs in early 2025. Civil society organizations continue to call for greater editorial independence clauses to be legally embedded, including full depoliticization of senior appointments.

In conclusion, while there is greater pluralism and less overt censorship than during the Zuma years, SABC cannot yet be described as fully editorially independent. Its current state can best be described as partially independent, with flashes of journalistic integrity offset by enduring structural and political constraints.

We are keeping a close watch on these developments, as tangible strides in editorial independence could justify SABC’s reclassification into the ‘independent’ tier of the State Media Matrix.

June 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Newspapers: Dailies- Cape Argus, Cape Times, The Mercury, The Star, Pretoria News, Daily News, Isolezwe, Daily Voice; Weeklies- Saturday Star, Pretoria News Weekend, Sunday Independent, Weekend Argus, Post, Independent on Saturday, Sunday Tribune, Isolezwe ngo Mqibelo, Isolezwe ngo Sonto, I’solezwe lesiXhosa; Magazines- GQ Style, GQ, Glamour, Glamour Hair, House & Garden, House & Garden Gourmet, Design Directory, Personal Finance, Business Report

News portal: IOL

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed or State-Owned (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

Independent Media’s ownership is a complex web involving state-linked interests from both South Africa and China. The breakdown is as follows:

• 55% of shares are held by Sekunjalo Investments, via its subsidiary Sekunjalo Independent Media.
• The remaining 45% is divided between:
  • South Africa’s Public Investment Corporation (PIC) – 25%
  • Two Chinese state-owned entities:
    • China International Television Corporation (CITVC)
    • China Africa Development Fund (CADFund) – jointly holding 20%

CITVC is wholly owned by China Central Television (CCTV), Beijing’s main state-run broadcasting body. This strategic partnership, forged during the 2013 acquisition of Independent Media from Ireland’s Independent News & Media (INM), has shaped not only the publisher’s boardroom dynamics but also its editorial agenda.

In recent years, the shareholding structure evolved further: ownership is now channeled through Sagarmatha Technologies Ltd, a Sekunjalo Group subsidiary, and Interacom Investment Holding Ltd, jointly controlled by CITVC and CADFund.

Independent Media’s recent corporate history has been marred by protracted legal wrangling between PIC and Sekunjalo Group. The PIC sought to recover the funds—drawn from government employee pension savings—it used to bankroll Sekunjalo’s 2013 takeover.

After several years of litigation, a tentative settlement was reached in March 2023, though the full terms have not been disclosed. While this has defused tensions for now, media watchdogs continue to question the role of public funds in subsidizing a publisher that often promotes pro-Chinese and pro-government narratives.

Source of funding and budget

Independent Media is officially funded primarily through commercial revenue, largely derived from advertising and subscriptions. However, journalists within the group and media analysts assert that Chinese state support remains a significant behind-the-scenes contributor—whether directly through investment structures or indirectly via syndicated content and cooperative agreements.

As of 2025, the IOL platform, however, has expanded, partially buoyed by syndicated content partnerships with Chinese media outlets.

No publicly available financial report has been released by the group since 2022.

Several titles within the group have cut newsroom staff or reduced print frequency due to declining ad revenues and mounting debt.

Editorial independence

Independent Media’s editorial autonomy has significantly eroded over the past decade. Following the Sekunjalo-led acquisition, the group’s titles shifted toward an increasingly partisan stance, often championing the positions of South Africa’s ruling elite and, more recently, the strategic narratives of the Chinese government.

Key indicators of compromised editorial independence include regular reproduction of China Global Television Network (CGTN) and Xinhua News Agency articles across IOL and in print publications; editorials and opinion columns echoing Beijing-aligned perspectives on foreign policy, investment, and governance; and a growing absence of critical reporting on both the ANC-led government and China’s role in Africa. In May 2025, Independent Media signed a new content-sharing agreement with China Media Group, cementing its status as a conduit for Chinese state media in Southern Africa.

To date, no domestic statute safeguards editorial independence for Independent Media and no independent ombudsperson, editorial review board, or third-party oversight body has been identified to monitor its journalistic standards. Staff and freelancers have reported cases of editorial interference and pressure to align content with ownership interests.

June 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Public Sector Manager, Vuk’uzenzele

Digital portal: SA News

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

GCIS was established under the Public Service Act of 1994, as subsequently amended, and operates under the oversight of the Minister in the Presidency. While its day-to-day activities are administratively linked to the Ministry of Communications, the system ultimately reports to the Presidency, anchoring it firmly within the executive branch.

At the helm of the GCIS is the Director-General, who serves concurrently as the official spokesperson of the government. The Director-General also chairs the Executive Committee (Exco), which plays a key role in crafting national communication strategy and aligning media narratives with policy priorities.

In 2024, veteran civil servant Nomonde Mnukwa was appointed Acting Director-General following the resignation of previous DG Phumla Williams, but as of mid-2025, a permanent appointment has yet to be confirmed.

Source of funding and budget

GCIS is entirely funded by the state, reflecting its role as a public relations extension of the executive. In the 2022/2023 fiscal year, it was allocated approximately ZAR 720 million (around US$ 45.4 million), a significant increase from the ZAR 382 million (US$ 23.1 million) it received in 2016/2017.

Most of its budget is channeled into government media campaigns, publication costs for its flagship monthly newspaper Vuk’uzenzele, and strategic messaging operations tied to cabinet priorities. In addition to its baseline allocation, GCIS earns modest supplementary income through the sale of advertising space in Vuk’uzenzele and other internal publications, primarily to other public sector entities.

For the 2025/2026 financial year, National Treasury documentation suggests that the GCIS allocation will surpass ZAR 750 million, though concerns have been raised about overlapping functions with other state information services, including brand agencies and public broadcasters.

Editorial independence

By its very design, GCIS lacks editorial independence. It operates as a state communication apparatus rather than a journalistic outlet, with a clear mandate to promote government policy, report on service delivery, and amplify presidential messaging. Its content is exclusively geared toward showcasing the state’s achievements, often avoiding critical scrutiny or alternative viewpoints.

There is no domestic statute or regulatory framework mandating editorial independence for GCIS. The organization is not subject to independent oversight, and its leadership remains politically appointed. Its publications act as government mouthpieces, focusing on official narratives and ministerial campaigns.

Watchdogs and media experts have routinely flagged the lack of transparency and accountability within GCIS communications, particularly during national crises or election periods.

In February 2025, parliamentary committees questioned the cost-efficiency of GCIS’s Vuk’uzenzele newspaper, which continues to be printed and distributed nationwide despite declining public engagement. In June 2025, advocacy groups renewed calls for a public information charter that would distinguish government messaging from independent public interest journalism.

June 2025

Media assets

Television: NBC1, NBC2, NBC3, NBC4, NBC5

Radio: Kati FM, Kaisames FM, Funkhaus FM, Nwanyi FM, Wato FM, Hartklop FM, Omurari FM, Tys FM, National FM

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

NBC is a statutory body established through the Namibian Broadcasting Act (Act No. 9 of 1991), which defines it as a juristic person. The corporation is overseen by a Board of Directors, appointed by the Minister of Information and Communication Technology (MICT) for five-year terms. The Board appoints the Director General (DG), who also sits on the Board as a non-voting member.

The DG holds executive authority over all operations and staff, acting under directives issued by the Board. While this governance structure provides for a semblance of managerial autonomy, in practice the broadcaster’s operations remain closely tethered to the ministry’s strategic direction.

Source of funding and budget

NBC derives the lion’s share of its budget from annual government subsidies disbursed via the MICT. Additional revenue streams include advertising, airtime sales, annual television licence fees, and transmitter rental fees. Over the years, state support has fluctuated:

Of the 2023/2024 allocation, NAD 310 million was earmarked for operational costs, while the remainder supported rural infrastructure upgrades and studio modernization.

As of mid-2025, no new subsidy has been announced for the 2024/2025 financial year, though budget planning documents suggest NBC will remain a top recipient of MICT funds. MICT officials continue to urge NBC to diversify its revenue base, citing the broadcaster’s long-standing overreliance on state support as unsustainable in the long term.

An internal review commissioned by the MICT is underway (as of June 2025) to assess NBC’s cost-efficiency and governance model, with recommendations expected later in the year.

Editorial independence

While NBC’s leadership frequently asserts its editorial independence, its programming has long been criticized for tilting heavily in favor of the ruling South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) party. In recent years, accusations of political meddling have gained traction, particularly during electoral cycles and debates on public policy.

In 2024 and early 2025, several opposition politicians and independent journalists claimed NBC had deliberately excluded dissenting voices from news programming. Some internal sources reportedly pointed to informal editorial directives from ministry officials—though these allegations remain unproven in court.

There is no specific statute that enshrines NBC’s editorial independence, and its mandate under the Broadcasting Act focuses on public service obligations rather than safeguarding autonomy.

Although the Media Ombudsman of Namibia accepts complaints concerning all Namibian media—including NBC—it lacks enforcement powers and has no direct mandate to uphold editorial independence at public broadcasters. Its rulings are advisory and rely on voluntary compliance.

June 2025

Media assets

Television: Lesotho TV

Radio: Radio Lesotho, Ultimate Radio

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

LNBS is fully owned and operated by the Government of Lesotho through the Ministry of Communications, Science & Technology, from which it receives direct policy direction. The service is administered by a Director General, who reports to the Deputy Principal Secretary of the Ministry. No independent board or governing body oversees its operations. LNBS functions largely as a communications arm of the state, with its leadership structure tightly embedded within government bureaucracy.

Source of funding and budget

LNBS relies almost entirely on annual government allocations, with limited supplementary income from advertising. Budget allocations in recent years have shown a slight upward trend:

As of June 2025, the budget for the 2024/2025 fiscal year has not been publicly disclosed. However, financial and operational audits are reportedly underway as part of a broader public sector reform agenda initiated by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning in early 2025.

Editorial independence

Although LNBS claims to serve the public interest, its content overwhelmingly reflects the official positions of the government. Programming decisions and news agendas are shaped by state policy priorities, with little evidence of editorial autonomy.

Government control extends to both editorial guidelines and staff appointments, effectively stifling pluralism and dissenting viewpoints, particularly around politically sensitive issues such as elections, corruption, or public protests. Independent observers—including regional media rights organizations—regularly criticize LNBS for functioning as a government propaganda outlet.

There is no domestic law guaranteeing editorial independence for LNBS. Disputes involving content or coverage are handled by the Broadcasting Disputes Resolution Panel (BDRP), a unit within the Lesotho Communications Authority (LCA). However, the effectiveness and neutrality of the panel have been questioned due to its proximity to state interests.

No external or independent oversight mechanism has been identified to evaluate or safeguard editorial independence. Internal performance reviews are conducted via standard government bureaucratic processes, which are neither transparent nor independently verifiable.

A coalition of journalists’ unions and civil society actors called for an independent media council to be established with statutory authority over all public media, including LNBS. As of June 2025, the government has not responded to this proposal.

June 2025

Media assets

Television: BTV1, BTV2, BTV News

Radio: Radio Botswana, Radio Botswana 2

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

DBS operates under the auspices of the Ministry for State President, previously known as the Ministry for Presidential Affairs, Governance and Public Administration. All key appointments within the department are made by the government in accordance with the Public Service Act. Although proposals were once floated to establish an independent board for BTV, these reforms have never materialized. As public servants, staff at DBS have been subject to reassignment across government departments, reinforcing the ministry’s direct control over broadcasting operations.

In Parliament, Minister Dr. Phenyo Butale confirmed in April 2025 ongoing efforts to reform the state broadcaster into a publicly governed entity. This includes: drafting a cabinet memorandum and preparing requests for tender to recruit a consultant to spearhead the transformation.

President Duma Boko, who took office in November 2024, has been openly critical of BTV’s news credibility, adding to pressure for reform across state media channel.

Source of funding and budget

DBS is primarily financed by the state. According to the most recently disclosed figures, the department received a government allocation of BWP 236.7 million (approximately US$19.9 million) for the fiscal year ending March 2020—an increase from BWP 153.3 million (US$16.7 million) in 2018. This state subsidy has historically covered more than three-quarters of the department’s operational budget. Although both BTV and Radio Botswana do accept commercial advertising, such revenues contribute only marginally to the overall financial picture.

As of June 2025, no new budget figures have been made publicly available, and no significant reforms have been introduced to improve financial transparency or diversify income sources.

Editorial independence

The Department publicly claims to deliver content that is “objective, balanced, credible, and professionally tailored.” However, these assurances are contradicted by multiple independent assessments which reveal a pronounced pro-government bias. The department’s editorial policies are explicitly aligned with state priorities, and its media outlets are widely regarded as mouthpieces for the ruling establishment.

Botswana lacks a legal framework that enshrines the editorial independence of DBS. Moreover, the department is not subject to oversight by the Botswana Communications Regulatory Authority (BOCRA), which licenses and regulates private broadcasters.

There is no independent watchdog tasked with scrutinizing the editorial practices of DBS. Occasionally, criticism surfaces from the Office of the Ombudsman. For instance, in a 2018 report, the Ombudsman highlighted that 82% of BTV’s political coverage was devoted to the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), with only 18% distributed among all opposition parties—a clear indicator, in the Ombudsman’s assessment, of biased reporting.

In recent years, however, there have been signs of improvement. Between 6 February and 6 March, BTV aired 10 interviews: six featuring civil society, two for the ruling party, and two representing opposition voices, a balance signaling a promising shift towards editorial impartiality and diversified media governance.

June 2025

Media assets

Publishing: New Era, Kundana

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

NEPC is wholly owned by the Government of Namibia. Its highest decision-making body, the Board of Directors, is appointed by the Minister of Information and Communication Technology, subject to Cabinet endorsement. The Board is empowered to appoint the Chief Executive Officer, who oversees day-to-day operations.

In May 2024, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT) revealed plans to merge NEPC with the Namibian Press Agency (NAMPA) in a bid to rationalize operations and cut costs. The proposed consolidation—reportedly inspired by Zimbabwe’s state-owned ZimPapers model—would maintain the NEPC and NAMPA brand names under a single holding entity, tentatively named Namibia Multimedia Network, Namibia Content Corporation, or Content Conglomerate of Namibia.

Critics argue that rather than streamline operations, the merger could balloon the public wage bill, with executive roles and board positions potentially awarded to politically connected individuals from state firms such as NamPower, NamWater, and Telecom Namibia.

In April 2025, a parliamentary hearing scrutinized the proposed NEPC–NAMPA merger, with several MPs raising concerns about transparency and the lack of an independent feasibility study. In May 2025, New Era published a controversial op-ed defending the merger plans, sparking backlash from civil society organizations that view the move as a political consolidation of state media.

According to local media economists, the combined liabilities of NEPC and NAMPA are estimated at NAD 154 million, with operating costs running close to NAD 75 million annually.

Source of funding and budget

NEPC is heavily dependent on state subsidies, although it generates modest revenue from advertising and commercial services. Financial transparency remains limited due to the absence of publicly audited annual reports. However, the following allocations have been reported in official budgets:

This more recent spike in funding raised eyebrows, especially given the publisher’s ongoing financial difficulties. Despite the state’s commitment to support NEPC’s survival, advertising revenue remains insufficient to cover operating costs, and financial sustainability continues to hang in the balance.

The corporation is accountable to Parliament through the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology.

Editorial independence

NEPC’s flagship title, New Era, has frequently been described as a government-aligned publication, often criticized for parroting official narratives while offering limited space to critical voices. Independent media monitors and academic studies have flagged New Era as a vehicle for state-sponsored messaging, particularly during election periods or moments of political sensitivity.

There is no statute in Namibia guaranteeing the editorial independence of NEPC or its publications. Editors and senior newsroom staff are political appointees or civil service secondees, and editorial lines are often aligned with government policy directives.

Namibia’s Media Ombudsman accepts complaints from the public about all media outlets, including NEPC, and may recommend corrective measures. However, the Ombudsman’s role is advisory and does not guarantee protection from government influence.

June 2025

Media assets

News agency: NAMPA

State Media Matrix Typology:

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

NAMPA was established as a juristic person through Act No. 3 of 1992 by the Parliament of the Republic of Namibia. It is wholly owned by the Namibian state and falls under the purview of the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT).

Its highest governing body is the Board of Directors, appointed by the Minister of Information. The Board is responsible for selecting the agency’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who oversees NAMPA’s operations. Despite formal independence under law, the agency’s governance structure reflects tight political oversight.

In May 2024, it was publicly revealed that the MICT intends to merge NAMPA with the New Era Publications Corporation (NEPC). The proposed consolidation aims to cut costs and streamline state media operations, potentially under a new umbrella organization (e.g. Namibia Multimedia Network or Content Conglomerate of Namibia). As of June 2025, the merger remains in limbo, with no timeline disclosed and parliamentary scrutiny delaying formal implementation.

Observers have raised concerns that the merged entity may increase bureaucratic costs and entrench political control over public information flows, rather than improve efficiency.

Source of funding and budget

NAMPA is primarily reliant on annual state subsidies, supplemented by modest income from subscriptions and content licensing. Financial reporting has been sporadic, with the last published reports dating back to 2014–2015, when: In more recent years:

Estimates indicate that state subsidies make up roughly 75–80% of NAMPA’s annual revenue. Without consistent public financial disclosures, NAMPA’s full financial picture remains opaque. Calls from civil society for audited annual reports and greater budget accountability have grown louder in 2025.

Editorial independence

While NAMPA officially claims to uphold editorial integrity—emphasizing its readiness to publish criticism of government when warranted—its credibility as an independent journalistic entity is frequently called into question. The Editors’ Forum of Namibia has publicly challenged claims of independence, citing institutional editorial bias and a lack of transparency in sourcing and story selection.

In early 2025, the Media Ombudsman of Namibia cited NAMPA in a series of complaints involving censorship and biased reporting, particularly related to political coverage and suppression of opposition viewpoints. These interventions remain advisory and lack legal force.

In March 2025, several journalists at NAMPA issued anonymous statements to watchdog groups alleging increased editorial pressure from MICT officials during the pre-budget period.

NAMPA does maintain an internal editorial policy document, but this guide is not legally binding and falls short of statutory protection for editorial independence.

No legislation currently exists that guarantees NAMPA’s autonomy from political interference. Editors and newsroom staff are effectively subordinate to government-appointed management.

June 2025

Media assets

News agency: LENA

Publishing: Lentsoe La Basotho, Lesotho Weekly

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

LENA is wholly owned by the Government of Lesotho, operating under the Department of Information within the Ministry of Communications, Science & Technology. Its leadership, including the Director General, is appointed directly by the Ministry, with final oversight lying with the Deputy Principal Secretary.

All key decisions—whether administrative or editorial—are subject to the hierarchical chain of command within the Ministry. No independent governance board exists to oversee or balance the agency’s management or output.

In April 2025, civil society organizations led by the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA Lesotho) called for the transformation of LENA into an autonomous public news agency with an independent board and editorial charter. The Ministry of Communications has yet to formally respond to this proposal.

Source of funding and budget

LENA’s operations are financed almost entirely through state subsidies. According to figures from the Ministry of Finance:

As of June 2025, no updated figures have been publicly released for the 2024/2025 fiscal year. However, public procurement records suggest that LENA continues to operate on a flat annual subsidy, without any material increase for inflation or operational expansion.

Despite the agency’s minimal commercial revenue—mainly from content syndication—this represents a fraction of its financial needs, rendering it entirely reliant on the public purse.

Persistent staff complaints about low pay and outdated equipment resurfaced in a leaked memo in May 2025, leading to calls within Parliament for increased funding and improved working conditions at the agency.

Editorial independence

LENA’s editorial direction remains firmly under state control. Its news coverage consistently echoes the voice of the ruling coalition and closely aligns with government narratives. Content analysis and local journalist testimonies indicate that critical perspectives—especially regarding government performance, corruption, or dissent—are routinely omitted or under-represented.

Editors and reporters at LENA are appointed by government ministries and are functionally subordinate to political appointees. No editorial charter or internal policy exists to safeguard autonomy or ethical reporting standards.

There is no statute guaranteeing LENA’s editorial independence, and no external review body is tasked with monitoring or evaluating its output. All editorial lines are aligned with the Ministry’s communications strategy, coordinated via the Department of Information.

June 2025

Media assets

News agency: Botswana Press Agency (BOPA)

Print media: Daily News, Kutlwano

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

The Department of Information Services is a government agency embedded within the Ministry for Presidential Affairs. All senior positions and editorial appointments are filled by the government, in accordance with the Public Service Act.

There is no independent board or governance body overseeing its operations. Instead, DIS remained firmly under the direction of the executive branch, with no provisions in place for autonomy or editorial insulation from political influence.

In April 2025, the government announced an organisational assessment of both DIS and DBS to clarify roles and career progression. DIS reportedly had 258 staff (versus a budgeted 276), with many on stagnant C1 salaries for over a decade—delays impacting morale and advancement

Source of funding and budget

DIS is overwhelmingly reliant on state subsidies. The most recent official figures show that it received:

• BWP 64.9 million (approx. US$ 5.6 million) in 2018
• BWP 73.4 million (approx. US$ 6.1 million) in the fiscal year ending March 2020

These allocations represent nearly 90% of the department’s total budget. Although limited advertising is accepted through its publications, commercial revenue remains negligible. As of June 2025, no updated budget figures have been released, and transparency regarding the department’s financial operations remains low.

Editorial independence

Despite public statements affirming a commitment to balanced and informative journalism, the Department of Information Services operates squarely within the confines of government directives. Its editorial line is shaped by its official mandate: to promote government policies and priorities. Independent media observers consistently describe BOPA, Daily News, and Kutlwano as unambiguously pro-government in tone and content.

Notably, BOPA content is syndicated across state-run platforms such as Radio Botswana and Botswana Television (BTV), further extending the government’s communication reach across print and broadcast. This content is not subject to regulation by the Botswana Communications Regulatory Authority (BOCRA), which oversees private media entities.

There is no statutory framework guaranteeing the editorial independence of DIS or its outlets, nor any independent oversight body tasked with monitoring or evaluating content standards. While the Office of the Ombudsman occasionally raises concerns about media bias or maladministration, such interventions are sporadic and lack enforcement authority.

June 2025