Media assets

Television: Al Wataniya 1, Al Wataniya 2

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

ETT was established in 2006 by presidential decree under the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, following the division of the former unified state broadcasting entity, Établissement de la Radiodiffusion-Télévision Tunisienne, into separate radio and television institutions. ETT is fully state-owned and falls under the direct authority of the Presidency of the Government, which holds the power to appoint members of its executive board.

In an effort to safeguard against political interference, Tunisia’s broadcast regulator—the Haute Autorité Indépendante de la Communication Audiovisuelle (HAICA)—was granted the legal prerogative to approve the appointment of ETT’s Chief Executive Officer. However, this institutional check has been significantly undermined in recent years, particularly under the current administration.

Source of funding and budget

ETT is primarily funded by state subsidies. Although it is permitted to generate revenue through advertising, commercial income constitutes only about 20% of its overall budget. Tunisia also levies a public broadcasting fee on households, but the majority of the funds collected are withheld by the state treasury, with only a minor share directed to the broadcaster.

Editorial independence

Historically, Tunisia’s state media functioned as an instrument of government propaganda, with editorial lines tightly controlled through executive appointments. While HAICA’s oversight over CEO appointments was initially seen as a step toward depoliticizing the broadcaster, this autonomy has been eroded since President Kais Saied’s 2021 power consolidation.

Under Saied’s “exceptional measures”—widely characterised by observers as a de facto coup—ETT has come under increasingly rigid editorial control. The broadcaster is no longer permitted to host political party representatives on air, a policy corroborated by local journalists and experts interviewed for this report in May 2024 and in March 2025.

In 2019, a performance-based contract between the Tunisian government and ETT had been hailed as a landmark achievement for media independence. The agreement stipulated that the dismissal of ETT’s President Director General could only occur following a formal evaluation conducted by HAICA. Regulators viewed this contract as a crucial tool to insulate the broadcaster from undue pressure and political meddling.

However, the protective force of this mechanism was nullified just two years later. In one of his first moves after seizing full executive control in July 2021, President Saied unilaterally dismissed Mohamed El-Asaad Dahesh, then CEO of ETT—flouting the procedures enshrined in the performance contract.

In August 2023, tensions between the presidency and ETT escalated further when President Saied summoned the broadcaster’s then-CEO, Awatef Daly, to a meeting that turned into a public reprimand. Saied sharply criticized the broadcaster’s editorial output, signalling an increasingly interventionist approach to state media. Awatef Dali continues as CEO of ETT in an interim capacity. Originally installed as interim leader in July 2021, she was formally appointed on 16 June 2024.

Despite HAICA’s nominal mandate to both oversee CEO appointments and monitor the implementation of the 2019 performance contract, the authority’s capacity to fulfil these duties has effectively been suspended under the current political climate.

Under Saied’s “exceptional measures”—widely characterised by observers as a de facto coup—ETT has come under increasingly rigid editorial control. The broadcaster is no longer permitted to host political party representatives on air, a policy corroborated by local journalists and experts interviewed for this report in May 2024 and in March 2025.

July 2025

Media assets

National: Radio Tunis, Radio Tunisie Culture, Radio Jeunes, Radio Panorama, RTCI;

Regional: Sfax, Monastir, Gafsa, Tataouine, Le Kef

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Radio Tunisienne was established through the same structural reform that created Télévision Tunisienne (ETT), following the 2006 split of the former Établissement de la Radiodiffusion-Télévision Tunisienne. Like ETT, it is a public institution wholly owned by the Tunisian state and governed by the Presidency of the Government, which appoints the members of its executive board. The appointment of the station’s CEO is subject to approval by HAICA (Haute Autorité Indépendante de la Communication Audiovisuelle), although this requirement has been weakened under the current political climate.

According to official sources, Henda Ben Alaya Ghribi has served as CEO of Radio Tunisienne since June 2023. She previously held several leadership roles within the public broadcasting sector, including director of national programming. Her appointment came amid heightened political scrutiny of state media, placing her at the centre of a complex and tightly controlled editorial environment.

Source of funding and budget

The broadcaster is primarily financed through direct state subsidies. It also earns a modest share of revenue through commercial advertising, but according to Tunisian media professionals interviewed in May 2024 and March 2025, this comprises only a minor portion of the total budget. As with other public media in Tunisia, the state levies a broadcasting fee, but most of the revenue from that fee is not directly channelled back to Radio Tunisienne.

Editorial independence

Historically, Radio Tunisienne functioned as a government-controlled outlet, echoing the narrative of those in power. However, in the decade following the 2011 revolution, efforts were made to transform the broadcaster into a more pluralistic and independent institution. At one point, the station followed an internal editorial charter designed to uphold journalistic integrity and autonomy. For several years, no systematic evidence of government interference in editorial content was reported.

This progress, however, has been largely reversed. Since President Kais Saied invoked a series of “exceptional measures” beginning in 2021, Radio Tunisienne—like ETT—has once again fallen under direct state control. The President dismissed the broadcaster’s CEO not once, but twice since asserting sweeping executive powers. These dismissals bypassed the previously established safeguards, notably the HAICA review requirement and the principles enshrined in the station’s editorial charter—both of which are now dormant.

Today, Radio Tunisienne operates in an environment where meaningful oversight is absent. No independent mechanisms currently exist to assess or validate the station’s editorial independence. The abandonment of its internal editorial charter and the repeated top-down interventions have signalled a return to the broadcaster’s pre-revolutionary role as a vehicle for state messaging.

July 2025

In July 2023, SNIPE expanded its portfolio by absorbing the Dar Assabah press group, a previously confiscated entity that published four titles, thus reinforcing SNIPE’s dominant presence in the national print media landscape.

Media assets

Publishing: La Presse, Essahafa; Dar Assabah titles: Assabah, Le Temps, Al Ousboui, Sabah Al Khair

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed Media (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

SNIPE is structured as a shareholding company, with approximately 73% of its capital held by the state and affiliated public institutions such as the Tunisian Trade Office and the Tunis Afrique Presse (TAP) news agency. The company operates under the direct oversight of the Presidency of the Republic, which retains the authority to appoint the CEO. This centralized governance model has reinforced SNIPE’s status as a key arm of the state media apparatus.

In 2014, Belgacem Tayaa was appointed Chief Executive Officer of SNIPE by the Head of Government. Since then, he has led the state-owned publishing group, overseeing major titles such as La Presse de Tunisie and Essahafa. Before joining SNIPE, Tayaa served as the Contrôleur Général des Services Publics attached to the Présidence du Gouvernement—a senior audit role with broad oversight of Tunisia’s public services.

Source of funding and budget

SNIPE’s operations are sustained through a mix of commercial revenues—predominantly from advertising—and substantial government subsidies. According to company insiders interviewed in May 2024 and March 2025, and corroborated by media reports, SNIPE ranks among the most heavily state-subsidized media organizations in the country.

Between 2020 and 2022, the company received nearly TND 9 million (approx. USD 3 million) in public funds. Budget data for 2023 and 2024 remain undisclosed as of mid-2025, although local observers suggest that allocations have continued at similar levels amid tightening control over the media sector.

Editorial independence

While no formal editorial guidelines have been imposed by the government, SNIPE’s track record suggests a longstanding alignment with state narratives. The company has historically appointed editors with affiliations dating back to the Ben Ali regime, though independent analyses—including a 2020 content review commissioned for this report—did not find direct evidence of editorial interference at that time.

However, the situation has markedly deteriorated since President Kaïs Saïed implemented his “exceptional measures” in July 2021. According to testimonies from local journalists and media observers, SNIPE’s editorial line has increasingly mirrored official positions, reflecting a growing pattern of state influence. This culminated in a joint strike in April 2022 by journalists from across Tunisia’s state media—including SNIPE—protesting governmental meddling in editorial affairs.

As of June 2025, no independent oversight or regulatory body exists to safeguard or assess the editorial autonomy of SNIPE’s publications. The absence of institutional checks has raised concerns among press freedom advocates about the long-term implications for pluralism and journalistic integrity in Tunisia’s public media sphere.

July 2025

Media assets

News agency: TAP

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

TAP operates as a public institution under the direct authority of the Tunisian Presidency. The agency’s Chief Executive Officer is appointed by the Presidency, reflecting the central government’s influence over the agency’s top-level management.

In March 2023, Najeh Missaoui, a seasoned media professional and former head of news programming on Tunisia’s national television channel Wataniya 1, was appointed CEO of TAP.

Source of funding and budget

According to interviews with local media experts conducted in May 2024 and March 2025, TAP’s operational budget relies heavily on public funding. Between 80% and 90% of its income is sourced from the government, with the remainder generated through the commercial sale of editorial content—such as wire news, multimedia materials, and photographs.

Editorial independence

TAP has long been cited—at least until recent years—as an exception in the Arab media landscape for maintaining a measure of editorial autonomy. Historically, the agency operated without explicit editorial directives from the state, a rarity among government-affiliated news services in the region.

However, this independence has been increasingly called into question since President Kais Saied’s invocation of “exceptional measures” in July 2021, which expanded executive powers and weakened institutional checks. Following these developments, TAP was subjected to tighter editorial constraints, prompting journalists from across Tunisia’s state media—including TAP—to launch a coordinated strike in April 2022 protesting government interference in newsroom decisions.

Just ahead of the October 2024 presidential election, TAP was spotlighted for censoring a dispatch about Mondher Zenaïdi—a declared rival of President Kais Saied. The National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT) raised the alarm, noting that the agency’s CEO, Najeh Missaoui, “gave instructions” to suppress reporting on both Zenaïdi and Abir Moussi. President Saied secured a second term on 6 October 2024 with over 90 % of the vote, although turnout remained low (28.8 %) and opposition parties boycotted the election.

As of June 2025, no formal domestic statute or oversight mechanism exists to safeguard or evaluate TAP’s editorial independence. This legal vacuum continues to expose the agency to political pressure, undermining its credibility and the professional autonomy of its staff.

July 2025