Media assets

News agency: WAL

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

WAL was reconstituted in 2011 by a decision of the Executive Office of the Transitional National Council. Since then, according to local journalists and media experts consulted in March and May 2024, the agency has functioned under the de facto authority of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and later the GNU.

No legal documentation clarifying WAL’s ownership structure is available. According to journalists specializing in Libyan media interviewed for this report in May 2025, appointments to its leadership are made solely at the discretion of the ruling government, with no competitive or transparent selection process in place.

Source of funding and budget

There is no publicly accessible financial documentation concerning WAL’s budget or funding streams. However, consistent findings from Altai Consulting’s past media mapping and testimonies gathered by the Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC) suggest that the agency has been fully financed by state authorities—initially the GNA, and since March 2021, the GNU.

In Libya’s media landscape, where commercial advertising markets remain largely dysfunctional, most news outlets either rely on direct government support or international donor funding. WAL, as a state-owned institution, has not demonstrated any diversification of its financial base.

Editorial independence

Despite post-2011 reforms, WAL continues to operate as a governmental mouthpiece. Interviews conducted with journalists, independent media monitors, and Libyan experts, alongside informal content analysis carried out by MJRC in early 2024, confirm that the agency’s editorial output overwhelmingly reflects the messaging priorities of the sitting government. WAL’s reporting routinely lacks critical scrutiny of official policies and tends to align with the narratives favored by the GNU.

No domestic statute, regulatory safeguard, or external oversight mechanism has been identified that would guarantee or even gesture toward the agency’s editorial independence. WAL’s institutional mandate remains closely tethered to the political objectives of Libya’s executive authority, a legacy reinforced by its origins as a state propaganda tool during the Jamahiriya era.

July 2025

Media assets

Television: Al Wataniya 1, Al Wataniya 2

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

ETT was established in 2006 by presidential decree under the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, following the division of the former unified state broadcasting entity, Établissement de la Radiodiffusion-Télévision Tunisienne, into separate radio and television institutions. ETT is fully state-owned and falls under the direct authority of the Presidency of the Government, which holds the power to appoint members of its executive board.

In an effort to safeguard against political interference, Tunisia’s broadcast regulator—the Haute Autorité Indépendante de la Communication Audiovisuelle (HAICA)—was granted the legal prerogative to approve the appointment of ETT’s Chief Executive Officer. However, this institutional check has been significantly undermined in recent years, particularly under the current administration.

Source of funding and budget

ETT is primarily funded by state subsidies. Although it is permitted to generate revenue through advertising, commercial income constitutes only about 20% of its overall budget. Tunisia also levies a public broadcasting fee on households, but the majority of the funds collected are withheld by the state treasury, with only a minor share directed to the broadcaster.

Editorial independence

Historically, Tunisia’s state media functioned as an instrument of government propaganda, with editorial lines tightly controlled through executive appointments. While HAICA’s oversight over CEO appointments was initially seen as a step toward depoliticizing the broadcaster, this autonomy has been eroded since President Kais Saied’s 2021 power consolidation.

Under Saied’s “exceptional measures”—widely characterised by observers as a de facto coup—ETT has come under increasingly rigid editorial control. The broadcaster is no longer permitted to host political party representatives on air, a policy corroborated by local journalists and experts interviewed for this report in May 2024 and in March 2025.

In 2019, a performance-based contract between the Tunisian government and ETT had been hailed as a landmark achievement for media independence. The agreement stipulated that the dismissal of ETT’s President Director General could only occur following a formal evaluation conducted by HAICA. Regulators viewed this contract as a crucial tool to insulate the broadcaster from undue pressure and political meddling.

However, the protective force of this mechanism was nullified just two years later. In one of his first moves after seizing full executive control in July 2021, President Saied unilaterally dismissed Mohamed El-Asaad Dahesh, then CEO of ETT—flouting the procedures enshrined in the performance contract.

In August 2023, tensions between the presidency and ETT escalated further when President Saied summoned the broadcaster’s then-CEO, Awatef Daly, to a meeting that turned into a public reprimand. Saied sharply criticized the broadcaster’s editorial output, signalling an increasingly interventionist approach to state media. Awatef Dali continues as CEO of ETT in an interim capacity. Originally installed as interim leader in July 2021, she was formally appointed on 16 June 2024.

Despite HAICA’s nominal mandate to both oversee CEO appointments and monitor the implementation of the 2019 performance contract, the authority’s capacity to fulfil these duties has effectively been suspended under the current political climate.

Under Saied’s “exceptional measures”—widely characterised by observers as a de facto coup—ETT has come under increasingly rigid editorial control. The broadcaster is no longer permitted to host political party representatives on air, a policy corroborated by local journalists and experts interviewed for this report in May 2024 and in March 2025.

July 2025

In our State Media Monitor database, the profile of station 2M will be integrated under SNRT once the creation of the new state-run media holding is completed.

Media assets

Television: Al Aoula, Laayoune TV, Arryadia, Athaqafia, Al Maghribia, Assadissa, Aflam TV, Tamazight TV, 2M, Medi1 TV

Radio: Al Idaa Al Watania, Chaine Inter, Al Idaa Al Amazighia, Radio Mohammed VI du Saint Quran; Regional radio stations: Radio Agadir, Radio Al Hoceima, Radio Casablanca, Radio Dakhla, Radio Fez, Radio Laayoune, Radio Marrakech, Radio Meknes, Radio Oujda, Radio Tangier, Radio Tetouan

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

SNRT is fully owned by the Moroccan state and operates under the authority of the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Communication, in accordance with the 2005 Law on Audiovisual Communication. The organization’s governance structure is headed by a 12-member Administrative Council, ten of whom are appointed by various government ministries. The remaining two are elected by SNRT staff.

The highest executive authority within SNRT is the Président Directeur Général (PDG), who is appointed by the minister of communication with the approval of the King—a process that underscores the broadcaster’s strategic and symbolic importance to the state.

SNRT is led by Faïçal Laraïchi, appointed as Président‑Directeur Général (PDG). His leadership was reaffirmed in early 2025.

Over the past four years, SNRT has been at the heart of the Moroccan government’s project to consolidate its state media assets into a powerful public broadcasting group. As part of this strategy, SNRT has been acquiring majority control of 2M and Medi1TV, along with Medi1 Radio. These acquisitions were officially authorized through a decree issued in February 2024, marking a significant shift in the country’s media landscape. According to information from the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Communication, Medi1TV is being repositioned as a 24/7 news channel specializing in live broadcasting.

In January 2025, SNRT finalized two major acquisitions: becoming the sole owner of 2M and Medi1 TV, and securing an 83.6 % stake in Medi1 Radio. This marks the most significant consolidation of Morocco’s public media to date, integrating approximately 4,500 employees across all outlets into the SNRT-led public holding by mid‑2025. The full integration of 2M under the SNRT umbrella is expected to take effect upon the formal creation of the new public media holding structure, anticipated by late 2025.

Source of funding and budget

SNRT’s operations are funded through a mix of public subsidies, commercial advertising revenue, and a special levy known as the Tax for Promotion of the National Audiovisual Space (TPPAN). In 2019, SNRT had a total operating budget of MAD 1.6 billion (approx. USD 181 million), with nearly two-thirds of that amount sourced from direct state subsidies. In 2020, the budget remained largely consistent, including MAD 1.1 billion in state subsidies, MAD 260 million from the TPPAN and MAD 120 million from the FPPAAEP (a state-managed fund for the promotion of audiovisual activities).

The 2025 Finance Law allocated MAD 1.9 billion (~USD 180 million) to public media, including SNRT, for the 2023–24 period.

Editorial independence

While SNRT’s transition from RTM was originally framed as a step toward creating a more autonomous public service broadcaster, in practice, little has changed in terms of editorial freedom. SNRT remains widely perceived as a mouthpiece for the government, avoiding any criticism of state authorities or controversial political actors.

This lack of independence stems not only from direct political control, but also from a pervasive climate of self-censorship—a hallmark of Morocco’s broader media ecosystem. Legal threats, regulatory pressure, and informal warnings remain commonplace, discouraging both public and private media outlets from pushing editorial boundaries. As a result, even when political circumstances allow for slightly greater openness, SNRT journalists often err on the side of caution to avoid potential reprisals.

While SNRT maintains an ethical charter and an internal rulebook, these instruments offer no substantive guarantees of editorial independence. The broadcaster does have an internal mediator’s office, tasked with managing audience complaints. The mediator is appointed by and reports directly to the PDG, and is mandated to compile an annual report based on feedback and inquiries directed at program producers. However, the mediator’s capacity to act as an independent ombudsman remains limited, given their institutional subordination.

July 2025

Media assets

National: TV1, Canal Algerie2, TV3, TV4, TV5, TV6, TV7, TV8; TV9

Regional: TV1 Alger, TV1 Oran, TV1 Constantine, TV1 Ouargla, TV1 Bechar

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Established by ministerial decree in 1991, succeeding ENTV and originally RTA (1962), EPTV functions as a “public establishment with industrial and commercial character.”

The highest governing structure at EPTV is its Administration Council, comprised of ten members—including the Director General—five appointed by government ministries and others by state firms (like APS) or media guilds. The council is chaired by the DG, who is installed via a decree from the Ministry of Communication.

In May 2025, Fethi Saïdi was appointed acting DG of EPTV, taking over from Salim Rebahi. This continues a pattern of frequent leadership turnover; the DG role remains highly unstable and politically sensitive.

Source of funding and budget

EPTV’s finances are propped up chiefly by state subsidies, accounting for over 70% of the budget; license fees collected via electricity bills; and advertising revenue. In 2021, the government allocated DZD 6.1 billion (~US $45 million), with a similar commitment in 2022 plus an extra DZD 550 million injection. The broadcaster has not disclosed updated financial reports since.

Editorial independence

Despite the façade of charter-based autonomy, censorship remains pervasive. Journalists interviewed for this report in May 2024, November 2024 and May 2025 acknowledge editorial interference from the Ministry of Communication.

The Boukabes/Lounakel episode speaks volumes: airing Moroccan sports success—a gesture seen as innocuous by many—reportedly cost Lounakel his job. This is evidence that any coverage deviating from state orthodoxy can result in executive repercussions.

No legal safeguards or independent oversight mechanisms exist to shield EPTV journalists from political intervention—editorial control remains firmly with the Ministry of Communication.

July 2025

In the first half of 2025, Chairman Ahmed al‑Moslemany unveiled the “Maspero Platform”, an integrated digital media portal designed to centralise state radio, television, and on-demand services—stepping into Egypt’s competitive digital content space

Media assets

Television: National- Channel 1, Channel 2, Channel Egypt

Regional- Cairo Channel, Canal Channel, Alexandria Channel, Delta Channel, Upper Channel, Thebes Channel; Nile TV satellite chain, Nile TV International, Nile Sport

Radio: National- General Programme, Voice of the Arabs, Middle East Radio, European Program Radio, Cultural Radio, Youth and Spots Radio, Radio Greater Cairo, Songs Radio, News & Music Radio, Radio Masr, Al Qur’an al Karim Radio, Educational Radio, Voice of Palestine

Regional- North of Saaeed Radio, Nile Valley Radio, Middle Delta Radio, Radio Alexandria

International- Radio Cairo International, Radio Cairo World Service

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

The NMA was formalized through Law No. 178 of 2018, which delineated its responsibilities and structure, following Egypt’s 2014 constitutional reform. As a public administrative body, the NMA is underpinned by a governance framework that effectively places it under strong executive control.

The President of the Republic appoints one-third of the Authority’s nine board members directly. The remaining members are nominated by various state and semi-state institutions, including the Ministry of Finance, Cabinet, telecom regulator, Parliament, Press Syndicate, and the Union of Print and Advertising Professionals—each nominating one representative.

While this appointment structure provides a veneer of multi-institutional involvement, it ensures that the executive branch retains predominant influence over the Authority’s governance.

As of November 2024, Ahmed al‑Moslemany (aka Ahmed El‑Moslemany) replaced Hussein Zein as head of the NMA, following a presidential decree reshaping Egypt’s media governance landscape. Al‑Moslemany is an Egyptian journalist, political analyst, and television presenter known for his close ties to state institutions. He previously served as a presidential media adviser.

Source of funding and budget

The NMA is heavily reliant on public subsidies, with the state treasury contributing the highest share of its financing. According to the 2022/2023 Egyptian national budget, the Authority received a total allocation of EGP 24.9 billion (approximately USD 805 million), of which EGP 18.4 billion (USD 595 million) came directly from state coffers.

In addition to direct budgetary support, the NMA collects income from the car radio tax—a legacy levy imposed on all vehicles equipped with radio receivers. However, according to Egyptian media experts consulted in May 2024, state funding consistently accounts for over 75% of the NMA’s annual financial intake, underlining its deep dependency on government support.

Editorial independence

Since its inception, the NMA—like its predecessor ERTU—has operated under firm government editorial control. Legislative changes introduced in recent years have further tightened state oversight, granting authorities more leeway to manage and censor public media content. These reforms, widely criticised by domestic and international observers, have facilitated a broader consolidation of media control in the hands of the executive.

To date, no domestic law guarantees the editorial independence of the NMA or the outlets under its remit. On the contrary, internal editorial processes are widely believed to be closely supervised to ensure alignment with the government’s political and ideological narrative. Journalists and media experts interviewed for this report in 2024 and again in March 2025 consistently pointed to an escalation in self-censorship and content filtering practices across NMA platforms.

There is no independent oversight body to monitor or evaluate the Authority’s editorial practices, nor are there any transparency mechanisms through which the public can scrutinise its output or strategic decisions.

July 2025

Media assets

National: Radio Tunis, Radio Tunisie Culture, Radio Jeunes, Radio Panorama, RTCI;

Regional: Sfax, Monastir, Gafsa, Tataouine, Le Kef

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Radio Tunisienne was established through the same structural reform that created Télévision Tunisienne (ETT), following the 2006 split of the former Établissement de la Radiodiffusion-Télévision Tunisienne. Like ETT, it is a public institution wholly owned by the Tunisian state and governed by the Presidency of the Government, which appoints the members of its executive board. The appointment of the station’s CEO is subject to approval by HAICA (Haute Autorité Indépendante de la Communication Audiovisuelle), although this requirement has been weakened under the current political climate.

According to official sources, Henda Ben Alaya Ghribi has served as CEO of Radio Tunisienne since June 2023. She previously held several leadership roles within the public broadcasting sector, including director of national programming. Her appointment came amid heightened political scrutiny of state media, placing her at the centre of a complex and tightly controlled editorial environment.

Source of funding and budget

The broadcaster is primarily financed through direct state subsidies. It also earns a modest share of revenue through commercial advertising, but according to Tunisian media professionals interviewed in May 2024 and March 2025, this comprises only a minor portion of the total budget. As with other public media in Tunisia, the state levies a broadcasting fee, but most of the revenue from that fee is not directly channelled back to Radio Tunisienne.

Editorial independence

Historically, Radio Tunisienne functioned as a government-controlled outlet, echoing the narrative of those in power. However, in the decade following the 2011 revolution, efforts were made to transform the broadcaster into a more pluralistic and independent institution. At one point, the station followed an internal editorial charter designed to uphold journalistic integrity and autonomy. For several years, no systematic evidence of government interference in editorial content was reported.

This progress, however, has been largely reversed. Since President Kais Saied invoked a series of “exceptional measures” beginning in 2021, Radio Tunisienne—like ETT—has once again fallen under direct state control. The President dismissed the broadcaster’s CEO not once, but twice since asserting sweeping executive powers. These dismissals bypassed the previously established safeguards, notably the HAICA review requirement and the principles enshrined in the station’s editorial charter—both of which are now dormant.

Today, Radio Tunisienne operates in an environment where meaningful oversight is absent. No independent mechanisms currently exist to assess or validate the station’s editorial independence. The abandonment of its internal editorial charter and the repeated top-down interventions have signalled a return to the broadcaster’s pre-revolutionary role as a vehicle for state messaging.

July 2025

As part of a sweeping state-led media consolidation, Société Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision (SNRT)formally acquired 2M in May 2021, integrating it into a wider plan to establish a state-run media conglomerate tentatively referred to as Media Holding Public.

Although the merger process is still underway in 2025, until SNRT fully integrates 2M in its operations, we will maintain 2M’s profile in the State Media Monitor database.

Media assets

Television: 2M

Typology: See SNRT

Ownership and governance

2M’s ownership history reflects its hybrid commercial–political positioning. Originally part of ONA, Morocco’s royal business holding, the broadcaster was sold to the state in 1999, with SOREAD (Société d’Études et de Réalisations Audiovisuelles) taking majority control (72%).

The Moroccan royal family, through Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI)—now rebranded as Al Mada—continued to hold a minority stake of roughly 20% in 2M for years, maintaining a degree of influence over its governance.

In May 2021, SNRT—entirely state-owned—acquired the entirety of SOREAD’s shares, including the stakes held by Al Mada, signaling a decisive shift in 2M’s institutional identity. The move was part of a broader initiative announced by the government to bring 2M, Medi1TV, and SNRT under one public umbrella, streamlining governance and optimizing state media resources. By early January 2025, SNRT had completed the acquisitions of both 2M and Medi1TV.

Despite the acquisition, 2M maintains a separate legal and web presence, pending full integration into the SNRT-led holding. Public statements from SNRT’s CEO suggest this process will be completed in 2025, with a single administrative and editorial structure replacing the current model.

When the consolidation of the media companies into Media Holding Public is completed, we will move 2M’s profile to SNRT. In the 2023 State and Public Media Global List, we already included 2M in the SNRT’s portfolio.

Source of funding and budget

2M has historically relied heavily on advertising revenue as its primary source of income. However, the station’s operator, SOREAD, had posted sustained financial losses over several years prior to the state buyout.

The government’s 2021 announcement of a merger between SNRT, 2M, and Medi1TV was framed as a response to these inefficiencies and as a means of safeguarding the future of Moroccan public broadcasting through consolidation and restructuring.

As of 2024, financial figures specific to 2M are no longer published independently. Instead, its revenues and expenditures are expected to be gradually absorbed into the broader SNRT budget, which for 2024 was estimated at approximately MAD 1.9 billion (USD 180 million), according to Morocco’s 2025 Finance Law.

Editorial independence

Despite the absence of explicit editorial directives imposed by law, 2M has long been perceived as editorially aligned with the Moroccan state. Although it offers a relatively wide range of programming—including entertainment, cultural features, and social issues—its news and political coverage consistently avoid criticism of the authorities.

Local journalists and media analysts interviewed for this report in May 2024 and May 2025 emphasized that this self-censorship is entrenched, and has deepened following the acquisition by SNRT. The prevailing consensus is that 2M has become even more of a government mouthpiece, both through formal alignment and informal editorial practices.

No independent oversight body or external evaluation mechanism exists to audit or validate 2M’s editorial integrity. With SNRT’s full control imminent, these concerns are likely to persist or intensify unless structural reforms are introduced.

July 2025

Media assets

National: Chaine 1, Chaine 2, Chaine 3, Radio Coran, Radio Culture, Jil FM

International: Radio International

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Structure: Governed by a 13-member Administration Council—four appointed by ministries, three from its main radio channels, representatives from APS (state news agency), journalists, and other stakeholders. The Council Chair is the Director General, appointed via presidential decree; the EPRS answers to the Ministry of Communication

Leadership update: In September 2024, Adel Salakdji assumed the role of Director General, succeeding Mohamed Baghali (who took over in January 2021). This change continues the broadcaster’s pattern of politically sensitive leadership shifts.

Source of funding and budget

Radio Algérienne (EPRS) continues to operate largely on the back of substantial state support. Public funding remains the cornerstone of its financial structure, with over 85% of its annual budget drawn directly from the national treasury. Advertising revenue provides a secondary income stream, but it is modest in scale and tightly regulated.

In 2021, the broadcaster received DZD 5 billion—approximately US$ 37.4 million—in direct subsidies from the Ministry of Communication. This level of support was reaffirmed in 2022, when the Algerian government unveiled a sweeping €120 million strategic communications program aimed at bolstering pro-government messaging across the media sector. Of that package, around €32 million was earmarked for Radio Algérienne, reinforcing its role as a primary vehicle for state discourse.

As of 2024–2025, although no updated financial reports have been published by EPRS itself, it is widely understood—based on Algeria’s ballooning national budget—that public broadcasters like EPRS remain generously funded.

Editorial independence

Despite its formal designation as a public broadcaster, Radio Algérienne (EPRS) operates squarely within the grip of state power. The Ministry of Communication exerts pervasive influence over editorial content, leaving little room for independent journalism or dissenting perspectives. While the broadcaster’s founding decree outlines general principles for programming, it includes no legal guarantees of editorial autonomy—nor has any independent oversight body been established to safeguard journalistic integrity.

Interviews with local journalists and media observers carried out for this report paint a consistent picture: censorship is routine, and editorial lines are dictated by government priorities. Program schedules, coverage angles, and even the tone of broadcasts are often shaped in consultation with ministry officials. In such an environment, self-censorship becomes second nature—journalists, aware of the professional risks, often choose silence or resignation over confrontation.

Over the past year, Algeria’s broader media landscape has seen renewed tightening of state control, and Radio Algérienne is no exception. The appointment of directors general continues to be a politically sensitive affair, with rapid turnover and little transparency. In this context, EPRS does not act as a platform for public debate, but rather as a loudspeaker for the state, amplifying official narratives while sidelining uncomfortable truths. Journalists who attempt to push editorial boundaries often find themselves marginalized or forced out altogether. As of mid-2025, no legal reforms or regulatory frameworks have been introduced to loosen this grip.

July 2025

Media assets

Print: Al Ahram Publishing House (Al Ahram, Al Ahram El Dawlia, Al Ahram Al Masai, Al Ahram Weekly (English), Al Ahram Hebdo (French), Al Shabab Magazine, Al Ahram Al Iktesadi, Al Ahram Al Ryadi, Al Syasa Al Dawlia, Nesf Al Donya, Alaa Al Deen, AhwalMasrya, Al Dimoqratya, Loghat Al Asr, Al Bayt, The strategic report (Arabic), The strategic report (English), Al Ahram Strategic File)

Dar Al Tahrir Publishing House (Al Gomhuria, Al Masa, The Egyptian Gazette, The Egyptian Mail (in English), La Bourse Egyptienne (in French), Le Progrès Egyptien (in French), Al Raay, Al Koura wa el mlaaeb, Al Alem Magazine, Ketab Al Gomhouria, Aqeedaty, Horyaty)

Akhbar Al Youm Foundation (Al Akhbar, Akhbar Al Youm weekly, Akher Saa, Akhbar Al Hwadeth, Akhbar Al Nogoom, Akhbar Al Adab, Akhbar Al Ryada, Al Lewaa Al Islam, Fares magazine, Kittab Al Youm, Kittab Al Youm Al Tebi, Braille News, Litterature News, El Masaa News, Akhbar Al Youm Classic)

Dar Al Hilal Publishing House (Al Hilal)

Rose Al Yousef Foundation (Rose al Yusuf)

Dar Al Maaref; News agency:Middle East News Agency (MENA)

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

The NPA was legally established under Law No. 179 of 2018, launching operationally that year after Egypt’s wider media restructuring. Its nine-member board is appointed by the President: three directly and six through nominations from bodies like the Ministry of Finance, Cabinet, Parliament, and press syndicates. The first Chairman, Karam Gabr, served until mid-2020, when he was promoted to chair the Supreme Council of Media Regulation—and succeeded by Abdel-Sadek El-Shorbagy, who has remained at the helm since 2020.

Current Chairman, CEO-equivalent, of NPA is Abdel-Sadek El-Shorbagy. He has served as Chairman of the NPA since June 2020, reappointed in 2024 by presidential decree. El-Shorbagy is a veteran journalist and former editor-in-chief of Rose Al-Yusuf magazine, known for his alignment with state narratives and close ties to the political establishment.

Source of funding and budget

According to local media experts and journalists interviewed for this report in May 2024 and February 2025, NPA is predominantly financed via the state budget, supplemented by 5% of state press group profits. In fiscal year 2021–22, the Authority posted a loss of approximately EGP 12.6 billion (USD 800 million), with state funding covering roughly two-thirds of its costs. By mid-2024, public financial oversight continued to note this dependency, with core funding still traced to the Treasury.

Editorial independence

Consistent with its mandate, the NPA’s publications remain under tight government control. Legal reforms since 2014 have fortified state influence, and leaders within the Authority have championed its role as a “pillar of the state.”

There are no legal guarantees in place to preserve editorial autonomy, nor mechanisms for independent monitoring or accountability.

July 2025

In July 2023, SNIPE expanded its portfolio by absorbing the Dar Assabah press group, a previously confiscated entity that published four titles, thus reinforcing SNIPE’s dominant presence in the national print media landscape.

Media assets

Publishing: La Presse, Essahafa; Dar Assabah titles: Assabah, Le Temps, Al Ousboui, Sabah Al Khair

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed Media (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

SNIPE is structured as a shareholding company, with approximately 73% of its capital held by the state and affiliated public institutions such as the Tunisian Trade Office and the Tunis Afrique Presse (TAP) news agency. The company operates under the direct oversight of the Presidency of the Republic, which retains the authority to appoint the CEO. This centralized governance model has reinforced SNIPE’s status as a key arm of the state media apparatus.

In 2014, Belgacem Tayaa was appointed Chief Executive Officer of SNIPE by the Head of Government. Since then, he has led the state-owned publishing group, overseeing major titles such as La Presse de Tunisie and Essahafa. Before joining SNIPE, Tayaa served as the Contrôleur Général des Services Publics attached to the Présidence du Gouvernement—a senior audit role with broad oversight of Tunisia’s public services.

Source of funding and budget

SNIPE’s operations are sustained through a mix of commercial revenues—predominantly from advertising—and substantial government subsidies. According to company insiders interviewed in May 2024 and March 2025, and corroborated by media reports, SNIPE ranks among the most heavily state-subsidized media organizations in the country.

Between 2020 and 2022, the company received nearly TND 9 million (approx. USD 3 million) in public funds. Budget data for 2023 and 2024 remain undisclosed as of mid-2025, although local observers suggest that allocations have continued at similar levels amid tightening control over the media sector.

Editorial independence

While no formal editorial guidelines have been imposed by the government, SNIPE’s track record suggests a longstanding alignment with state narratives. The company has historically appointed editors with affiliations dating back to the Ben Ali regime, though independent analyses—including a 2020 content review commissioned for this report—did not find direct evidence of editorial interference at that time.

However, the situation has markedly deteriorated since President Kaïs Saïed implemented his “exceptional measures” in July 2021. According to testimonies from local journalists and media observers, SNIPE’s editorial line has increasingly mirrored official positions, reflecting a growing pattern of state influence. This culminated in a joint strike in April 2022 by journalists from across Tunisia’s state media—including SNIPE—protesting governmental meddling in editorial affairs.

As of June 2025, no independent oversight or regulatory body exists to safeguard or assess the editorial autonomy of SNIPE’s publications. The absence of institutional checks has raised concerns among press freedom advocates about the long-term implications for pluralism and journalistic integrity in Tunisia’s public media sphere.

July 2025