Media asset

Television: Yemen TV (run by Presidential Leadership Council), Yemen TV (run by Supreme Political Council)

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

The protracted Yemeni Civil War, which erupted in 2014, continues to cast a long shadow over the country’s media landscape. The conflict, primarily between the internationally recognized government—formerly led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and now represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—and the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), has fractured the nation’s institutions, including its once-unified state media. In the absence of a stable central authority, Yemen’s media sector has descended into a battleground of competing narratives, propaganda warfare, and extreme censorship.

During the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s media operated within a tightly controlled environment, with clearly demarcated red lines. While freedom was limited, journalists often knew the parameters within which they could function. That clarity has since dissolved. The collapse of central authority and the fragmentation of territorial control have ushered in an era of media chaos, where new red lines are not only broader but constantly shifting, depending on the faction in power.

The period of 2014–2015 marked a turning point. As the Houthis overran the capital, Sana’a, and consolidated control over large swathes of territory, media outlets sympathetic to the Hadi administration became prime targets. Numerous stations were shut down, looted, or repurposed to serve the Houthi cause. Journalists faced intimidation, abduction, or worse—many disappeared altogether. What remained of the profession became a shell of its former self, reduced to operating within the confines of factional allegiance or exile.

In March 2025, the U.S. classified the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, significantly intensifying sanctions and complicating humanitarian logistics despite a partial waiver for aid.

In such a perilous environment, neutrality has become a near-impossible stance. Journalists are often forced to align themselves with the authority—whether militia or government—that controls their region. Many have abandoned the profession altogether or fled the country, contributing to an unprecedented media brain drain.

Fragmentation of “State” Media

In a country that effectively functions as a failed state, determining what qualifies as “state media” is a fraught exercise. Today, Yemen is governed by parallel administrations:

• On one side, the Supreme Political Council led by the Houthis from Sana’a, which exercises de facto control over much of northern Yemen but lacks international recognition.
• On the other, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), formed by decree in Riyadh on 7 April 2022 with Saudi support and international recognition, which governs southern territories and serves as the successor to the Hadi government. A significant reshuffle occurred in May 2025 when Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak resigned amid political gridlock, and Salem Saleh bin Braik—former finance minister—was installed by the PLC.

Both claim legitimacy. Both operate media outlets bearing the insignia and institutional legacy of the Yemeni state.

Yemen TV—also referred to as Channel One—is emblematic of the country’s deep divisions. Originally founded in 1975 in North Yemen as the official state broadcaster, Yemen TV was historically headquartered in Sana’a and served as the regime’s primary mouthpiece. Following the Houthi takeover of Sana’a in 2015, the group seized the channel’s facilities and repurposed the station to disseminate its messaging.

In response, the Hadi administration—operating in exile from Riyadh—launched a parallel version of Yemen TV using the same name and branding. This satellite-based clone has continued to function under the control of the PLC and is broadcast from Saudi Arabia, targeting pro-government audiences within Yemen and the diaspora.

As of mid-2025, both iterations of Yemen TV remain operational, broadcasting diametrically opposed narratives under identical branding. Each is fully financed, governed, and editorially steered by its respective patron administration—the Houthis in Sana’a and the PLC in Riyadh—offering no semblance of editorial independence.

July 2025

Media assets

Radio: National- Republic of Yemen Radio; Local- Al Hudaydah Radio, Ta’izz Radio, Mukalla Radio, Hajjah Radio, Shabwah Radio, Al Mahrah Radio, Sa’dah Radio, Abyan Radio, Say’un Radio, Lahij Radio, Shabab Radio

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

The protracted Yemeni Civil War, which erupted in 2014, continues to cast a long shadow over the country’s media landscape. The conflict, primarily between the internationally recognized government—formerly led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and now represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—and the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), has fractured the nation’s institutions, including its once-unified state media. In the absence of a stable central authority, Yemen’s media sector has descended into a battleground of competing narratives, propaganda warfare, and extreme censorship.

During the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s media operated within a tightly controlled environment, with clearly demarcated red lines. While freedom was limited, journalists often knew the parameters within which they could function. That clarity has since dissolved. The collapse of central authority and the fragmentation of territorial control have ushered in an era of media chaos, where new red lines are not only broader but constantly shifting, depending on the faction in power.

The period of 2014–2015 marked a turning point. As the Houthis overran the capital, Sana’a, and consolidated control over large swathes of territory, media outlets sympathetic to the Hadi administration became prime targets. Numerous stations were shut down, looted, or repurposed to serve the Houthi cause. Journalists faced intimidation, abduction, or worse—many disappeared altogether. What remained of the profession became a shell of its former self, reduced to operating within the confines of factional allegiance or exile.

In March 2025, the U.S. classified the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, significantly intensifying sanctions and complicating humanitarian logistics despite a partial waiver for aid.

In such a perilous environment, neutrality has become a near-impossible stance. Journalists are often forced to align themselves with the authority—whether militia or government—that controls their region. Many have abandoned the profession altogether or fled the country, contributing to an unprecedented media brain drain.

Fragmentation of “State” Media

In a country that effectively functions as a failed state, determining what qualifies as “state media” is a fraught exercise. Today, Yemen is governed by parallel administrations:

• On one side, the Supreme Political Council led by the Houthis from Sana’a, which exercises de facto control over much of northern Yemen but lacks international recognition.
• On the other, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), formed by decree in Riyadh on 7 April 2022 with Saudi support and international recognition, which governs southern territories and serves as the successor to the Hadi government. A significant reshuffle occurred in May 2025 when Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak resigned amid political gridlock, and Salem Saleh bin Braik—former finance minister—was installed by the PLC.

This dual-governance structure has created parallel institutions across the board—including the media sector. Outlets under the Houthis and the PLC not only operate with opposing editorial lines but often mirror each other in branding and structure, further confusing the public and obscuring accountability.

Yemen’s media is now entirely beholden to political patrons. Outlets survive only through funding and protection provided by one of the competing governments or allied militias. In this environment, labeling any outlet as “state media” is problematic: both the SPC and PLC run institutions that function as state broadcasters—but there is no single, uncontested state to speak of.

The Yemen General Corporation for Radio and Television exemplifies this dilemma. Originally established as a national institution, it is today fully under the control of the Houthi Supreme Political Council. The corporation oversees national radio broadcasting and a network of local radio stations, all of which are editorially aligned with the Houthi administration and serve its propaganda objectives.

July 2025

Media asset

Publishing: Al-Thawra

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

The protracted Yemeni Civil War, which erupted in 2014, continues to cast a long shadow over the country’s media landscape. The conflict, primarily between the internationally recognized government—formerly led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and now represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—and the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), has fractured the nation’s institutions, including its once-unified state media. In the absence of a stable central authority, Yemen’s media sector has descended into a battleground of competing narratives, propaganda warfare, and extreme censorship.

During the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s media operated within a tightly controlled environment, with clearly demarcated red lines. While freedom was limited, journalists often knew the parameters within which they could function. That clarity has since dissolved. The collapse of central authority and the fragmentation of territorial control have ushered in an era of media chaos, where new red lines are not only broader but constantly shifting, depending on the faction in power.

The period of 2014–2015 marked a turning point. As the Houthis overran the capital, Sana’a, and consolidated control over large swathes of territory, media outlets sympathetic to the Hadi administration became prime targets. Numerous stations were shut down, looted, or repurposed to serve the Houthi cause. Journalists faced intimidation, abduction, or worse—many disappeared altogether. What remained of the profession became a shell of its former self, reduced to operating within the confines of factional allegiance or exile.

In March 2025, the U.S. classified the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, significantly intensifying sanctions and complicating humanitarian logistics despite a partial waiver for aid.

In such a perilous environment, neutrality has become a near-impossible stance. Journalists are often forced to align themselves with the authority—whether militia or government—that controls their region. Many have abandoned the profession altogether or fled the country, contributing to an unprecedented media brain drain.

Fragmentation of “State” Media

In a country that effectively functions as a failed state, determining what qualifies as “state media” is a fraught exercise. Today, Yemen is governed by parallel administrations:

• On one side, the Supreme Political Council led by the Houthis from Sana’a, which exercises de facto control over much of northern Yemen but lacks international recognition.
• On the other, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), formed by decree in Riyadh on 7 April 2022 with Saudi support and international recognition, which governs southern territories and serves as the successor to the Hadi government. A significant reshuffle occurred in May 2025 when Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak resigned amid political gridlock, and Salem Saleh bin Braik—former finance minister—was installed by the PLC.

Both claim legitimacy. Both operate media outlets bearing the insignia and institutional legacy of the Yemeni state.

Founded in 1962, Al-Thawra (Arabic for “The Revolution”) is one of Yemen’s oldest and once most respected daily newspapers. Over the decades, it evolved into a flagship institution of state-affiliated journalism in the capital, Sana’a. However, like much of Yemen’s media landscape, it underwent a dramatic transformation following the political and military upheaval of 2015.

In early 2015, after Houthi forces seized control of Sana’a, Al-Thawra Press and Publishing was swiftly taken over by the new de facto authorities. Since then, the outlet has been fully controlled—both editorially and institutionally—by the Supreme Political Council (SPC), the governing body established by the Houthi movement in the absence of internationally recognized governance in northern Yemen.

Today, Al-Thawra operates as an unambiguous mouthpiece of the Houthi regime. Its coverage is tightly aligned with the movement’s ideological and geopolitical narratives, serving as a key platform for official propaganda. The paper routinely echoes the SPC’s positions on domestic governance, regional conflicts, and global affairs—particularly in amplifying hostility toward Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel, and voicing strong support for Palestinian resistance and Iranian-aligned movements.

In 2025, amid the intensification of the regional conflict—including Israeli and U.S. airstrikes on Houthi-controlled infrastructure—Al-Thawra’s role as a wartime propaganda vehicle has only deepened. Its print editions and online presence frequently carry front-page coverage glorifying Houthi military resilience, denouncing Western interventionism, and commemorating fallen fighters. Despite infrastructure disruptions caused by air raids, the paper has maintained continuous publication, aided by robust digital channels and its central place within the Houthi communication apparatus.

Notably, Al-Thawra remains one of the few functioning print dailies in northern Yemen, where newsprint shortages, electricity outages, and the economic collapse have devastated traditional media. Its survival is largely due to direct subsidies from the SPC and its embeddedness within the Houthi-controlled state apparatus.

July 2025

Media asset

Publishing: Al-Jumhuryah

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

The protracted Yemeni Civil War, which erupted in 2014, continues to cast a long shadow over the country’s media landscape. The conflict, primarily between the internationally recognized government—formerly led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and now represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—and the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), has fractured the nation’s institutions, including its once-unified state media. In the absence of a stable central authority, Yemen’s media sector has descended into a battleground of competing narratives, propaganda warfare, and extreme censorship.

During the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s media operated within a tightly controlled environment, with clearly demarcated red lines. While freedom was limited, journalists often knew the parameters within which they could function. That clarity has since dissolved. The collapse of central authority and the fragmentation of territorial control have ushered in an era of media chaos, where new red lines are not only broader but constantly shifting, depending on the faction in power.

The period of 2014–2015 marked a turning point. As the Houthis overran the capital, Sana’a, and consolidated control over large swathes of territory, media outlets sympathetic to the Hadi administration became prime targets. Numerous stations were shut down, looted, or repurposed to serve the Houthi cause. Journalists faced intimidation, abduction, or worse—many disappeared altogether. What remained of the profession became a shell of its former self, reduced to operating within the confines of factional allegiance or exile.

In March 2025, the U.S. classified the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, significantly intensifying sanctions and complicating humanitarian logistics despite a partial waiver for aid.

In such a perilous environment, neutrality has become a near-impossible stance. Journalists are often forced to align themselves with the authority—whether militia or government—that controls their region. Many have abandoned the profession altogether or fled the country, contributing to an unprecedented media brain drain.

Fragmentation of “State” Media

In a country that effectively functions as a failed state, determining what qualifies as “state media” is a fraught exercise. Today, Yemen is governed by parallel administrations:

• On one side, the Supreme Political Council led by the Houthis from Sana’a, which exercises de facto control over much of northern Yemen but lacks international recognition.
• On the other, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), formed by decree in Riyadh on 7 April 2022 with Saudi support and international recognition, which governs southern territories and serves as the successor to the Hadi government. A significant reshuffle occurred in May 2025 when Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak resigned amid political gridlock, and Salem Saleh bin Braik—former finance minister—was installed by the PLC.

Both claim legitimacy. Both operate media outlets bearing the insignia and institutional legacy of the Yemeni state.

Founded in 1962 and based in the strategic city of Taiz, Al-Jumhuryah has long been one of Yemen’s most influential newspapers. Originally conceived as a state-aligned publication, its editorial line has consistently championed the ruling regime of the day—often toeing the official line with little deviation.

The eruption of the Yemeni Civil War in 2015 brought the newspaper’s operations to an abrupt halt. With Taiz caught in the crossfire between Houthi forces and government-aligned troops, Al-Jumhuryah was forced to shut down entirely. The suspension lasted nearly four years, during which time much of the city’s media infrastructure was destroyed or repurposed for wartime propaganda.

In 2018, the paper was relaunched under the aegis of the internationally recognized, Saudi-backed government then led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and now succeeded by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Since its revival, Al-Jumhuryah has resumed its role as a staunchly pro-government outlet, operating under the editorial supervision of the PLC. It primarily publishes digital content, a shift necessitated by the collapse of Yemen’s print distribution networks and the fragile security situation in Taiz.

Historically, the newspaper has walked a fine line between loyalism and cautious reformism. During the 2011 uprisings, Al-Jumhuryah notably condemned critical coverage of the protests from other state media, while paradoxically voicing support for peaceful demonstrations—a rare move at the time for a government-aligned outlet.

By mid-2025, Al-Jumhuryah continues to operate, though in a reduced and largely symbolic capacity. Its editorial focus remains firmly aligned with the PLC’s objectives, particularly in framing the conflict as a struggle against Iranian-backed Houthi militias and promoting the legitimacy of the PLC’s leadership.

The outlet plays a key role in Taiz’s media environment, where it competes with Houthi disinformation efforts and local militia propaganda. However, its influence is curtailed by a lack of resources, intermittent electricity, and ongoing insecurity in the region. The newsroom operates under precarious conditions, with many journalists working remotely or in exile.

In 2025, Al-Jumhuryah has served as a platform for disseminating updates on the humanitarian crisis in the south, including coverage of Saudi relief aid and criticism of Houthi missile attacks on civilian targets in Taiz and nearby governorates. Despite these contributions, the paper is often criticized by media watchdogs for echoing official narratives without offering critical scrutiny of PLC policy failures, internal power struggles, or corruption allegations.

July 2025

Media asset

News agency: SABA (run by the Houthis), SABA (run by Supreme Political Council)

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

The Yemeni Civil War, which began in 2014 and opposes the government led by Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Houthis, an Islamic armed movement, has had a massive impact on the Yemeni media. In a country ravaged by war where both fighting factions (and some others) claim to be the official government, it is extremely difficult for journalists to operate independently. All of them are used as instruments of one of the parties in the war.

The media sector has transitioned from a period of harsh restrictions imposed by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (when journalists at least understood the limits within which they could operate) to a time of chaotic infighting, during which the red lines that journalists are not allowed to cross have expanded.

The situation worsened the most in 2014-2015 when the Houthis occupied the capital city of Sanaa and bolstered their positions elsewhere in the country as they challenged the Hadi presidency. As a result, many of the media outlets that supported President Hadi had been attacked, and many eventually had to shut down. Journalists who continued to report suffered undesired consequences. Examples of journalists who disappeared have proliferated.

In such an environment, the journalists who continued doing their jobs practically accepted being part of a propaganda game (which is what the entire Yemeni media sector is at the moment) where they have to choose a position with or against the local government or militias controlling the areas where they live. Since the start of the war, a large number of journalists have stopped working, either by changing their activity or leaving the country.

Given the extreme political instability in Yemen following nearly six years of bloody confrontations between the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Houthi movement, the status of the media in Yemen is changing rapidly, depending on who gets to control the media outlets.

All media in Yemen today are in a dire state, relying almost entirely on financing from one of the parties in the conflict. In such an environment (a classic example of a failed state), classifying Yemeni state media is an extremely complex process. At first sight, all media outlets in Yemen are politically backed. However, agreeing on what constitutes state control is almost disputable in Yemen simply because the country doesn’t have an internally accepted government (a situation similar to Libya).

The disintegration of Yemen’s central authority has spawned a surreal media phenomenon: duplicated state institutions. One of the most emblematic cases is the Yemen News Agency (SABA), which now exists in two rival incarnations—each claiming to be the official national news service of Yemen.

Following the outbreak of the civil war and the Houthi seizure of Sana’a in 2015, the original SABA headquarters fell under the control of the Houthi-led Supreme Political Council (SPC). Since then, the Houthis have maintained a fully operational version of the agency, publishing official statements, dispatches, and propaganda aligned with their political and military agenda. The Houthi-run SABA plays a key role in disseminating wartime narratives, glorifying resistance against foreign “aggression,” and reinforcing the movement’s legitimacy.

In response, the internationally recognized government, now represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), established a parallel version of the agency. Operating primarily from Aden and Riyadh, the PLC-run SABA publishes official communiqués, international diplomatic updates, and reports that bolster the legitimacy of the PLC while condemning Houthi actions as terrorist and illegitimate.

Each version of SABA functions as a state-controlled news agency, fully financed, governed, and editorially directed by its respective ruling authority. There is no pretense of editorial independence on either side. The SABA agency in Sana’a is institutionally embedded within the Houthi governance framework, while the version in Aden/Riyadhanswers to the PLC’s Ministry of Information. Both publish in Arabic and English and maintain active websites and social media feeds, often pushing conflicting versions of the same event.

This duplicity not only sows confusion among Yemeni audiences and international observers but also illustrates the profound institutional fragmentation caused by the war. Competing headlines, contradictory casualty figures, and ideologically colored reporting are now standard fare—turning SABA from a national newswire into a split-stage for information warfare.

As of mid-2025, the Houthi-run SABA remains a central pillar of the group’s information strategy. It has continued uninterrupted despite aerial bombardments by U.S., Israeli, and UK forces in retaliation for Red Sea attacks. SABA’s editorial output has ramped up coverage of international “aggressors,” promoting the Houthi narrative of resilience and sovereignty. In April and May 2025, SABA reported extensively on civilian casualties following U.S. airstrikes on northern Yemen, including the controversial bombing of a migrant detention center in Saada.

Meanwhile, the PLC-aligned SABA focuses on regional diplomacy, development projects in southern Yemen, and Saudi and Emirati aid initiatives. It also publishes statements from Rashad al-Alimi and other PLC members condemning Houthi missile strikes on civilian areas, and calling for tighter international sanctions following the Houthi’s U.S. terrorism designation in March 2025.

July 2025