Domestically, IRIB runs a broad array of channels tailored to Iranian audiences, while internationally it serves as the voice of the regime through a number of language-specific outlets. Its global media arms include: Press TV, an English and French-language news and documentary channel; Al-Alam, an Arabic-language news broadcaster with a complementary digital platform, Alalam News; Sahar TV, under the Sahar Universal Network, airing in Azeri, Kurdish, Urdu, and Balkan languages; Al Kawthar, an Arabic religious and cultural channel aimed at MENA audiences; HispanTV, which targets Spanish-speaking audiences, especially in Latin America; Jam-e Jam World Network, catering to the Iranian diaspora with content tailored for Iranians abroad.

IRIB also manages a comprehensive network of domestic radio channels and operates IRIB World Service, Iran’s international broadcasting wing, delivering programming in 32 languages. In the print sector, it publishes Jam-e Jam, a major Persian-language newspaper. According to on-the-ground sources, the organization employs approximately 46,000 staff members.

Media assets

Television: National– IRIB TV: TV1, TV2, TV3, TV4, TV5, Amoozesh, Quran TV, Namayesh TV, TV Nasim, Ofogh TV, Salamat TV, Nahal TV, DocTV, Varzesh TV, Pooya TV, Tamasha TV, Omid TV, Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (IRINN); International– Press TV; Al-Alam, Sahar TV, Al Kawthar, Hispan TV, Jam Jam World, iFilm, Al-Quds TV; Regional-Abadan, East Azerbaijan, Western Azerbaijan, Ardabil. Esfahan, Alborz, Ilam, Bushehr, Southern Korasan, Khorasan Razavi, North Korasan, Persian Gulf, Khuzestan

Radio: National– Tehran Radio, Radio Recitation, Payam, Iran Radio Network, Economics Radio Network, Radio Ava, Goftu Radio Network, Quran Radio Network, Farhang Radio, Saba Radio, Health Radio, Young Radio, Sports Radio, Show Radio, Education Radio; International- Pars Today

Print: Jam-e Jam

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

IRIB functions as a fully state-owned enterprise, tightly controlled by the political establishment. In line with Article 175 of Iran’s Constitution, the head of IRIB is appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The organization’s nominal Supervisory Board comprises representatives from the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. However, insiders and media observers consulted for this report consistently point out that real authority lies with IRIB’s head—a position often reserved for trusted allies of the Supreme Leader.

In October 2021, Payman Jebelli, a figure closely aligned with Khamenei’s inner circle and affiliated with hardline factions, was appointed director of IRIB. Jebelli’s tenure has coincided with intensified ideological messaging and further centralization of media control.

Source of funding and budget

IRIB is financed through a combination of state subsidies and advertising revenue. Officially, ad sales account for approximately 50% of its annual budget, although much of this revenue comes from other state-controlled entities. Moreover, under Iranian law, all advertising income is ultimately subject to state appropriation.

Estimates from domestic analysts and publicly available data suggest IRIB’s total annual budget hovers around US$ 1 billion. In 2022, it earned roughly US$ 560 million in advertising, again largely via state-linked firms. That same year, IRIB received US$ 200 million from the national budget—an amount comparable to the total public sector wage bill. In 2023, it received an additional US$ 158 million in government allocations.

Most notably, in 2025, the Iranian government tripled IRIB’s annual budget, allocating IRR 240 trillion (approx. US$ 480 million)—a landmark increase driven, according to observers, by pressure from the ultraconservative Paydari Party, which has gained significant influence in the Iranian parliament. This surge in funding is not linked to audience performance; in fact, IRIB’s own research reportedly shows its viewership has plummeted from 57% to 11%, as more Iranians turn to satellite TV and social media platforms for news and entertainment. Another source indicated that the budget of the IRIB in 2025 (expressed in tomans) was 35 million (which means some IRR 350 trillion or US$ 564 million) and surpassed the combined budgets of at least ten ministries.

Editorial independence

IRIB’s editorial stance is fundamentally aligned with the goals and ideological orientation of the Iranian regime. It serves as a state propaganda arm rather than an independent news organization. Internal directives guide journalists on acceptable topics and prescribed narratives, with heavy censorship of dissenting views.

Investigations conducted in 2023 and 2024 by the Media and Journalism Research Center indicate that IRIB staff routinely receive instructions on coverage tone and subject matter, and that foreign films or TV content are subject to strict editing to remove “immoral” elements, as determined by Islamic codes. An Asia Times report characterized IRIB as “infamous for its explicit censorship of critical debate,” reflecting broader public perception of the broadcaster.

While IRIB’s own charter nominally encourages it to “welcome criticism,” the broader document reinforces its primary mandate: to uphold the ideological principles of the Islamic Republic and to disseminate content that reflects the Supreme Leader’s vision and promotes the “supremacy of Islam.” The charter thus fails to guarantee editorial autonomy in any meaningful sense.

To date, no independent oversight body or external evaluation mechanism has been identified that would ensure or even assess IRIB’s editorial independence.

July 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Tehran Times

News agency: Mehr News Agency (MNA), Tasnim News Agency

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

IIDO is a state-controlled entity whose governance is tightly tethered to the apex of Iran’s political and religious hierarchy. Its director is appointed directly by the Supreme Leader of Iran, underscoring the organization’s central role in propagating state ideology. Since 2018, Hujjat al-Islam Mohammad Qomi has helmed IIDO, having been personally appointed by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Qomi is a senior Shia cleric with deep connections to the political establishment and a record of spearheading ideological and cultural initiatives aligned with the regime’s objectives.

While the organization itself reports to the Supreme Leader, its media arms also reflect internal alignments with powerful factions within the state. Most notably, Tasnim News Agency is widely recognized for its affiliation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—a military and ideological force that exerts significant influence over both domestic affairs and regional geopolitical policy. Tasnim’s editorial line often mirrors the IRGC’s messaging priorities, particularly on security, regional intervention, and resistance discourse.

Source of funding and budget

IIDO does not disclose detailed financial statements or budget reports. Nevertheless, Iranian media observers and local experts with knowledge of internal operations suggest that the organization’s media activities are heavily subsidized. It is estimated that up to 75% of its operating costs are covered by state allocations, with the remainder drawn from advertising revenues—much of which originates from other state-linked institutions and government-controlled companies. This structure makes IIDO’s media arms financially dependent on public funding, reinforcing their alignment with state interests.

Editorial independence

Despite occasional claims to editorial autonomy, IIDO’s affiliated outlets serve as direct instruments of the Iranian state’s communication strategy. The Tehran Times proclaims its role as “a loud voice of the Islamic Revolution and the loudspeaker of the oppressed people of the world,” distancing itself rhetorically from government affiliation. However, in practice, the newspaper functions as an English-language propaganda platform, echoing the state’s positions and framing aligned with Iran’s foreign policy and ideological narratives.

MNA, likewise, acknowledges its institutional connection to government authorities, which ensures privileged access to official information but also severely constrains editorial independence. Tasnim, the most overtly ideological of the three, states its mission as defending the Islamic Revolution from “negative media propaganda”—a phrase commonly used in Iran to discredit critical or foreign media outlets. Its reporting is consistently aligned with the IRGC’s worldview and serves as a key node in the state’s narrative-building infrastructure.

To date, no independent regulatory framework, statute, or oversight body exists to safeguard or verify the editorial independence of IIDO’s media operations. Nor is there any transparency mechanism that would allow public scrutiny of governance or journalistic standards. International watchdogs and local press freedom advocates have routinely classified these outlets as state-aligned or captured, pointing to their role in reproducing government messaging and suppressing dissenting viewpoints.

July 2025

Media assets

News agency: IRNA

Print: Iran, Iran Daily, Alvefagh, Irane Varzeshi, Irane Sepid

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

IRNA operates under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which appoints the agency’s leadership. The current Managing Director, Ali Naderi, was appointed in October 2021 during a restructuring of the country’s state media architecture. A staunch ultraconservative and loyalist to Iran’s ruling elite, Naderi publicly stated upon assuming the role that IRNA would serve as a news agency of the political system—a phrase that, in the Iranian context, unequivocally refers to the ideological and political directives of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Under Naderi’s leadership, IRNA has further entrenched its role as a governmental megaphone, aligning its editorial stance with hardline policies and the broader objectives of the Islamic Republic’s leadership. There is no pluralism in editorial appointments, and governance remains opaque, with no public accountability mechanisms in place.

Source of funding and budget

IRNA is funded through a combination of state allocations and limited commercial income, including advertising and content syndication. However, the agency does not disclose its financial reports or operating budgets. According to local media analysts and insiders consulted in April 2024, over 80% of IRNA’s annual budget is sourced directly from the government. This substantial financial dependence ensures the agency’s alignment with state priorities and limits any operational independence.

In 2025, while the precise figures for IRNA’s budget have not been made public, Iran’s national budget showed a marked increase in allocations for state-run propaganda and ideological institutions. This trend—also seen in the significant budget expansion for IRIB and affiliated bodies—suggests that IRNA’s funding has likely followed a similar upward trajectory. Despite this, civil society experts have criticized the Ministry of Planning and Budget for its refusal to publish the full financial tables for the current fiscal year, thus shielding agencies like IRNA from fiscal scrutiny.

Editorial independence

IRNA functions as the Iranian government’s primary instrument for shaping public discourse and international messaging. It consistently promotes the regime’s political narratives, economic policies, and foreign policy positions while marginalizing dissenting voices. The agency’s coverage is often indistinguishable from state communiqués, with its news products frequently echoing official speeches, military statements, and ideological declarations without independent analysis or counterpoint.

While IRNA occasionally covers social and economic issues, these are invariably framed to reinforce state legitimacy or to deflect criticism onto external actors such as Western governments or regional adversaries. Editorial independence is virtually non-existent. Indeed, IRNA has been routinely characterized by both domestic critics and international media watchdogs as a propaganda vehicle of the Islamic Republic.

To date, no domestic statute, regulatory safeguard, or third-party oversight body has been established to monitor or validate the editorial integrity of IRNA or its affiliated publications. The agency remains fully embedded in the state apparatus, lacking both transparency and autonomy.

July 2025

Over the years, Fars has evolved into one of the regime’s most visible instruments of information warfare, frequently accused of peddling disinformation and ideological messaging aligned with hardline interests.

Media assets

Fars News Agency

State Media Monitor Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

According to local media analysts and multiple international assessments, Fars News Agency is effectively controlled by the IRGC, Iran’s elite military and intelligence organization. While its formal legal structure remains opaque, the agency’s leadership and editorial line are widely understood to be vetted by the Guards. Appointments at senior editorial levels are reportedly made with IRGC oversight, ensuring alignment with its political and ideological objectives.

There is no publicly available corporate or institutional governance information, nor any evidence of oversight by an independent regulatory body. Fars operates in a legal grey zone between quasi-state control and private management, giving it operational latitude but binding it ideologically to the IRGC.

In February 2020, the United States Department of the Treasury designated Fars News Agency under Executive Order 13876, placing it on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. The Treasury cited Fars’ deep affiliation with the IRGC and its role in spreading “malign influence and disinformation” both within Iran and abroad. This designation freezes any assets Fars may hold under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibits U.S. persons or entities from conducting any transactions with it. The designation has severely restricted its access to international platforms and financial tools, though Fars continues to publish online and operate through Iranian infrastructure.

Payam Tirandaz is the Managing Director (General Director) of Fars News Agency. Known for his close affiliations with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Tirandaz plays a key role in shaping the agency’s strategic messaging and operational direction. Before assuming leadership at Fars, Tirandaz held several roles within the state-controlled media ecosystem, including editorial and managerial positions at IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) and various IRGC-linked cultural organizations. He is also believed to be affiliated with Iran’s hardline media networks and ideological institutions.

Since his appointment, Tirandaz has overseen the expansion of Fars’ multilingual operations, the tightening of editorial alignment with IRGC policy lines, and the agency’s heightened role in regional disinformation campaigns, particularly amid tensions in Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf. Tirandaz is also known for his public support of Iran’s Supreme Leader and the “Resistance Axis”—a political-military alliance led by Tehran.

Source of funding and budget

Based on the assessments of local experts consulted for this report in April 2024, Fars News Agency is primarily state-funded, with most of its budget sourced from government subsidies, likely funneled through IRGC-affiliated institutions. The agency’s estimated operational budget was approximately USD 9 million in 2023.

While precise financial details remain unavailable due to lack of transparency in Iranian media financing, the consistent quality of its output, including multilingual operations and overseas reporting, indicates continued access to significant public funding.

Editorial independence

In practice, Fars News Agency lacks editorial autonomy, operating as a tool of state propaganda. Its output is tightly controlled and aligned with the ideological line of the IRGC and Iran’s broader security and intelligence apparatus.

Key concerns include: disinformation and bias (Fars has a long-standing reputation for publishing inflammatory content, conspiracy theories, and ideologically driven coverage. It frequently targets reformist voices, civil society actors, and foreign governments hostile to Iran); sanctioned propaganda (the U.S. government explicitly cited the agency’s role in extremist messaging and disinformation as justification for its SDN designation); and absence of oversight (there is no domestic statute or independent regulatory framework that guarantees or verifies Fars’ editorial independence).

The agency operates within a heavily censored media ecosystem, where criticism of state policies—especially those linked to the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, or foreign policy—can lead to repression or prosecution. In this context, Fars functions not as a watchdog, but as a megaphone for the ruling establishment.

July 2025

Media assets

News agency: ISNA

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

ISNA is formally state-licensed and functions under the aegis of government regulation, like all media entities in Iran. However, it distinguishes itself through its operational structure: much of its reporting and editorial work is carried out by university students, who serve as editors, correspondents, and content producers. This student-led model gives the agency a tone and outlook that often diverges from more hardline, state-aligned platforms.

Despite this grassroots appearance, ISNA is embedded within Iran’s institutional media apparatus. It operates under the supervision of official authorities and its continued existence depends on adhering to regulatory boundaries defined by the regime. Appointments to key leadership roles are not fully autonomous, and ultimate editorial responsibility rests with individuals vetted by state bodies.

Source of funding and budget

No official or transparent budgetary documentation is available for ISNA. However, according to local analysts interviewed in April 2024, the agency sustains its operations largely through annual state subsidies, which reportedly constitute the majority of its funding. In addition to this public financing, ISNA is partially supported by a domestic student-affiliated NGO, though the nature and extent of this support remain opaque.

Given recent trends in Iran’s national budget, which has favored increased funding for ideological and media institutions in 2025, it is likely that ISNA continues to benefit from public resources—though probably not at the scale of more prominent state outlets such as IRNA or Tasnim.

Editorial independence

ISNA is often characterized in Western media analyses as one of Iran’s more moderate news agencies, offering relatively balanced coverage on cultural, social, and academic issues. While it avoids overt criticism of the Supreme Leader or the foundational tenets of the Islamic Republic, it has at times pushed the envelope on political and institutional transparency—especially during periods of relative reformist ascendancy.

The agency’s editorial stance has historically leaned toward the reformist camp, with an affinity for figures such as former President Mohammad Khatami. Despite these leanings, ISNA has faced pressure from conservative elements within the state. One of the most prominent examples was the conviction of its director following the publication of an interview that was critical of Iran’s intelligence services abroad. This high-profile case underscored the risks ISNA faces when stepping outside regime-sanctioned narratives.

ISNA continued to maintain a degree of editorial latitude, particularly on domestic and social issues. That said, it consistently operates under the shadow of potential reprisals—legal, financial, or administrative—should it overstep politically sensitive boundaries. In the past year, ISNA has lost its editorial freedom in the context of the conflict in Gaza, which prompted us to relegate the outlet to the State-Controlled (SC) category in our taxonomy.

July 2025

Media assets

Newspaper: Kayhan Al Arabi

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Kayhan is published by the Keyhan Institute, an entity closely affiliated with Iran’s ruling elite. According to multiple local sources and media scholars consulted for this report, the Supreme Leader of Iran exerts direct influence over the newspaper, including the power to appoint its Editor-in-Chief.

The current Editor-in-Chief, Hossein Shariatmadari, is a longtime loyalist of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, serving in the position since 1993. He is considered the Supreme Leader’s “representative” in the press, and his editorial direction is understood to reflect Khamenei’s personal and political worldview. This structure places Kayhan squarely within the orbit of Iran’s theocratic command center, leaving little doubt about the political loyalties shaping its editorial policy.

Source of funding and budget

There is no publicly available data regarding Kayhan’s financial statements, revenue, or operational budget.

However, according to local experts consulted in April 2024, the newspaper operates largely through government subsidies, channeled via cultural and media institutions aligned with the Office of the Supreme Leader. Advertising revenue plays a marginal role, as Kayhan’s readership and messaging are ideologically niche and state-supported.

The financial opacity surrounding Kayhan mirrors broader trends in Iran’s media ecosystem, particularly among ideologically rigid outlets protected by the ruling elite.

Editorial independence

Kayhan is not independent by any measure of international journalistic standards. Its editorial line is closely synchronized with the Supreme Leader’s political and ideological priorities. The paper routinely targets reformist politicians, independent journalists, civil society groups, and foreign governments, especially those perceived as adversarial to Iran’s conservative establishment.

In a notorious 2022 editorial, Editor-in-Chief Hossein Shariatmadari openly declared that Kayhan’s positions are “shared by the Supreme Leader”, underscoring the paper’s function as a quasi-official organ of the regime.

Its coverage frequently veers into incendiary rhetoric, with headlines and op-eds designed to inflame rather than inform, catering primarily to a religiously conservative and nationalist readership.

There is no domestic legal framework, institutional check, or independent oversight body that guarantees editorial autonomy for Kayhan or evaluates its content according to professional journalistic ethics.

July 2025

A second category includes a host of media entities either directly affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or owned through its extensive network of front companies. While these outlets are not yet profiled in the Iran country folder, we have catalogued them under the MENA section of our Global State Media List, as they fit our definition of captured private media—outlets nominally independent but deeply intertwined with state or parastatal entities.

Throughout the past decade, we have compiled a broader sample of outlets we suspect to be state-controlled, but which remain largely opaque, even to our local experts. These entities often operate with limited reach or influence and are virtually invisible in terms of verifiable ownership or funding documentation. Due to this lack of data—and their minimal relevance to the wider media ecosystem—we have not included them in the main database, although we continue to monitor and collect information on them. This group includes: Iran Book News Agency (IBNA), Iranian Agriculture News Agency, Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA) – nominally owned by a government-backed trade union, Iran Metropolises News Agency (IMNA), Icana News Agency and Pupils Association News Agency (PANA).

We have also reviewed a range of state-controlled news websites that have grown in prominence, but do not qualify as journalistic outlets. These platforms are often directly tied to military or paramilitary organizations and primarily function as propaganda arms rather than media sources in the conventional sense. Examples include Sepah News (IRGC official news site) and Basij News (the media arm of the Basij militia).

Observers and digital forensics experts consulted for this report continue to highlight the Iranian regime’s extensive use of online influence operations, often deploying dozens of temporary websites and social media accounts aimed at spreading regime-aligned narratives both at home and abroad. Many of these operations are short-lived, with platforms frequently being deactivated by social media companies for coordinated inauthentic behavior or disinformation campaigns.

Experts also affirm that the Iranian state has been pursuing a long-term strategic objective of expanding its media footprint internationally, particularly in Western and regional markets. This campaign includes the creation of shell companies and proxy news portals targeting specific countries—especially the United States. In 2024, the American government once again sanctioned Bayan Gostar, a front entity alleged to be involved in orchestrating such propaganda operations. This follows earlier revelations, including the 2018 Reuters investigation that exposed the role of the International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) in managing hundreds of such portals. However, we have not included these sites in the State Media Monitor due to their ephemeral nature—many have since disappeared following enforcement actions by online platforms.

Meanwhile, on the domestic front, Iran’s media governance model has shown signs of both centralization and contraction. In 2021, the government began restructuring its state media leadership, appointing individuals closely aligned with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei to key positions. In parallel, Tehran announced in early 2022 the closure of several foreign news bureaux operated by state media, citing fiscal constraints linked to the country’s deteriorating economic situation. This trend has continued: in 2025, while foreign-facing operations have been further scaled back, domestic investments in media—particularly in IRIB—have intensified. The sharp increase in IRIB’s annual budget in 2025, reportedly tripling to IRR 240 trillion (or even more to IRR 350 trillion, according to other sources), sparked internal criticism among journalists and civil servants, who viewed the move as politically motivated rather than performance-based.

These intersecting developments—budget reallocations, shrinking international reach, heightened domestic control, and persistent efforts to influence foreign audiences through covert digital campaigns—are reshaping the architecture of Iran’s state-aligned media. The full implications of these shifts remain to be seen, but they signal a clear trend toward the consolidation of media power under the direct control of the Islamic Republic’s ruling elite.

July 2025