Media asset

Television: Yemen TV (run by Presidential Leadership Council), Yemen TV (run by Supreme Political Council)

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

The protracted Yemeni Civil War, which erupted in 2014, continues to cast a long shadow over the country’s media landscape. The conflict, primarily between the internationally recognized government—formerly led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and now represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—and the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), has fractured the nation’s institutions, including its once-unified state media. In the absence of a stable central authority, Yemen’s media sector has descended into a battleground of competing narratives, propaganda warfare, and extreme censorship.

During the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s media operated within a tightly controlled environment, with clearly demarcated red lines. While freedom was limited, journalists often knew the parameters within which they could function. That clarity has since dissolved. The collapse of central authority and the fragmentation of territorial control have ushered in an era of media chaos, where new red lines are not only broader but constantly shifting, depending on the faction in power.

The period of 2014–2015 marked a turning point. As the Houthis overran the capital, Sana’a, and consolidated control over large swathes of territory, media outlets sympathetic to the Hadi administration became prime targets. Numerous stations were shut down, looted, or repurposed to serve the Houthi cause. Journalists faced intimidation, abduction, or worse—many disappeared altogether. What remained of the profession became a shell of its former self, reduced to operating within the confines of factional allegiance or exile.

In March 2025, the U.S. classified the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, significantly intensifying sanctions and complicating humanitarian logistics despite a partial waiver for aid.

In such a perilous environment, neutrality has become a near-impossible stance. Journalists are often forced to align themselves with the authority—whether militia or government—that controls their region. Many have abandoned the profession altogether or fled the country, contributing to an unprecedented media brain drain.

Fragmentation of “State” Media

In a country that effectively functions as a failed state, determining what qualifies as “state media” is a fraught exercise. Today, Yemen is governed by parallel administrations:

• On one side, the Supreme Political Council led by the Houthis from Sana’a, which exercises de facto control over much of northern Yemen but lacks international recognition.
• On the other, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), formed by decree in Riyadh on 7 April 2022 with Saudi support and international recognition, which governs southern territories and serves as the successor to the Hadi government. A significant reshuffle occurred in May 2025 when Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak resigned amid political gridlock, and Salem Saleh bin Braik—former finance minister—was installed by the PLC.

Both claim legitimacy. Both operate media outlets bearing the insignia and institutional legacy of the Yemeni state.

Yemen TV—also referred to as Channel One—is emblematic of the country’s deep divisions. Originally founded in 1975 in North Yemen as the official state broadcaster, Yemen TV was historically headquartered in Sana’a and served as the regime’s primary mouthpiece. Following the Houthi takeover of Sana’a in 2015, the group seized the channel’s facilities and repurposed the station to disseminate its messaging.

In response, the Hadi administration—operating in exile from Riyadh—launched a parallel version of Yemen TV using the same name and branding. This satellite-based clone has continued to function under the control of the PLC and is broadcast from Saudi Arabia, targeting pro-government audiences within Yemen and the diaspora.

As of mid-2025, both iterations of Yemen TV remain operational, broadcasting diametrically opposed narratives under identical branding. Each is fully financed, governed, and editorially steered by its respective patron administration—the Houthis in Sana’a and the PLC in Riyadh—offering no semblance of editorial independence.

July 2025

Media assets

Television: Dubai TV, Sama Dubai, Dubai One, Dubai Sports, Dubai Racing

Radio: Noor Dubai, Radio Dubai

Publishing: Al Bayan, Emarat Al Youm

Online: Emirates 247

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

DMI is wholly owned by the Government of Dubai. Prior to its formal incorporation in 2003, its media operations were managed directly under the government’s media department. As per official decrees, the government appoints the company’s top leadership. In August 2022, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum issued Decree No. (11), appointing Sheikh Hasher Bin Maktoum Bin Juma Al Maktoum as Chairman of the Board and Mohammed Sulaiman Al Mulla as Chief Executive Officer.

Source of funding and budget

While DMI’s exact financial statements remain undisclosed, multiple journalists and analysts familiar with the UAE media landscape interviewed in March 2024 and May 2025 confirmed that the group operates through a mixed funding model. Advertising and commercial partnerships provide a significant share of DMI’s income, while the Dubai Government supplies supplementary funding. However, this subsidy is estimated to represent less than half of the group’s overall annual budget, allowing DMI a degree of operational flexibility while maintaining strategic alignment with state interests.

Editorial independence

Although there are no publicly available editorial statutes or explicit governmental censorship protocols formally imposed on DMI’s outlets, editorial control is exercised indirectly. The government’s influence is channelled through its hand-picked top management, many of whom are longstanding insiders and political loyalists. As a result, the editorial line across DMI’s platforms consistently aligns with government narratives, steering clear of critical or investigative coverage of UAE authorities.

On occasion, DMI outlets have pursued human interest stories and regional reporting that appear bold by local standards. However, such efforts tend to fall well within the parameters of permissible discourse, avoiding any substantive challenge to state policy or leadership.

No domestic law or independent body currently exists to safeguard or verify the editorial autonomy of DMI’s media. Consequently, the group is widely perceived by media freedom advocates as an arm of the state, serving to reinforce the official image of the emirate both at home and abroad.

July 2025

Media assets

Radio: National- Republic of Yemen Radio; Local- Al Hudaydah Radio, Ta’izz Radio, Mukalla Radio, Hajjah Radio, Shabwah Radio, Al Mahrah Radio, Sa’dah Radio, Abyan Radio, Say’un Radio, Lahij Radio, Shabab Radio

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

The protracted Yemeni Civil War, which erupted in 2014, continues to cast a long shadow over the country’s media landscape. The conflict, primarily between the internationally recognized government—formerly led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and now represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—and the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), has fractured the nation’s institutions, including its once-unified state media. In the absence of a stable central authority, Yemen’s media sector has descended into a battleground of competing narratives, propaganda warfare, and extreme censorship.

During the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s media operated within a tightly controlled environment, with clearly demarcated red lines. While freedom was limited, journalists often knew the parameters within which they could function. That clarity has since dissolved. The collapse of central authority and the fragmentation of territorial control have ushered in an era of media chaos, where new red lines are not only broader but constantly shifting, depending on the faction in power.

The period of 2014–2015 marked a turning point. As the Houthis overran the capital, Sana’a, and consolidated control over large swathes of territory, media outlets sympathetic to the Hadi administration became prime targets. Numerous stations were shut down, looted, or repurposed to serve the Houthi cause. Journalists faced intimidation, abduction, or worse—many disappeared altogether. What remained of the profession became a shell of its former self, reduced to operating within the confines of factional allegiance or exile.

In March 2025, the U.S. classified the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, significantly intensifying sanctions and complicating humanitarian logistics despite a partial waiver for aid.

In such a perilous environment, neutrality has become a near-impossible stance. Journalists are often forced to align themselves with the authority—whether militia or government—that controls their region. Many have abandoned the profession altogether or fled the country, contributing to an unprecedented media brain drain.

Fragmentation of “State” Media

In a country that effectively functions as a failed state, determining what qualifies as “state media” is a fraught exercise. Today, Yemen is governed by parallel administrations:

• On one side, the Supreme Political Council led by the Houthis from Sana’a, which exercises de facto control over much of northern Yemen but lacks international recognition.
• On the other, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), formed by decree in Riyadh on 7 April 2022 with Saudi support and international recognition, which governs southern territories and serves as the successor to the Hadi government. A significant reshuffle occurred in May 2025 when Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak resigned amid political gridlock, and Salem Saleh bin Braik—former finance minister—was installed by the PLC.

This dual-governance structure has created parallel institutions across the board—including the media sector. Outlets under the Houthis and the PLC not only operate with opposing editorial lines but often mirror each other in branding and structure, further confusing the public and obscuring accountability.

Yemen’s media is now entirely beholden to political patrons. Outlets survive only through funding and protection provided by one of the competing governments or allied militias. In this environment, labeling any outlet as “state media” is problematic: both the SPC and PLC run institutions that function as state broadcasters—but there is no single, uncontested state to speak of.

The Yemen General Corporation for Radio and Television exemplifies this dilemma. Originally established as a national institution, it is today fully under the control of the Houthi Supreme Political Council. The corporation oversees national radio broadcasting and a network of local radio stations, all of which are editorially aligned with the Houthi administration and serve its propaganda objectives.

July 2025

Following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, ORTAS–owned outlets, including Syrian News Channel (Al‑Ikhbariyah Syria), temporarily ceased broadcasting amid the regime’s rapid fall. However, under the guidance of the new interim president Ahmed al‑Sharaa, the Syrian News Channel was relaunched on 5 May 2025, resuming satellite broadcasts via Nilesat and Es’hailsat.

Media assets

Television: Al-Ikhbariyah Syria, Nour El-Sham, Syria Drama

Radio: Radio Damascus

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

ORTAS is wholly owned and operated by the Syrian Ministry of Information, which exerts full control over its operations, strategic direction, and management. Decision-making authority rests with the Ministry, and the organization ultimately answers to the Council of Ministers, reinforcing its status as an arm of the Syrian government.

Following the collapse of the Assad regime, ORTAS is now overseen by the Syrian transitional government, established on 29 March 2025 under President Ahmed al‑Sharaa.

Hamza al‑Mustafa was appointed Minister of Information in the new cabinet in March 2025, and is recognized as an independent figure with media management experience.

Source of funding and budget

Detailed financial data regarding ORTAS remains unavailable, as the Syrian authorities do not routinely disclose budgetary information for state-run institutions. However, based on interviews with Syrian journalists living in exile (conducted in May 2024), ORTAS was believed to be entirely financed by the Syrian state, with no indication of independent revenue streams such as commercial advertising or donor support.

After the collapse of the Assad regime, ORTAS remains entirely state-funded, with its revenue coming from the transitional government.

Editorial independence

ORTAS has historically operated under a strictly pro-government editorial line, with its content shaped by the directives and priorities of the ruling regime. According to Syrian journalists and media scholars based abroad, the broadcaster functioned as a propaganda vehicle, echoing the official discourse and avoiding dissenting or oppositional perspectives. Its journalistic output was therefore perceived by external observers as closely aligned with the political and ideological interests of the now collapsed Assad regime.

Following Assad’s fall, legal reforms and a new interim constitution include language guaranteeing freedom of the press. Some opening has occurred, such as allowing limited operations of independent outlets. Yet, media, including ORTAS, remains subject to strong governmental control. There are repeated reports of harassment, selective bans, and editorial oversight by interim authorities. There is no independent regulatory body to date.

Claims by government supporters of significant pluralism, transparency, and fully independent editorial shifts at ORTAS remain aspirational and not fully realized.

July 2025

Media assets

Television: Abu Dhabi TV, Al Emarat, Abu Dhabi Drama, Abu Dhabi Sports 1, Abu Dhabi Sports 2, Abu Dhabi Sports 3, Abi Dhabi Sports 4, Yas, Majid TV, National Geographic Abu Dhabi

Radio: Quran Kareem, Emarat FM, Abu Dhabi FM, Star FM, Abu Dhabi Classic FM, KADAK FM, Radio 1, Radio 2

Publishing: Al Ittihad, Zahrat Al Khaleej, Majid Magazine, National Geographic Al Arabiya Magazine

Portals: Zayed, Mohtawa

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

ADM is a 100% government-owned joint-stock company, born from the merger of Emirates Media Incorporated’s assets in 2007. Its governance structure features a five-member Board of Directors appointed by decree from the Crown Prince. The board oversees strategic direction, ensuring alignment with government objectives.

As of 2025, Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber serves as Chair of the board, with Sheikh Abdulla bin Mohamed bin Butti Al Hamed—appointed as National Media Office Minister in January 2024—playing a central coordination role with federal media regulators.

Source of funding and budget

ADM operates under a mixed-revenue model. It draws on advertising and commercial partnerships, supplemented by government subsidies—though insiders affirm the latter remains under 50% of annual expenditure.

Detailed financial disclosures for 2024 are not publicly available, consistent with the opacity characterizing most UAE media entities. Nevertheless, industry analysts note significant growth in digital advertising across the UAE, with sector-wide revenues surpassing AED 800 million in 2024.

Editorial independence

ADM does not operate under officially codified editorial independence. Top-level management—appointed by government decree—regulates editorial direction, effectively curbing any critical engagement with state policy. While outlets occasionally cover soft-interest topics and culturally safe investigative features, no domestic legislation or independent body guarantees editorial autonomy.

As is the case with most state-run media in the UAE, ADM’s outlets never openly criticize Emirati authorities or government policy. Although certain platforms occasionally publish features on social issues, culture, and safe investigative topics, these are carefully curated to avoid political friction.

No domestic statute, independent assessment, or external oversight mechanism exists to validate or enforce editorial autonomy. In this context, media freedom watchdogs have repeatedly flagged ADM’s operations as lacking transparency and independence, reinforcing its image as a communications arm of the state rather than an independent media organisation.

July 2025

Media asset

Publishing: Al-Thawra

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

The protracted Yemeni Civil War, which erupted in 2014, continues to cast a long shadow over the country’s media landscape. The conflict, primarily between the internationally recognized government—formerly led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and now represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)—and the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), has fractured the nation’s institutions, including its once-unified state media. In the absence of a stable central authority, Yemen’s media sector has descended into a battleground of competing narratives, propaganda warfare, and extreme censorship.

During the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s media operated within a tightly controlled environment, with clearly demarcated red lines. While freedom was limited, journalists often knew the parameters within which they could function. That clarity has since dissolved. The collapse of central authority and the fragmentation of territorial control have ushered in an era of media chaos, where new red lines are not only broader but constantly shifting, depending on the faction in power.

The period of 2014–2015 marked a turning point. As the Houthis overran the capital, Sana’a, and consolidated control over large swathes of territory, media outlets sympathetic to the Hadi administration became prime targets. Numerous stations were shut down, looted, or repurposed to serve the Houthi cause. Journalists faced intimidation, abduction, or worse—many disappeared altogether. What remained of the profession became a shell of its former self, reduced to operating within the confines of factional allegiance or exile.

In March 2025, the U.S. classified the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, significantly intensifying sanctions and complicating humanitarian logistics despite a partial waiver for aid.

In such a perilous environment, neutrality has become a near-impossible stance. Journalists are often forced to align themselves with the authority—whether militia or government—that controls their region. Many have abandoned the profession altogether or fled the country, contributing to an unprecedented media brain drain.

Fragmentation of “State” Media

In a country that effectively functions as a failed state, determining what qualifies as “state media” is a fraught exercise. Today, Yemen is governed by parallel administrations:

• On one side, the Supreme Political Council led by the Houthis from Sana’a, which exercises de facto control over much of northern Yemen but lacks international recognition.
• On the other, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), formed by decree in Riyadh on 7 April 2022 with Saudi support and international recognition, which governs southern territories and serves as the successor to the Hadi government. A significant reshuffle occurred in May 2025 when Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak resigned amid political gridlock, and Salem Saleh bin Braik—former finance minister—was installed by the PLC.

Both claim legitimacy. Both operate media outlets bearing the insignia and institutional legacy of the Yemeni state.

Founded in 1962, Al-Thawra (Arabic for “The Revolution”) is one of Yemen’s oldest and once most respected daily newspapers. Over the decades, it evolved into a flagship institution of state-affiliated journalism in the capital, Sana’a. However, like much of Yemen’s media landscape, it underwent a dramatic transformation following the political and military upheaval of 2015.

In early 2015, after Houthi forces seized control of Sana’a, Al-Thawra Press and Publishing was swiftly taken over by the new de facto authorities. Since then, the outlet has been fully controlled—both editorially and institutionally—by the Supreme Political Council (SPC), the governing body established by the Houthi movement in the absence of internationally recognized governance in northern Yemen.

Today, Al-Thawra operates as an unambiguous mouthpiece of the Houthi regime. Its coverage is tightly aligned with the movement’s ideological and geopolitical narratives, serving as a key platform for official propaganda. The paper routinely echoes the SPC’s positions on domestic governance, regional conflicts, and global affairs—particularly in amplifying hostility toward Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel, and voicing strong support for Palestinian resistance and Iranian-aligned movements.

In 2025, amid the intensification of the regional conflict—including Israeli and U.S. airstrikes on Houthi-controlled infrastructure—Al-Thawra’s role as a wartime propaganda vehicle has only deepened. Its print editions and online presence frequently carry front-page coverage glorifying Houthi military resilience, denouncing Western interventionism, and commemorating fallen fighters. Despite infrastructure disruptions caused by air raids, the paper has maintained continuous publication, aided by robust digital channels and its central place within the Houthi communication apparatus.

Notably, Al-Thawra remains one of the few functioning print dailies in northern Yemen, where newsprint shortages, electricity outages, and the economic collapse have devastated traditional media. Its survival is largely due to direct subsidies from the SPC and its embeddedness within the Houthi-controlled state apparatus.

July 2025

Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Al-Watan resumed regular publication in January 2025, publishing mostly on its website and Telegram channel. Its tone remains conservative, though more careful in framing political events. Sama TV returned to broadcasting on satellite platforms in April 2025, largely airing apolitical entertainment content and coverage of post-conflict reconstruction.

Media assets

Television: Sama TV

Publishing: Al Watan, Al-Iqtissadiya

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Private (CaPr)

Ownership and governance

The company is owned by Rami Makhlouf, a maternal cousin of former President Bashar al-Assad and once regarded as the most powerful businessman in Syria. His name appeared prominently on the UK’s consolidated list of financial sanctions targets, with the last confirmed update referencing him in May 2022. Makhlouf’s business empire extended across a wide range of sectors, including telecommunications, real estate, finance, and aviation. At his peak, The Financial Times estimated that he exercised influence over as much as 60% of the Syrian economy.

Following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, the status of Rami Makhlouf’s holdings, including this company, has come under intense scrutiny. While much of his business empire was reportedly frozen or placed under investigation by the transitional authorities, there is no public confirmation to date that the Syrian Arab Publishing and Distributing Company has been formally dissolved or placed under state control.

The transitional government’s Media Oversight Commission, established in May 2025, has stated that investigations are ongoing into media companies connected to sanctioned individuals but has not yet moved to restructure or revoke licenses.

Source of funding and budget

No audited financial information has ever been made publicly available regarding the company or its media outlets. Prior to the fall of the regime, Syrian exile journalists and analysts consistently reported that the company benefited from direct government subsidies, as well as preferential treatment in licensing, advertising, and distribution. However, the precise share of public funding within its operational budget remains unknown.

Since early 2025, transitional government officials have launched investigations into media assets linked to sanctioned individuals, including Makhlouf, but have yet to publish findings. Whether Sama TV and Al-Watan continue to receive any form of public financing under the transitional administration is unclear as of June 2025.

Editorial independence

The company’s media arms — most visibly Sama TV and Al-Watan — have long adopted an unambiguously pro-government editorial stance, often echoing the Assad regime’s talking points with little to no deviation. Their reporting historically focused on portraying opposition forces as extremists, discrediting foreign media coverage, and glorifying state-led military and infrastructure campaigns.

There are no known statutes or regulatory mechanisms in Syria, either past or present, that enforce editorial independence or hold private media accountable to impartial standards. Despite the regime change, Al-Watan and Sama TV continue to operate, though their coverage has become more muted, cautiously aligning with the transitional government’s national unity discourse — while avoiding direct criticism of former regime elites.

July 2025

Media assets

Television: Sharjah TV, Sharjah Sports, Al Wusta, Al Sharqiya, Sharjah 2

Radio: Sharjah Radio, Quran Radio, Pulse 95

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

SBA operates as a government agency under the umbrella of the Sharjah Government. Governing bodies are appointed directly by the Supreme Council of Sharjah. A regulatory update came in 2021 when Decree Law No. 2 was issued by Sheikh Dr. Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, effectively tightening government oversight. Under this law, SBA must secure approvals from the Sharjah Media Council—a politically affiliated regulatory body—before undertaking any core media activities. As of mid-2025, the SBA is led by Salem Ali Al Ghaithi, who assumed the role of Director in 2023.

Source of funding and budget

SBA follows a mixed funding model: it generates commercial revenue primarily through advertising, supplemented by state subsidies. According to data collected by the Media and Journalism Research Center by May 2024, government contributions represent under 50% of its annual operating budget. However, full financial disclosures for 2024 and 2025 remain unavailable.

Editorial independence

While SBC faces no explicit legal constraints on editorial direction, its output is heavily influenced by top-down management. Appointments by government decree and required oversight by the Sharjah Media Council ensure that SBA’s content consistently aligns with state-approved messaging. As with other UAE-affiliated broadcasters, SBA rarely, if ever, critiques Emirati authorities.

Despite occasional coverage of cultural, soft-feature stories, there is no legal statute, external audit, or independent oversight body guaranteeing editorial freedom. Consequently, watchdogs view the SBA as an arm of the regime, rather than an autonomous media entity.

July 2025

Media assets

Television: Al Saudiya, Al Ekhbariya, AlRiyadiya, SBC, Sunnah TV, Quran TV, Thikrayat TV

Radio: Ryiadh Radio, Jeddah Radio, Holy Quran Radio, Saudi Radio, Radio Call of Islam, Al-Ekhbariya Radio

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

The SBA functions as a government entity under the supervision of the Ministry of Media. Its governance structure is anchored in a board of directors, whose members are appointed by ministerial decree. The Minister of Media chairs the board, cementing the organization’s close institutional ties to the state apparatus.

Mohammed Fahad Al‑Harthi has served as the CEO of SBA since August 2020. A seasoned journalist and media strategist, he also chairs the Arab States Broadcasting Union.

While the SBA nominally presents itself as a public service broadcaster, its mandate and decision-making processes are tightly bound to state policy objectives. The lack of an independent board or multi-stakeholder oversight body further underscores its status as a government-controlled entity rather than an autonomous media institution.

Source of funding and budget

As of June 2025, no official or audited financial statements have been made publicly available that would shed light on the SBA’s annual operating budget or revenue streams. However, based on interviews conducted in May 2024 with three independent journalists and media analysts familiar with Saudi Arabia’s media environment, the SBA is fully financed by the Saudi government. Its operations are included as part of the state’s media and cultural expenditures, with allocations determined by the Ministry of Finance in coordination with the Ministry of Media.

Editorial independence

The editorial output of the SBA is subject to extensive state oversight and conforms closely to the kingdom’s official messaging. Media content produced by SBA outlets adheres to strict regulatory and censorship frameworks, as delineated by government authorities. Coverage routinely avoids criticism of the ruling family, national policies, or Saudi Arabia’s strategic partners, and instead prioritizes narratives that align with Vision 2030 and the broader modernization image promoted by the Crown Prince.

There is currently no statutory framework, independent regulator, or ombudsman that provides assurance of editorial autonomy for the SBA. Consequently, the organization cannot be considered editorially independent under any recognized international standards for public service broadcasting.

July 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Tishreen, Al Thawra, Al Ba’ath, Al Fida, Al Furat, Al Jamahir, Al Wahda, Al Ouruba, Syria Times

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

According to Syrian journalists and academics based abroad who were consulted in May 2024, the Ministry of Information had full ownership and operational control over Al Wahda Foundation. All key appointments, editorial guidelines, and publishing directives emanated directly from the Ministry, reinforcing the foundation’s role as a state-controlled media apparatus.

Following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, Al Wahda was formally placed under the provisional authority of the Syrian Transitional Government, which assumed temporary custodianship of all public media institutions pending a broader legislative and constitutional reform process. As of June 2025, the Ministry of Information — now led by Hamza al-Mustafa, an independent figure within the transitional cabinet — continues to administer the foundation, though structural reforms are said to be under consideration.

The transitional government’s Media Oversight Commission, established in May 2025, has reportedly launched a comprehensive audit of Al Wahda Foundation’s governance, funding mechanisms, and editorial policies. Findings are expected in late 2025.

Source of funding and budget

Reliable financial data regarding Al Wahda’s operations remains unavailable, as neither the former regime nor the current transitional authorities have published budgetary disclosures. According to sources interviewed for this report in 2024, the foundation was primarily funded through direct government subsidies, while also deriving a modest share of its revenue from advertising contracts, often awarded under opaque or preferential arrangements.

Since the political transition, no substantive change has been reported in its funding structure. However, there have been public calls from civil society groups and press freedom advocates for Al Wahda to publish its accounts and adopt more transparent financial practices as part of Syria’s media reform agenda.

Editorial independence

Throughout the Assad era, Al Wahda’s newspapers adhered rigidly to the regime’s official narrative, offering uncritical coverage of government initiatives while marginalising or vilifying dissenting voices. The editorial line was heavily curated by the Ministry of Information, leaving little room for independent or investigative journalism.

As of mid-2025, there has been no formal statute or institutional mechanism introduced to safeguard editorial independence at Al Wahda. While some newspapers under its banner — particularly Tishreen — have begun to cautiously include more diverse voices and cover transitional government activities, the underlying culture of state-aligned journalism remains deeply entrenched.

July 2025