South Asia – State Media Monitor https://statemediamonitor.com Fri, 25 Jul 2025 22:42:52 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.3 https://statemediamonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/cropped-Studio-32x32.jpg South Asia – State Media Monitor https://statemediamonitor.com 32 32 Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (SLRC) https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/sri-lanka-rupavahini-corporation-slrc/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=sri-lanka-rupavahini-corporation-slrc Thu, 24 Jul 2025 10:58:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=74 The Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (SLRC) serves as the country’s principal public television broadcaster. Established in 1982, SLRC operates three terrestrial channels: Rupavahini, its flagship Sinhala-language service; Channel Eye, which broadcasts in English with a focus on education, sports, and current affairs; and Nethra TV, which caters to Tamil-speaking audiences.

Media assets

Television: Rupavahini, Channel Eye, Nethra TV


State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)


Ownership and governance

SLRC was constituted under Act No. 6 of 1982, now referred to as the SLRC Act, as a state-owned public corporation under the purview of the Ministry of Mass Media. Governance is formally entrusted to a board of seven members, traditionally appointed by the Minister of Mass Media. However, the governance structure has undergone notable political shifts in recent years.

In late 2019, the President issued an order transferring oversight of the corporation from the Ministry of Mass Media to the Ministry of Defence—an unprecedented move justified by concerns over ministerial overreach into SLRC affairs. This transfer raised eyebrows among media watchdogs and civil society groups, as it significantly enhanced executive influence over the broadcaster. Despite this shift, SLRC remains listed under the Ministry of Mass Media on official platforms, reflecting ongoing ambiguity in its institutional positioning.

The current government has pledged a broader media reform agenda, including changes to SLRC’s governance model. As of June 2025, proposals are being reviewed that would place the broadcaster under the supervision of a parliamentary commission—ostensibly to improve accountability and reduce ministerial interference. However, the timeline and scope of these reforms remain unclear.

In January 2022, Sonala Gunawardana was appointed Chairman of the SLRC. A seasoned civil servant and media scholar, Gunawardana previously chaired the National Library of Sri Lanka and has been vocal about the need to shift SLRC away from perceptions of partisanship. The current Chairman is Gihan De Silva, appointed in late December 2024. He is an MBA from University of Sri Jayewardenepura and has 25+ years in strategic leadership roles with strong marketing credentials.

In a major structural development, the government approved in February 2024 the merger of SLRC with the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC), citing long-standing financial inefficiencies and operational overlap.

However, by June 2025, the Cabinet concluded that merging would not deliver expected gains due to differences in broadcasting technology, transmission infrastructure, and studio space needs. Consequently, SLRC and SLBC will remain as separate entities, each retaining its identity while following a strategic roadmap for operational reform.


Source of funding and budget

SLRC’s revenue model is a hybrid of commercial income and state support. It generates the bulk of its income through the sale of advertising slots and sponsored content, while receiving an annual government grant to support its operations.

In 2020, the broadcaster operated on a total budget of LKR 1.34 billion (approx. US$ 7.2 million), with less than 23% of that amount derived from direct government subsidies, according to the Ministry of Finance.

By 2023, the corporation declared a total income of LKR 1.6 billion (approx. US$ 4.9 million), but still posted a loss of LKR 277 million (US$ 848,000), underscoring persistent financial strain. The SLRC-SLBC merger is expected to streamline budgetary allocations and reduce duplication of resources, but no financial data for 2024 or projections for the post-merger entity have been made publicly available to date.


Editorial independence

SLRC’s editorial autonomy remains compromised by entrenched political control. The governing board is appointed by the government, which exercises considerable sway over strategic and editorial decisions, according to interviews conducted with local media analysts in September 2023 and June 2024.

Upon his appointment in early 2022, Chairman Gunawardana publicly acknowledged the widespread perception of SLRC as a mouthpiece of the ruling administration. He pledged to reorient the institution toward more balanced public service broadcasting, though as of mid-2025, no concrete statutory or regulatory changes have been enacted to institutionalise such a shift.

There is currently no independent legal or regulatory mechanism in Sri Lanka that guarantees SLRC’s editorial independence or subjects its performance to impartial review. The absence of such safeguards continues to fuel criticism about the broadcaster’s lack of pluralism and its vulnerability to government influence, particularly during election cycles or moments of political unrest.

July 2025

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Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/pakistan-broadcasting-corporation-pbc/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=pakistan-broadcasting-corporation-pbc Thu, 24 Jul 2025 10:19:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=68 The Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), headquartered in Islamabad, serves as the country’s primary public service broadcaster. It began operations in 1947 under the name Radio Pakistan, shortly after the nation’s independence, and was formally reconstituted as the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation in 1972.

Media assets

Radio: News & Current Affairs Channel 24/7, FM 101, FM 93, Dhanak FM 94


State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)


Ownership and governance

PBC was established under the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation Act of 1973 as a limited liability entity, wholly owned by the federal government. It operates under the administrative control of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

Governance is vested in the PBC Board, which is entirely comprised of government-appointed members. In the past, the board included 11 members. A Presidential Ordinance in 2024, further supported by the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Bill 2024, expanded the PBC Board to 18 members. The new composition includes eleven independent directors, largely from the private sector, and seven ex-officio members. These ex-officio members include: The Secretary of the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting & National Heritage; an additional Foreign Secretary; an additional Secretary Finance, the Director General of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), which is the official media and public relations wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the managing Director of the Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV), the Director General of PBC, and a representative of the Interior Division.

As per the updated law, the appointment of the Director General (DG) of PBC is now handled by the federal government, based on the board’s recommendation, making the board more influential in PBC governance than before. The current Director General, Saeed Ahmed Shaikh has been serving in this role as of August 2024.

In June 2024, the Ministry submitted a proposal to designate PBC as a “strategic state-owned enterprise.” The proposal included a clause enabling future privatization, raising concerns among public interest advocates and employees alike regarding editorial independence and access to non-commercial broadcasting.

In June–July 2025, the Cabinet Committee on State‑Owned Enterprises (CCoSOEs), under the Ministry of Finance, approved the appointment of six independent directors to the PBC Board. These include Sadia Khan, Jehangir Khan, Sadiqa Sultan, Nasira Azim Khan, Khan Bibi, and Nadeem Haider Kiyani. These appointments signal a modest shift towards diversifying governance beyond traditional government representatives.


Source of funding and budget

Historically, PBC has relied almost entirely on federal subsidies to sustain its operations. In 2018, its budget stood at PKR 5.5 billion (approximately US$34.5 million), with over 94% of funding derived from government grants and the remainder from commercial advertising. However, persistent fiscal challenges led to sweeping layoffs in 2020, affecting hundreds of employees.

To ensure a more sustainable funding model, a license fee mechanism was introduced in July 2023. This fee is embedded in the national electricity bill, mandating a monthly contribution of PKR 50 (approx. US$0.17) from households, of which PKR 15 is earmarked for radio operations.

For the fiscal year 2022–2023, PBC received a separate allocation of PKR 562.8 million (approx. US$2.34 million) for special projects. Despite this, budgetary shortfalls continue to constrain modernization and expansion efforts, particularly in regional outreach and digital transformation.

In FY 2025, PBC was allocated a total of PKR 6.413 billion, of which PKR 6.183 billion had been disbursed as of March 2025. Simultaneously, PBC’s financial performance during the first semester of FY 2025 showed persistent shortfalls in revenue generation—particularly in advertising and leasing revenues—despite new commercial strategies. Receivables and cash collections remain well below targets, putting significant pressure on PBC’s financial health.


Editorial independence

PBC has long operated under significant state influence, with its editorial line closely aligned with government positions and subject to de facto censorship, particularly in areas deemed sensitive by the military or civilian authorities.

Although the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government initially pledged reforms to enhance freedom of expression following the 2018 general elections—including relaxing editorial oversight at public broadcasters—these efforts were short-lived. Media freedom advocates report that state interference has intensified in subsequent years, coinciding with a general backslide in press freedom indicators across the country.

No legal safeguards or independent regulatory frameworks are currently in place to guarantee the editorial autonomy of PBC. Nor does any domestic law mandate independent audits or public accountability mechanisms to assess its compliance with public service media standards.

July 2025

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Independent Television Network (ITN) https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/independent-television-network-itn/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=independent-television-network-itn Wed, 23 Jul 2025 11:02:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=76 The Independent Television Network (ITN) is a state-owned media organization in Sri Lanka that broadcasts in Sinhala, Tamil, and English. It operates two television channels and two radio stations, offering a diverse mix of programming aimed at a broad demographic. Initially launched as a private entity, ITN has undergone several structural changes over the decades, gradually evolving into a firmly state-controlled media house.

Media assets

Television: ITN TV, Vasantham TV

Radio: Lakhanda FM, Vasantham FM


State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)


Ownership and governance

After its early days as a privately owned broadcaster, ITN transitioned into government ownership and, in 1992, was formally reconstituted as a public company under state supervision. All shares of ITN are held by the Secretary to the Treasury of the Government of Sri Lanka, effectively cementing its status as a state-run entity.

The governance structure of ITN reflects this centralized control. Members of its board, including the chairperson, are appointed directly by the government. It is common practice for political appointees or former public officials to occupy these senior posts. In January 2022, for instance, Niroshan Premaratne, a former Member of Parliament, was appointed Chairman of ITN—a move widely interpreted as a continuation of the government’s tight grip over the broadcaster.

In September 2024, Priyantha Wedamulla, a veteran journalist and senior lecturer, was appointed Chairman of ITN—marking a notable leadership change while maintaining the pattern of government-appointed heads drawn from media or political circles.


Source of funding and budget

ITN derives the bulk of its revenue from commercial sources, including advertising and content licensing. However, government subsidies still play a role, particularly in offsetting operational losses.

In 2020, ITN reported revenues of LKR 1.5 billion (approximately US$ 8 million), with less than 20% of its budget funded by the state. By 2023, revenue had marginally increased to LKR 1.68 billion (roughly US$ 5.1 million), but the company posted a net loss of LKR 181 million (US$ 554,000), according to figures released by the Ministry of Finance. Data for 2024 has not yet been disclosed, but early indications suggest that ITN continued to operate at a financial deficit, prompting periodic scrutiny from parliamentary oversight committees.


Editorial independence

Editorial autonomy at ITN remains deeply compromised. Interviews conducted with local media experts and journalists in May 2023, September 2024 and July 2025 consistently point to pervasive government control over editorial decisions. The political affiliations and government backgrounds of ITN’s leadership underscore the absence of a firewall between state interests and editorial output.

No domestic legislation or external review mechanism has been identified that could affirm ITN’s independence or establish editorial safeguards. Unlike in some democracies where state broadcasters are insulated from political interference, ITN continues to function largely as a government mouthpiece, with no structural provisions to ensure impartiality or protect journalistic autonomy.

July 2025

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Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/pakistan-television-corporation-ptv/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=pakistan-television-corporation-ptv Wed, 23 Jul 2025 10:24:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=70 Established in 1964, Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) is the state-owned national television broadcaster of Pakistan. Over the decades, PTV has grown into a broadcasting powerhouse, with a workforce of approximately 6,000 employees and a nationwide reach. Its network includes several distinct channels: PTV Home, PTV Global, PTV National, PTV News, and PTV Sports. Programming is delivered in Urdu, English, and numerous regional languages spoken across Pakistan’s diverse provinces, reflecting its mandate to cater to a broad demographic.

Media assets

Television: PTV News, PTV Home, PTV Sports, PTV World, PTV National, AJK TV, PTV Bolan, PTV Global, PTV Parliament


State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)


Ownership and governance

PTV is registered as a limited liability company wholly owned by the Government of Pakistan. Operationally, it falls under the purview of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, mirroring the governance framework of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC).

The corporation is overseen by a government-appointed Board of Directors, which serves as its highest decision-making body. The Managing Director (MD) of PTV is likewise appointed by the federal government, reinforcing the broadcaster’s close institutional linkage to state structures.

PTV’s supreme governing structure is its board of directors that is appointed by the Federal Government. The Managing Director of PTV is also appointed by the government.

As of May 2025, the federal government extended an additional charge of Managing Director (MD) of PTVC—held by Ambreen Jan, Secretary of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting—for a further three months, pending appointment of a permanent MD.


Source of funding and budget

PTV’s primary funding stream derives from a license fee levied on electricity bills, a mechanism that generated over 71% of its budget in 2019, when its total expenditure stood at PKR 11.1 billion (approx. US$ 61.9 million at the time). This model is intended to provide a buffer against overt governmental influence by ensuring a degree of financial autonomy; however, in practice, the broadcaster remains financially dependent on state allocations and directives.

In 2020, the monthly license fee was raised from PKR 35 to PKR 60 (US$ 0.20 to US$ 0.35), a move aimed at shoring up the broadcaster’s revenues. That same year, advertising revenues hit an all-time high of PKR 1.3 billion, indicating a modest commercial uptick. Nevertheless, PTV’s liabilities reached PKR 19.41 billion, highlighting deep structural financial challenges.

For the 2022 fiscal year, government budgetary support stood at PKR 700 million (approximately US$ 4.1 million). Specific figures for the 2024–25 fiscal year budget for PTVC have not been publicly disclosed as of mid‑2025.


Editorial independence

PTV’s editorial posture remains closely aligned with that of PBC, reflecting Pakistan’s long-standing tradition of tight state control over public media. For decades, PTV has been perceived as a government mouthpiece, and despite occasional rhetoric in favour of reform, little progress has been made.

A brief wave of optimism followed Prime Minister Imran Khan’s 2018 pledge to roll back censorship across state media. However, this initiative failed to translate into tangible change. PTV continues to operate primarily as a vehicle for disseminating official narratives, with editorial decisions often reflecting government priorities.

As of 2025, there is no legislation safeguarding editorial independence at PTV, nor does any independent oversight mechanism exist to monitor or verify its editorial autonomy. Local experts and journalists interviewed for this report in March 2023, June 2024 and May 2025 confirmed that the broadcaster remains effectively tethered to state interests, with limited room for dissenting or critical perspectives.

July 2025

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Public Service Broadcasting Nepal (PSBN) https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/nepal-television-ntv/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=nepal-television-ntv Tue, 22 Jul 2025 13:02:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=59 Nepal Television (NTV) is the most widely watched television network in Nepal. It held an uncontested monopoly over the country’s television broadcasting landscape until 2003, when the government opened the sector to private competitors.

Established in 1951, Radio Nepal served as the sole voice of radio broadcasting in the country until 1997, when liberalisation efforts paved the way for the first non-state radio stations. For decades, it was the dominant auditory medium for news, education, and cultural programming across the nation.


Media assets

Television: NTV, NTV Plus, NTV News, NTV Kohalpur, NTV Itahari

Radio: Radio Nepal


State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)


Ownership and governance

NTV has operated as a fully state-owned enterprise under the purview of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. Radio Nepal has historically functioned as a fully state-owned entity under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology.

In a major institutional shift, the Nepalese government announced in May 2023 its intention to merge NTV with Radio Nepal to create a unified public broadcasting entity. This transition moved forward substantively in September 2024, when the Parliament passed the Public Service Broadcasting Act, mandating the consolidation of Nepal Television and Radio Nepal into a single public broadcaster. As per the Act, the governance of the new entity will fall under a council chaired by a senior government official—either the Minister for Communications or a State Minister—raising concerns among media advocates about potential executive overreach.

In January 2025, the two state broadcasters officially merged to form a single entity known as Public Service Broadcasting Nepal (PSBN).

Dr Mahendra Bista was appointed Executive Chairperson (equivalent to CEO) of PSBN in December 2024, following the enactment of the Public Service Broadcasting Act. He formally took office in mid-December after taking the oath in a ceremony at Singha Durbar, administered by the Minister for Communication and Information Technology, Prithvi Subba Gurung. Prior to this role, Dr Bista served as the Executive Chairperson of Nepal Television.


Source of funding and budget

NTV and Radio Nepal, prior to the merger, remained heavily dependent on public financing. Government subsidies constituted the bulk of its operational budget, and additional funding was channelled through a state-managed advertising fund. According to local media experts and journalists interviewed in May 2023, June 2024 and March 2025, this funding model reinforced the broadcasters’ institutional reliance on the state, making financial independence a significant hurdle.


Editorial independence

Despite periodic pledges by civil society groups and some policymakers to transform NTV and Radio Nepal into genuinely autonomous public service media outlets, the broadcasters remained under de facto government editorial control. Their news content is widely perceived as aligned with official state narratives, often reflecting the priorities and rhetoric of the ruling administration.

While the proposed institutional merger was originally presented as a potential pathway to greater editorial independence, the final Public Service Broadcasting Act failed to incorporate key safeguards recommended by domestic and international media experts. These included provisions for an independent board, editorial charter, and firewall protections against political interference. The absence of these mechanisms suggests that the merger is unlikely to usher in substantive changes to the broadcasters’ editorial posture.

As of June 2025, there is no evidence of any national legislation, independent oversight body, or third-party review mechanism tasked with evaluating or ensuring PSBN’s editorial independence. The group remains a state-controlled voice rather than a platform for pluralistic or impartial journalism.

July 2025

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Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC) https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/sri-lanka-broadcasting-corporation-slbc/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=sri-lanka-broadcasting-corporation-slbc Tue, 22 Jul 2025 11:07:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=78 The Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC), the country’s oldest electronic media institution, traces its origins back to 1925 with the launch of Colombo Radio. Officially reconstituted in 1967 as Radio Ceylon and later renamed SLBC, the broadcaster has long served as the state’s primary radio arm.

Media assets

Radio: Thesiya FM, City FM, SLBC National Service, SLBC Commercial Service, Radio Sri Lanka, Vidula, Yal FM, Rajarata, Ruhuna, Uva, Wayamba, Kandurata, Thendral, Pirei, Sports Service



Ownership and governance

Since 1972, SLBC has operated as a state-owned corporation under the aegis of the Ministry of Mass Media. Its governance is tightly interwoven with the state apparatus: the board of directors is directly appointed by the government, with the Minister of Mass Media empowered to name the Chairperson.

Hudson Samarasinghe—a former Member of Parliament and long-time media figure— served as Chairman, following his appointment in June 2021. Critics argued that his appointment was emblematic of the wider pattern of politicized governance, as SLBC’s leadership has historically been composed of politically affiliated or state-favored individuals.

In September 2024, Professor Dr. Uditha Gayashan Gunasekara was appointed as Chairman of SLBC by the Minister of Media, succeeding earlier leadership.

A major structural reform was initiated in November 2023, when the government announced a merger between SLBC and the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (SLRC). This decision, officially approved in February 2024, was justified as a cost-cutting measure, citing sustained financial losses across both entities for over a decade.

However, by June 2025, the Cabinet concluded that merging would not deliver expected gains due to differences in broadcasting technology, transmission infrastructure, and studio space needs. Consequently, SLRC and SLBC will remain as separate entities, each retaining its identity while following a strategic roadmap for operational reform.


Source of funding and budget

SLBC’s revenue model relies on a hybrid system, combining commercial income with state subsidies. While it receives significantly more state support than other state-run outlets, subsidies still fall short of covering half the broadcaster’s operational costs.

According to its 2020 annual report, SLBC operated on a budget of LKR 948 million (US$ 5.1 million), with the state subsidy contributing 46%. By 2022, the corporation reported revenues of LKR 682 million (US$ 1.9 million) but also recorded losses of LKR 141 million (US$ 390,000), according to the Ministry of Finance. No official financial report for 2024 has been made publicly available at the time of writing, amid the ongoing restructuring.


Editorial independence

SLBC’s editorial operations remain firmly under government control, with no demonstrable safeguards ensuring independence from political interference. Local media analysts and journalists consulted in March 2023, and again in September 2024 and July 2025 observed that the editorial agenda frequently mirrors that of the ruling administration. Appointees to editorial and managerial roles are routinely drawn from political or bureaucratic circles.

Importantly, Sri Lanka lacks any statutory mechanism or independent oversight body tasked with guaranteeing the editorial autonomy of SLBC. The absence of legal protections or accountability structures makes the broadcaster especially vulnerable to state influence and editorial capture—a concern exacerbated by the impending SLBC–SLRC merger, which may further consolidate political control over public broadcasting.

July 2025

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Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/associated-press-of-pakistan-app/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=associated-press-of-pakistan-app Tue, 22 Jul 2025 10:28:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=72 The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) is the state-run news agency of Pakistan, established shortly after the country gained independence in 1947. As Pakistan’s flagship national newswire, APP plays a central role in shaping the government’s public communication strategy. However, the agency has long struggled with underfunding, operating from dilapidated premises and relying on outdated technical infrastructure that hampers its journalistic efficiency and credibility.

Media assets

News agency: APP


State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)


Ownership and governance

APP is wholly owned by the Government of Pakistan and functions under the administrative control of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. In 2002, APP was converted into a corporate entity known as the Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation. Despite this nominal corporatization, its operations and leadership remain firmly tethered to the state.

The agency’s top executive—the Managing Director—is directly appointed by the government, typically from within the ranks of serving bureaucrats. For instance, in March 2023, Muhammad Asim was appointed Managing Director while simultaneously holding the post of Head of the Cyber Wing at the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, a dual role that underscores the close institutional ties between APP and the state apparatus.


Source of funding and budget

According to insights gathered from Pakistani media professionals and analysts during field interviews conducted in March 2023, June 2024 and July 2025, APP operates on a shoestring budget relative to other state media organisations. Experts estimate that APP’s budget is over ten times smaller than that of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), another major state media entity.

Although APP generates modest revenue through the sale of content subscriptions—primarily to public institutions and select media outlets—these commercial activities cover only a fraction of its expenditures. Local estimates suggest that close to 70% of its annual operating budget is covered by government subsidies.


Editorial independence

APP functions not as an independent journalistic body but as an arm of the state’s communication machinery. Editorial directives are centrally controlled through the Managing Director, whose dual role as a government official further blurs the line between public information and political messaging.

The agency refrains from publishing critical or adversarial content about the government and primarily acts as a conduit for official statements, press releases, and narratives aligned with the sitting administration. Interviews with local journalists and observers confirm that APP’s editorial stance consistently echoes government priorities, with little room for dissenting perspectives or journalistic scrutiny.

As of June 2025, there remains no domestic legislation to safeguard APP’s editorial independence, nor does any external regulatory or oversight mechanism exist to evaluate or enforce such independence. The absence of a public service remit or independent governance structure renders the agency vulnerable to political interference and instrumentalisation.

July 2025

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Gorkhapatra Sansthan https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/gorkhapatra-sansthan/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=gorkhapatra-sansthan Mon, 21 Jul 2025 14:09:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=63 Gorkhapatra Sansthan is Nepal’s oldest and most prominent state-run publishing house, wholly owned and operated by the Government of Nepal. It publishes several newspapers and periodicals, the most notable of which are the Nepali-language daily Gorkhapatra—one of South Asia’s longest-running publications—and its English-language counterpart, The Rising Nepal. Established in the early 20th century, the Sansthan continues to serve as a central arm of the government’s public communication apparatus.

Media assets

Publishing: Gorkhapatra, The Rising Nepal, Madupark, Muna, Yuvamanch


State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)


Ownership and governance

The Sansthan operates under the direct authority of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. It remains a fully state-owned enterprise. In September 2021, veteran journalist Bishnu Prasad Subedi was appointed as Chairman of the organization—a position he continued to hold as of mid-2025. His appointment signaled continuity in a governance model that has long been intertwined with state oversight.

Shiv Kumar Bhattarai was the Acting Editor-in-Chief of Gorkhapatra until May 2025, but he retired in late May 2025 due to reaching the age limit. His successor, Junar Babu Basnet, was appointed as Acting Editor-in-Chief effective from May 21, 2025. Bhimsen Thapaliya continues as the Editor-in-Chief (also referred to as Acting Editor-in-Chief) of The Rising Nepal as of May 2025.


Source of funding and budget

The organization’s financial backbone is comprised largely of government subsidies, which remain its primary source of income. A significant portion of its budget is also drawn from the state-controlled advertising fund, designed to sustain a variety of media outlets across Nepal. This dual support structure reinforces Gorkhapatra Sansthan’s dependency on state allocations for its operational viability.


Editorial independence

Despite its long-standing history and national reach, Gorkhapatra Sansthan is widely regarded as pro-government in its editorial stance. Expert assessments conducted for this report during March–April 2023 and again in March 2025 described its publications as closely aligned with the interests and narratives of the incumbent administration. The perception of bias has led to ongoing concerns about the credibility and independence of its journalism.

To date, no domestic legislation, third-party audit, or independent oversight body has been identified that could credibly vouch for the editorial autonomy of Gorkhapatra Sansthan’s publications. This absence of institutional safeguards continues to cast a long shadow over its journalistic integrity.

July 2025

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Prasar Bharati https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/prasar-bharati/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=prasar-bharati Mon, 21 Jul 2025 12:53:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=56 Prasar Bharati serves as India’s public service broadcaster, overseeing both Doordarshan—the national television network—and All India Radio (AIR), the country’s extensive radio broadcasting service. Doordarshan operates a wide array of channels, including national, regional, and local stations, while AIR runs nearly 470 radio stations across the subcontinent, making it one of the most expansive public radio networks in the world.

The WAVES OTT platform—Prasar Bharati’s flagship digital streaming service—was officially launched on 20 November 2024 during the International Film Festival of India (IFFI) in Goa.


Media assets

Television: (Doordarshan): National- DD National, DD News, DD India, DD Sports, DD Bharati, DD Kissan, DD Urdu, DD Retro; Regional- DD Arun Prabha, DD Bangla, DD Bihar, DD Chandana, DD Girnar, DD Madhya Pradesh, DD Malayalam, DD North East, DD Odia, DD Podhigai, DD Punjabi, DD Rajasthan, DD Sahyadri, DD Saptagiri, DD Uttar Pradesh, DD Yadagiri, DD Kashir; State- DD Chhattisgarh, DD Panaji, DD Haryana, DD Himachal Pradesh, DD Jharkhand, DD Manipur, DD Meghalaya, DD Mizoram, DD Nagaland, DD Tripura, DD Uttarakhand; City- DD Andaman and Nicobar, DD Chandigarh, DD Dadra and Nagar Haveli, DD Daman and Diu, DD Delhi, DD Lakshadweep, DD Pondicherry; Satellite- DD India;

Radio: (All India Radio, AIR) (470 radio stations)


State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)


Ownership and governance

Prasar Bharati was formally established as an autonomous entity under the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act of 1990. However, the provisions of the Act only came into effect in 1997. Prior to that, both Doordarshan and AIR functioned as integral parts of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB). While the statutory framework grants Prasar Bharati legal autonomy, the Ministry retains considerable leverage, particularly in terms of operational directives and appointments, blurring the lines between editorial independence and state control.

The corporation is governed by a 15-member board. Ten of these members—including the chairperson—are appointed by the President of India. The remaining five include the ex officio director generals of AIR and Doordarshan, a ministry representative appointed by senior officials at the MIB, and two elected representatives from among Prasar Bharati’s own staff.

Gaurav Dwivedi is an Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer of the 1995 batch (Chhattisgarh cadre) and currently serves as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Prasar Bharati, India’s public service broadcaster. He was appointed in November 2022 and, as of April 2025, also holds the positions of Member (Finance) and Member (Personnel) of the Prasar Bharati Board. Prior to this, he held senior roles in e-governance and digital infrastructure within the central government. Dwivedi has been instrumental in advancing Prasar Bharati’s digital transformation, notably through the launch and expansion of the WAVES OTT platform and the rollout of AI-assisted newsroom tools.


Source of funding and budget

Prasar Bharati’s funding model is hybrid, combining government grants with commercial revenue. In FY2018–2019, the corporation reported revenue of INR 49.5 billion (approximately USD 711 million), with 61% derived from state subsidies and 24% from advertising and other commercial activities.

The 2021–2022 fiscal year saw a 13% rise in commercial revenues, reaching INR 13.5 billion (USD 168 million), while government support totalled INR 27.6 billion (USD 345 million), as per The Economic Times. The allocation for 2022–2023 stood at INR 28 billion (USD 338 million), with the central government continuing its financial patronage. In February 2023, an additional INR 28 million was approved for future operations, though this constituted a relatively minor subsidy in the overall budget.

In the 2022–2023 fiscal year, Prasar Bharati received a government grant of INR 28 billion, according to multiple media reports (≈ USD 338 million at the time of reporting). For 2023–2024, the Union Budget allocated INR 26.44 billion to Prasar Bharati, marking a slight reduction from the previous year.

The 2024–2025 revised estimate (RE) was approximately INR 25.10 billion, with a budget estimate (BE) of INR 24.80 billion for 2025–2026, according to official Ministry of Information and Broadcasting data and media analysis.

These allocations represent a gradual decrease in state subsidies to the broadcaster, continuing a trend towards modest budget contraction since the 2022–2023 peak.

Fiscal YearGovernment Allocation (INR)Notes
2022–2023₹28.00 billionConfirmed in media reports
2023–2024 (BE)₹26.44 billionUnion Budget
2024–2025 (RE)₹25.10 billion (approx.)Revised Estimate
2025–2026 (BE)₹24.80 billion (approx.)Budget Estimate (–3% YoY decline)

Editorial independence

Despite its statutory autonomy, Prasar Bharati has long struggled to assert genuine editorial independence. The Prasar Bharati Act empowers the central government to issue binding directions under vague provisions such as safeguarding “sovereignty, unity and integrity of India” or ensuring “public order.” These clauses have been frequently used to shape or suppress coverage of politically sensitive issues.

The appointment process for both board members and editorial staff is frequently politicized. Journalists and media observers interviewed between February 2023 and July 2025 highlighted persistent partisan bias in DD News, with several high-level appointments reportedly linked to ruling party affiliates or Congress-era patronage networks.

A report from the Media Influence Matrix project underscored these concerns, stating:

“The Corporation lacks editorial freedom promised to it via the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act of 1990. This has led to the Corporation repeatedly being used for self-aggrandizing publicity by successive governments, besides giving preferential airtime to ruling governments and blacking out any criticism towards them.”

An MJRC review of news content from 15 Indian outlets, including Prasar Bharati, covering the period November 2023 to April 2024, found recurring patterns of censorship targeting opposition figures, notably in coverage of parliamentary debates and state-level protests.

Prasar Bharati has formal mechanisms such as the Citizen’s Charters for Doordarshan and AIR, outlining commitments to content diversity and public service. However, these documents fall short of guaranteeing editorial independence. Similarly, its Vigilance Wing and Independent External Monitor focus on procedural and procurement-related integrity rather than content oversight, limiting their relevance for upholding journalistic standards.

July 2025

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Bhutan Broadcasting Service (BBS) https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/bhutan-broadcasting-service-bbs/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=bhutan-broadcasting-service-bbs Mon, 21 Jul 2025 12:33:00 +0000 https://statemediamonitor.com/?p=52 The Bhutan Broadcasting Service (BBS) stands as Bhutan’s state-owned, multi-platform media powerhouse—catering to a diverse viewership through its radio, television, and digital outlets. As the kingdom’s lone domestic television broadcaster, BBS plays an unmatched role in shaping the national narrative.

Media assets

Television: BBS1, BBS2, BBS3

Radio: BBS1, BBS2


State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)


Ownership and governance

Operated as a public corporation since 1992, BBS is wholly owned by the Government of Bhutan, with the Ministry of Finance as its sole shareholder. The Editorial Board—nominated by the same ministry—holds formal responsibility for editorial policy, but in reality, this structure leaves it under tight state oversight with limited editorial independence. Despite a royal edict in 1992 calling for autonomy, BBS remains effectively a state-serving broadcaster lacking legally enshrined safeguards to guarantee impartiality.

In February 2025, BBS’s board terminated its then-CEO for alleged misconduct and weak leadership; this decision was upheld by the Thimphu District Court. As of June 2025, Tshering Wangchuk is serving as BBS’s CEO. A veteran media leader, he previously co-founded Business Bhutan and is considered the first Bhutanese to helm a print, radio, and television organization


Source of funding and budget

BBS relies heavily on state support—more than 80% of its budget is government-funded. In 2019, it total budget was BTN 269 million (~US$ 3.6 million), with BTN 44 million from its own sources; government subsidies comprised ≈55% of revenues.

In 2020, the budget rose moderately to BTN 296 million (~US$ 3.6 million); internal revenue held steady at BTN 49 million. The following year, amidst losses of BTN 31 million (~US$ 424,000), BBS received around BTN 200 million (~US$ 2.7 million) in subsidies, making it the fourth-largest loss‑making state enterprise.

BBS has not publicly released any updated standalone revenue figures for 2022, 2023, or 2024, either in its annual report or on public platforms.

Lines blur between “own revenues” and “other state funding,” suggesting a fiscal architecture propped up more by taxpayers than commercial earnings—placing BBS firmly under the state umbrella.


Editorial independence

There are no laws, independent bodies, or watchdog mechanisms safeguarding BBS’s editorial autonomy. Despite public assurances—such as the 1992 royal edict—the broadcaster continues to function as an instrument of state communication, lacking the structural safeguards found in genuinely independent public service media.

July 2025

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