Media assets

Television: China Central Television (CCTV)– CCTV-1, CCTV-1 Hong Kong & Macau, CCTV-2, CCTV-3, CCTV-4 Asia, CCTV-4 Europe, CCTV-4 America, CCTV-4 Daifu, CCTV-5, CCTV-5+, CCTV-6, CCTV-7, CCTV-8, CCTV-9, CCTV-10, CCTV-11, CCTV-12, CCTV-13, CCTV-14, CCTV-15, CCTV-16, CCTV-17, CCTV-4K; Foreign operations- CCTV Entertainment, CCTV Daifu, CCTV Overseas Chinese Opera; China Global Television Network (CGTN)

Radio: China National Radio (CNR)– Voice of China (CNR1), Business Radio (CNR2), Music Radio (CNR3), Golden Radio (CNR4), Zhongua News Radio (CNR5), Shenzhou Radio (CNR6), Radio Greater Bay (CNR7), Ethnic Minority Radio (CNR8), Story Radio (CNR9), Senior Citizen Radio (CNR10), Tibetan Radio (CNR11), Reading radio (CNR12), Uygur Radio (CNR13), Hong Kong Edition (CNR14), Highway Radio (CNR15), Countryside Radio (CNR16), Kazakh Radio (CNR17); China Radio International (CRI)

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

CMG is a state-controlled broadcasting conglomerate that answers directly to both the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council. Oversight is exercised by the National Radio and Television Administration, a ministry-level agency. The group’s chairperson is invariably a senior Party official, underscoring the high political importance of the organization.

Shen Haixiong (born 4 April 1967, Zhejiang Province) is the President and Editor-in-Chief of China Media Group (CMG) and a Deputy Head of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Publicity Department. A veteran journalist who rose through the ranks of Xinhua News Agency, serving as Shanghai bureau chief, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, and later Guangdong’s provincial propaganda chief, Shen was appointed to lead CMG at its creation in March 2018. A member of the CCP’s 20th Central Committee, he is a prominent figure in China’s global media outreach and state propaganda strategy.

Source of funding and budget

A number of CMG’s constituent outlets, particularly CCTV, generate substantial commercial income through advertising sales. However, all of its branches receive financing from the state budget. Although the proportion of state funding in CCTV’s overall budget has declined in recent years, it still represents a significant share, accounting for over half of the group’s total expenditure. While the consolidated revenue for CMG as a whole is not publicly disclosed, analysis by the Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC), based on available budget data for most of its constituent outlets, indicates that state funding consistently exceeds the 50% threshold of total spending.

The 2024 departmental budget for CMG, as filed with the Ministry of Finance, totalled CNY 2.1086 billion (about US $289 million), including CNY 1.7378 billion (around US $238 million) from public appropriations, CNY 4 million (about US $0.55 million) from the state-capital budget, and CNY 365.37 million (about US $50 million) carried over from previous years.

Editorial independence

CMG functions as the primary vehicle for Chinese government propaganda, its broadcasters faithfully reflecting the official positions and priorities of the Chinese Communist Party. Editorial guidelines are set at the top levels of government, leaving no scope for independent editorial policy. Chinese journalists and media analysts consulted for this report emphasise that the group operates as the Party’s authoritative voice, both domestically and internationally.

This has led to regulatory pushback in certain jurisdictions. In February 2021, for example, the UK’s media regulator revoked CGTN’s broadcast licence, ruling that its licence holder, Star China Media Limited, did not exercise editorial control over the channel’s content as required under British law.

In recent years, CMG has sought to bolster its international reach through strategic partnerships with foreign media organizations. Africa has been singled out as a key target region, but collaborative ventures have been established across multiple continents. Following the U.S. government’s decision in April 2025 to cut funding for Radio Free Asia, China, via CMG, significantly expanded its shortwave broadcast capacity, adding 80 new frequencies, including 26 in Tibetan and 16 in Uyghur, increasing its dominance in sensitive border regions.

No legislation exists, nor any independent oversight body, to guarantee the editorial independence of CMG or its component outlets. In practice, these broadcasters act as the CCP’s principal propaganda channels.

August 2025

Media assets

Publishing: People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), People’s Daily Oveseas Edition, People’s Daily Tibetan Edition, Global Times

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State Managed/Owned Media (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

As the official mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), People’s Daily serves as a direct conduit for the Party’s policies and ideological messaging. It is overseen exclusively by the CCP and managed through the People’s Daily Press, a ministerial-level institution.

In September 2024, Yu Shaoliang assumed the role of President of People’s Daily Press, and concurrently relinquished his position as Editor-in-Chief. His editorial responsibilities were handed over to Chen Jianwen.

Source of funding and budget

The newspaper earns income from both advertising and government subsidies, although it does not open its books to the public. According to interviews with local journalists in June 2023, June 2024 and May 2025, its online operations alone yielded roughly CNY 2.2 billion (about USD 345 million) in 2021, while total income that year reached around CNY 12.1 billion (approximately USD 1.9 billion).

In 2023, operating income stood at CNY 2.115 billion (USD 289 million), up nearly 7% year-on-year, with CNY 1.1 billion generated from advertising and a further CNY 538 million from its second-largest revenue stream, per data from the Media and Journalism Research Center.

Editorial independence

Strictly speaking, People’s Daily functions as a state-controlled propaganda organ, aligning closely with the CCP’s editorial line. It employs so-called “writing task groups” (写作任务组), which are used to craft content that reflects the Party’s official perspective.

While some observers acknowledge that it may enjoy a modicum of editorial leeway, there is no legal framework or independent oversight in place to assess or guarantee its impartiality.

The organization has also ventured into data services, through a unit called People’s Data, supplying overseas social media analysis to judicial and party organs and offering corporate tools like the censorship‑aiding service Renmin Shenjiao.

August 2025

Media assets

Publishing: China Daily (Zhōngguó Qīngnián Bào), China Daily Hong Kong, China Daily Asia Weekly, China Daily US Edition, China Daily European Weekly, China Daily Africa

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Formally owned and overseen by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, China Daily operates under tight editorial control, with its messaging and tone aligned with party directives.

Qu Yingpu is indeed the current Editor-in-Chief and President of China Daily. He stepped into this role in April 2022 after a long tenure with the organization. Born in 1965, Qu Yingpu has a background in English language and literature, international journalism, and public administration, having studied at Shanghai International Studies University and Harvard University. Prior to becoming Editor-in-Chief and President, he held several positions at China Daily, including deputy director of the Economic News Department, director of the Chief Editor’s Office, chief editor of the Hong Kong edition, and deputy chief editor.

Source of funding and budget

Although China Daily refrains from disclosing detailed financial statements, independent observers affirm that its operations benefit significantly from state underwriting. The daily has channelled substantial resources into the United States, buying advertising space in leading American newspapers to distribute its content to foreign audiences.

Editorial independence

True editorial independence remains elusive. Content consistently favors pro-government narratives, and the newspaper has been faulted for publishing inaccuracies and propagandistic distortions. It has been implicated in disseminating dubious content—from misattributed quotes to politically laden narratives—leading to criticism from international media and watchdogs.

The newspaper is used as a vehicle for promoting China’s vision abroad, evidenced by “China Watch,” a sponsored supplement previously carried by The New York Times, The Washington Post, and others until several media partners severed ties over concerns about propaganda. . In March 2025, U.S. Congressional Republicans banned its distribution on Capitol Hill, and UK MPs called for reviewing its free circulation to legislators

August 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Zhōngguó Qīngnián Bào

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

China Youth Daily is overseen by the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China—a youth mass organization operating under the aegis of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The League, itself an extension of the Party’s apparatus, exercises full control over editorial staffing and organizational direction, consistent with broader media governance under Party structures.

Source of funding and budget

While China Youth Daily does not publicly disclose detailed financial statements, it is known to generate revenue through advertising and to benefit from significant government subsidies, typically funneled via the Youth League’s budget, a pattern observed as recently as 2023.

Editorial independence

Although the newspaper occasionally publishes relatively bold commentary, such as investigative pieces or content that hints at mild critique, it remains firmly tethered to Party messaging and objectives. Editorial autonomy is tightly constrained by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, which presides over media narratives across the country.

There is currently no legislation in place, nor an independent assessment or oversight mechanism, to validate the editorial independence of China Youth Daily.

August 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Jiěfàngjūn Bào

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Under the stewardship of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission (formerly the PLA General Political Department), the PLA Daily is institutionally embedded within the Chinese military’s propaganda apparatus. Its editorial staff draws largely from press bureaus across the various service branches and theater commands.

Source of funding and budget

The People’s Liberation Army Daily does not disclose financial information. Local journalists and experts interviewed for this report in March 2024 have confirmed that the publication is fully funded by the government through the army.

Editorial independence

As the PLA’s mouthpiece, the newspaper’s output is closely aligned with the government’s political posture, especially in foreign‑policy and strategic communications. Local journalists interviewed in early 2024 emphasize its unwavering fidelity to official lines. Significantly, no legal safeguards, independent audits, or oversight bodies validate editorial autonomy in any meaningful way.

August 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Economic Daily, China Flower & Gardening News, Spotlight Times, China Fashion News, Securities Daily, China Building Materials News, China Fashion Weekly, China Entrepreneur (bimonthly), China Economic Information (bimonthly), Economy (monthly), China Textile News

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

As of mid‑2025, the Economic Daily remains firmly under the control of the Chinese Communist Party. It is owned and closely managed by the Central Propaganda Department of the Party, with its publishing arm, Economic Daily Press, operating at the deputy‑ministerial level.

Source of funding and budget

While comprehensive financial transparency remains elusive, interviews with local experts and journalists in March 2024 confirm that the Economic Daily relies primarily on advertising revenue. Government funding still plays a pivotal role, accounting for over half of its budget. No official breakdown of revenue or funding sources has been made public.

Editorial independence

Editorial policy is tightly reinscribed by the Communist Party Central Committee, which maintains a heavy hand in shaping content and messaging. There are currently no independent oversight mechanisms or legislation to safeguard journalistic autonomy, leaving editorial independence effectively off the table.

August 2025

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Guangming Daily stood among the “three papers and one magazine” that continued publication, alongside People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag, playing an outsized role in shaping the national discourse.

In the political storms of the late 1970s, the paper was central to ideological shifts—publishing, most notably, the 1978 editorial “Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth”, which helped propel Deng Xiaoping’s reformist agenda.

Media assets

Publishing: Guangming Daily

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Guangming Daily operates under the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee—a ministerial-level body responsible for shaping ideology, overseeing media content, and enforcing obedience to party doctrine. . It ranks administratively just below outlets like People’s Daily and China Daily, and its leadership—including publisher and editor—are appointed by this department.

Since May 2021, Wang Huimin has served as the president and editor-in-chief of Guangming Daily. He also sits on the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and was a representative at the 20th Party Congress.

Source of funding and budget

While the paper strives for greater self‑sufficiency through advertising and broader content, it remains largely reliant on government funding. Circulation peaked around 1.5 million in 1987, shrinking to 800,000 by 1993 as media diversification took root. In response, Guangming Daily deliberately dialed down overt political messaging and broadened coverage in culture, science, and education, appealing more to intellectual circles, academic institutions, and official agencies.

By the early 2010s, daily print circulation further waned (to about 490,000) though digital reach remained noteworthy, especially via GMW.cn, launched in 1998, which by 2019 reportedly drew around 180 million daily page views and 35 million unique visitors. According to a September 2024 briefing, Guangming Daily has continued to lose traction among readers. To stave off further declines, it has doubled down on expanding cultural and scientific content. Yet today’s print circulation remains a shadow of its past heyday.

Editorial independence

Guangming Daily is regarded as a propaganda outlet that frequently disseminates the perspectives of the government. Despite a reduction in political coverage in recent years, the newspaper’s editorial line remains subject to strict government and Communist Party control. In its published material, Guangming Daily explicitly advocates for governmental control over the dissemination of information within China.

There is no legislation in place, nor is there an independent assessment or oversight mechanism, to validate the editorial independence of Guangming Daily.

August 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Qiushi

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Headquartered in Beijing and published by Qiushi Press, a deputy-ministerial-level organ under the CCP’s Central Committee, Qiushi holds an unrivaled perch in China’s ideological apparatus.

Source of funding and budget

Qiushi is wholly financed through government stipends.

Editorial independence

Qiushi functions as a clearly defined mouthpiece of the CCP, offering little in terms of editorial independence. Articles, especially speeches by Xi Jinping and other senior leaders, are carefully vetted before publication. No independent oversight exists to audit or validate its autonomy.

August 2025

It also issues two internal “neican” editions: one broadly circulated to officials nationwide and a more tightly controlled version reserved for those directly involved in specific legal matters.

Media assets

Publishing: Fǎzhì Rìbào

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

The Chinese government, through the CCP’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, holds sway over Legal Daily—effectively calling the shots on its strategic direction and content agenda.

Source of funding and budget

As confirmed by journalists and experts in March 2024, the publication is fully financed by the government arm that owns it—meaning it operates on public coffers with no known independent revenue streams beyond its official backing.

Editorial independence

Legal Daily operates in lockstep with state policy. Its output undergoes routine censorship, ensuring alignment with government messaging. Notably, there are no formal internal rules shielding editors from political oversight, nor is there any independent mechanism to assess its editorial autonomy—it functions entirely within the state’s orbit.

August 2025

Beyond publishing, CIPG operates the China Internet Information Center, manages the national translation‑testing system under the Ministry of Human Resources, and runs branded social media platforms like China Matters and Third Eye on China. It also maintains about 20 overseas branches, including offices in the US, UK, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Egypt, Mexico, and Hong Kong, with a workforce nearing 3,000, including around 100 foreign professionals.

Media assets

News portal: China Internet News Center, China Net, Digital Media Center

Publishing: Beijing Review, China Today, China Pictorial, People’s China Magazine, China Reports

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

CIPG operates under the aegis of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, aligning its operations closely with the Party’s messaging and external propaganda strategy.

Source of funding and budget

While the most recent publicly available figures date to CIPG’s 2020 annual report, which indicated that approximately 78% of its funding came from state budget allocations, with the remainder generated through the sale of its publications, there is no subsequent official report accessible through mid‑2025.

Editorial independence

As a state‑affiliated entity, CIPG’s editorial direction adheres to “central government guidelines and policies on external propaganda,” and is widely viewed, by local journalists and experts, as an arm of the Chinese government’s soft‑power outreach.

No independent oversight or legislative safeguard is currently in place to guarantee editorial autonomy.

July 2025