Media assets

Television: Korean Central Television (KCTV), Ryongnamsan Television, Kaesong Television, Sport Television

Radio: Korean Central Broadcasting Station, Voice of Korea

News agency: Korea Central News Agency (KCNA)

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

KCBC operates under the auspices of the State Affairs Commission (SAC), the DPRK’s supreme policy-making entity, firmly under the control of Kim Jong‑un. Personnel appointments and directives for KCBC are orchestrated by the Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) of the Workers’ Party of Korea, underscoring its role as a central cog in the regime’s ideological machinery.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: Chinese Television System (CTS): CTS Main Channel, CTS Education and Culture, CTS Recreation, CTS News and Info, CTS Variety; PTS: PTS Main Channel, PTS Taigi, PTS HD, PTS XS, Taiwan Plus; Hakka TV

State Media Matrix Typology

Independent State Funded and State Managed (ISFM)

Ownership and governance

TBS was created as part of Taiwan’s media reform initiative in 2006, which merged CTS and PTS into a unified public broadcasting group. This consolidation was enabled by the Statute Regarding the Disposition of Government Shareholdings in the Terrestrial Television Industry, a law enacted in 2006 that provided the legal framework for transferring CTS shares to the newly formed TBS. The statute also mandated that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) divest its media holdings, a move that reshaped the country’s media landscape.

TBS is publicly owned, with its entities managed by the PTS Foundation, the non-profit body that formerly operated PTS alone. Today, the PTS Foundation oversees PTS, CTS (whose shares were transferred to the foundation in 2006), and Hakka TV (integrated into TBS in 2007). The foundation operates under the Public Television Act of 2009.

The governance structure of the PTS Foundation comprises a Board of Directors and Supervisors with 18 members, appointed by the Legislative Yuan and confirmed by the Examination Yuan, Taiwan’s independent civil service commission. Members of the Executive Yuan are appointed by the president and confirmed by parliament. The Chairman of the Executive Yuan concurrently serves as Chairman of the Board for all TBS entities.

Source of funding and budget

In 2023, the PTS Foundation reported total income of TWD 3.42 billion (US$ 110.6 million), with government donations and subsidies amounting to TWD 2.7 billion (US$ 87.2 million). The remainder was generated from commercial revenues, according to the company’s self-reported data. In 2024, the Foundation operated with total income of TWD 3.52 billion (US$ 111.8 million), as stated in its annual report. Government funding accounted for 78% of the total, with the balance coming from advertising, sponsorships, programme sales, and other commercial sources. The launch of PTS XS (Children’s Channel) in August 2024 drove an increase in content production expenditure, particularly in children’s programming and digital services.

In early 2025, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan approved central government budget cuts affecting public media. Lawmakers initially proposed a complete (100%) budget elimination for PTS amid allegations of mismanagement and bias. After widespread public outcry, the final approved cut was scaled back to 1%, with an additional 25% of its budget frozen, instead of full elimination. TaiwanPlus was hit harder: its budget was cut by 20% and an additional 30% was frozen, effectively halving its operational funding. Critics warned that these reductions could undermine Taiwan’s international media presence and cultural diplomacy, while supporters argued for stricter fiscal discipline. CTS is the only TBS entity that does not receive direct funding from the state budget allocated to TBS.

Editorial independence

Although TBS outlets occasionally encounter political pressure, they generally maintain a reputation for editorial independence. Media professionals in Taiwan, interviewed in May 2023, June 2024 and March 2025, expressed strong confidence in the quality and integrity of public broadcaster programming.

The Public Television Act enshrines principles designed to safeguard editorial independence. To uphold these standards, TBS operates a structured public feedback system through which viewers can submit complaints about programming.

The process is as follows: the relevant TBS department responds to the initial complaint; if unsatisfied, the viewer can request a formal investigation by the Board of Directors; the Board is required to review the case, issue a decision, and make it public; the decision is communicated to the program producer, station manager, and the complainant.

While TBS lacks an independent external body to audit editorial independence, it compensates with a robust framework for public participation. This allows the Board of Directors to monitor weaknesses in editorial output and respond to audience concerns in a transparent manner.

In 2025, the budgetary disputes, especially over TaiwanPlus, highlighted the structural vulnerability of public broadcasters to political funding leverage. Observers cautioned that sustained fiscal pressure could indirectly shape editorial decisions, even without overt censorship.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: KBS 1TV, KBS 2TV, KBS News D, KBS World

Radio: KBS 1Radio, KBS 2Radio, KBS 3Radio, KBS Classic FM, KBS Cool FM, KBS Hanminjok, KBS World Radio

State Media Matrix Typology

Independent Public Media (IP)

Ownership and governance

KBS functions as a statutory public corporation under the framework of the Korean Broadcasting Act. Its leadership is structured around a Board of Governors, which until August 2025 comprised 11 members who were recommended by the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) and appointed by the President of the Republic.

A significant reform arrived in 2018: a Public Advisory Group, made up of independent professionals, was created to evaluate presidential/CEO candidates for KBS. Following their assessment—through interviews and strategic presentations—the Board submits recommendations to the President, who makes the formal appointment. This process underscores a commitment to merit-based governance.

CEO Park Jang‑beom officially took the helm of KBS on December 10, 2024, amid union protests against his appointment. In March 2025, Park unveiled plans to reduce approximately 1,000 employees—about 20% of the workforce—to streamline operations. He also introduced a Future Growth Committee aimed at performance optimization and new revenue generation channels.

Under President Lee Jae‑myung’s administration installed after the June 2025 elections, existing legislation was swiftly amended in August 2025. According to the new provisions, the proportion of KBS board members recommended by the National Assembly has been reduced from 100% to 40%. A new programming committee has been instituted, comprising five members each from labor and management, and empowered with genuine decision‑making authority over programming matters. The law mandates that KBS must reconstitute its board within three months of the amendment’s passage. Under the revised Broadcasting Act, the KBS board was expanded to 15 members, nominated as follows: the National Assembly (6 members), the viewer committee (2 members), employees (3 members), academic societies (2 members), and bar associations (2 members).

Source of funding and budget

KBS is primarily funded through a license fee, currently 2,500 KRW (US$ 1.90) per household per month, collected via electricity bills (a practice in place since 1994).

In July 2023, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration pushed through a change to the KBS funding system that removed the TV licence fee from the bundled Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) electricity bill. Up to that point, every household’s power bill automatically included the 2,500 KRW monthly broadcasting fee, which KEPCO collected and transferred to KBS. After the reform, households received separate bills—one from KEPCO for electricity, and a stand-alone invoice from KBS (or its designated collection agent) for the licence fee.

Critics, including the Global Task Force for Public Media, warned that without the automatic, bundled collection mechanism, payment compliance would drop sharply, creating serious cash-flow problems for KBS. KBS itself declared a “financial emergency,” estimating it would lose hundreds of billions of won in revenue and would need to spend at least KRW 200 billion (about US $148 million) to set up the infrastructure for independent fee collection.

In April 2025, Parliament passed a bill to restore the licence fee’s collection via electricity bills, reuniting the fee with the electricity charge after its 2023 separation.

In June 2025, President and CEO Park Jang‑beom proposed raising the licence fee by KRW 500 (to KRW 3,000/month), the broadcaster’s first increase in 45 years, as KBS faces an estimated deficit of KRW, amid shrinking advertising revenue and growing competition from OTT platforms.

In the 2019 fiscal year, the broadcaster operated with a budget of KRW 1.36 trillion (about US$ 1.25 billion at the 2019 exchange rate). License fees accounted for 49% of revenues, while ad sales accounted for 19%. The government allocated approximately 2% of the broadcaster’s total budget. In the 2020 fiscal year, KBS had a similar budget, with the license fee accounting for approximately 40% and ad sales for roughly 17%.

In the following two fiscal years, KBS had a total budget of KRW 1.46 trillion (about US$ 1.20 billion) in 2021, and KRW 1.48 trillion (about US $1.03 billion) in 2022. The license fee continued to represent the primary source of revenue, accounting for over 46% of KBS’ total revenue in the 2022 fiscal year. In 2023, KBS reported total income of KWR 1.42 trillion (about US$ 1.06 billion), with the license fee generating around KRW 685 billion (about US$ 511 million).

In 2024, KBS had a total budget of KRW 1.33 trillion (almost US$ 986 million), nearly 49% of which represented revenue from license fees, with the rest being self-generated income (such as advertising, content sales, syndication and other commercial revenues).

Editorial independence

For decades, there was no evidence to suggest that KBS had been subject to censorship or manipulation of its editorial content. While the broadcaster has previously faced political pressure, its journalists have demonstrated a robust commitment to maintaining editorial independence, resisting such external influences.

In 2018, KBS implemented an amendment to the Broadcast Planning Regulation for the first time in 16 years. Under the revised regulation, Planning Committee meetings became mandatory, and a new stipulation was incorporated to safeguard editorial autonomy.

However, since 2023, the broadcaster has faced significant government pressure. In consequence of the legal provisions adopted in summer 2023 that threatened KBS’s financial stability (see Source of funding and budget), the broadcaster’s editorial independence has gradually eroded, as government influence over appointees has led to decisions detrimental to its autonomy. For example, on his first day as KBS president, Park Min abruptly canceled a current affairs program criticized by the ruling party as “biased” and replaced several newscasters, actions that prompted controversy over infringements on production autonomy and the rationale behind staffing changes.

In light of these developments, in 2024, KBS has been reclassified from the Independent Public Media (IP) category, representing the highest standard of autonomy, to the Captured Public or State-Managed/Owned Media (CaPu) category, which denotes significantly lower independence.

In June 2025, Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party was elected President of South Korea, succeeding the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. His victory followed a campaign in which public broadcasting reform and independence were recurring themes, with both supporters and critics expecting shifts in the media–government relationship. Shortly after the change in administration, debates in the National Assembly intensified over new governance reforms for KBS. These include diversifying the composition of the Board of Governors, introducing citizen participation in CEO selection, and increasing transparency in editorial decision-making, measures aimed at reducing political influence.

These reforms moved from proposal to implementation with the August 2025 amendment of the Broadcast Act (see Ownership and governance above). In light of these legally binding changes, which strengthen structural safeguards for editorial autonomy, we have reclassified KBS back into the Independent Public Media (IP) category.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: NHK General TV, NHK Educational TV, NHK BS1, NHK BS Premium, NHK BS4K, NHK BS8K; NHK World-Japan

Radio: NHK Radio 1, NHK Radio 2, NHK FM

State Media Matrix Typology

Independent State-Managed (ISM)

Ownership and governance

Until 1950, the government held the reins on broadcasting. The Broadcasting Law of 1950 marked a turning point, forbidding governmental meddling in programming and formally establishing NHK as a public broadcaster. The law also paved the way for private broadcasters to enter the fray.

The Board of Governors, consisting of 12 members appointed by the Prime Minister and ratified by both houses of Parliament, oversees the corporation—tasked with appointing NHK’s president and green‑lighting its strategic direction, policies, budget, and programming. These plans are passed to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications and ultimately reviewed by the government and Diet.

NHK’s Executive Board is led by its president, currently Nobuo Inaba, accompanied by an executive vice‑president and seven to ten directors. When Inaba took the helm of NHK in January 2023, he inherited a century-old institution at a crossroads. A veteran of the Bank of Japan and later an executive at Ricoh, Inaba brought with him a technocrat’s discipline and a reformer’s eye. From his first days, he set about steering the public broadcaster toward a leaner, more digitally agile future, overseeing a 10% cut in the reception fee in 2023 and pushing for online distribution to stand on equal footing with terrestrial broadcasting.

The Audit Committee, comprising at least three members appointed by the Board of Governors, audits operations and reports back to the governors.

Source of funding and budget

NHK remains fully funded by license (reception) fees, paid by households and businesses equipped to receive broadcasts. This model is widely viewed as a keystone of its financial autonomy.

In 2021, NHK had an operating budget of JPY 690bn (US$ 6.3bn), of which the license fee accounted for over 97%. The following year, NHK had a budget of JPY 689bn (US$ 4.8bn), of which about JPY 670bn (US$ 4.6bn) came from license fees. In 2023, the broadcaster operated on a budget of JPY 688 billion (USD 4.9 billion), of which license fees contributed roughly JPY 669 billion. Entering fiscal 2025, NHK projected a shortfall of around JPY 40 billion, or USD 270 million.

Editorial independence

The Broadcasting Law plainly forbids NHK’s Board of Governors from meddling in editorial decisions. For many years this shield appeared to hold firm, although whispers of state pressure under Shinzō Abe’s administration (2012–2020) began to erode confidence. Journalists reported that dissenting or critical coverage met resistance, ranging from dismissals to sidelining of sensitive reports, raising concerns that NHK was veering off its legally mandated independence.

Even after Abe’s departure in August 2020, the clouds of suspicion lingered. In June 2021, the NHK board drew fire for withholding minutes from contentious meetings, a move critics said smacked of opacity and possibly, covert agenda‑setting. The re-election of Shunzo Morishita as head of the Board in March 2021 drew particular ire, given his widely reported reputation for influencing editorial coverage. Independent journalists have frequently described such interference as “illegal,” arguing that it violates the very provisions designed to guarantee NHK’s editorial independence.

Over the past several years, incidents have emerged in which journalists were dismissed from their posts or in which sensitive reports were withheld from broadcast. In one notable case, NHK’s board of directors reportedly issued a warning to the corporation’s president following a corporate complaint about critical coverage. Such episodes have fuelled accusations that these actions constitute “interference with programming,” a direct breach of the Broadcasting Law.

At present, there is no independent body or formal oversight mechanism to verify NHK’s editorial independence. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is responsible for regulating this independence, and the minister holds the authority to suspend the operations of any broadcaster found in breach of the Broadcasting Law.

In the past year, no documented case has been identified of the government issuing direct orders to alter or suppress NHK’s domestic programming. Despite some ongoing indirect pressures, no formal censorship orders were uncovered in 2025. While NHK remains structurally vulnerable to government influence—through board appointments, statutory powers, and a media environment that encourages self-censorship—there is insufficient evidence in 2025 to conclude that NHK is under systematic, direct editorial control by the Japanese government. For this reason, we have reclassified NHK from the Captured Public/State-Managed or Owned Media (CaPu) category to the Independent State-Managed (ISM) category, which denotes the existence of editorial autonomy.

August 2025

As a state-controlled outlet, it serves as an extension of centralized media oversight, though with a relatively lighter, entertainment-focused identity compared to the flagship channel, Korean Central Television (KCTV).

Media assets

Television: Mansudae TV

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

August 2025

Media assets

Television: TV 31, TV 32, TV33, TV34, TV35

Radio: Radio 1, Radio 2, Radio 3, Radio 4, Radio 5, Putonghua Channel, CNR/HK, CMG/RGB

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

RTHK operates as a government department under the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau (CEDB), which oversees trade-related policy for the Hong Kong Government.

Its governance includes a Board of Advisors, comprising 14 members appointed by the Director of Broadcasting under the RTHK Charter, ratified in August 2010. This board serves in an advisory capacity, reviewing editorial principles, handling complaints, and advising on community engagement. The Director of Broadcasting sits on the board ex officio and is appointed by the Chief Executive (the head of the Hong Kong Government).

Angelina Kwan Yuen-yee, a veteran Hong Kong Administrative Officer with nearly three decades of government service, became Director of Broadcasting at RTHK in January 2025. Rising through the civil service since 1996, she has held senior roles across key bureaus, including security, welfare, housing, and the Chief Executive’s Office. Formerly Deputy Secretary for Labor and Welfare (Manpower), Kwan is recognized for her strong leadership and management skills.

Source of funding and budget

Fully funded by the government, RTHK’s financial trajectory over recent years is presented in the table below. Most recently, the 2025–26 fiscal year sees a projected budget of around HKD 1.55 billion, a sizable uplift, prompting legislative scrutiny and an imminent government review of RTHK’s operations, production, and staffing levels.

Editorial independence

For decades, RTHK enjoyed a hard-earned reputation for editorial autonomy, frequently lauded for its adherence to the principles enshrined in the RTHK Charter and reinforced by its detailed editorial policies. This tradition positioned the broadcaster as a trusted source of independent journalism in Hong Kong.

In recent years, however, this standing has come under sustained pressure, particularly since the introduction of the Beijing-imposed national security law. Over the past three years, government influence over editorial matters has become increasingly pronounced. The previous chair of the RTHK Advisory Board, replaced in August 2020m was reportedly a vocal proponent of steering coverage toward a more favourable portrayal of the national security law.

Concrete manifestations of this pressure emerged in mid-2020: in June, an RTHK program was terminated following complaints from the police force; two months later, the broadcaster removed an interview with a human rights activist wanted by the authorities.

Since then, the government has exercised its editorial control with striking consistency, resulting in a series of censorship incidents, often reinforced by self-censorship from within the newsroom. The appointment of Patrick Li, a career civil servant, as Director of Broadcasting in February 2021 marked a turning point. His leadership coincided with the resignation of numerous journalists, as noted by Hong Kong Watch in April 2022, and signalled a perceptible shift in the station’s editorial climate.

Many previously aired RTHK programmes have since been erased from all online platforms. Journalists are now required to follow new programming guidelines that, in practice, have curtailed the station’s editorial freedom. These rules are further underpinned by a punitive measure that holds staff personally liable for the financial consequences of producing content later subjected to censorship, a policy widely interpreted as a deterrent to covering sensitive issues.

Public perception has followed suit: a study released in June 2022 documented a decline in public trust, with RTHK’s trust rating falling to 53%, down from 59% in 2021.

According to the Charter, RTHK’s mission is to serve as an impartial platform for the exchange of views “without fear or favor.” The document further stipulates that editorial independence must be preserved, outlines specific editorial principles, and grants the Director of Broadcasting ultimate responsibility for safeguarding that independence and making final editorial judgments.

To monitor its performance, RTHK deploys several internal mechanisms, most notably the Television Appreciation Index Advisory Panel, comprising representatives from local broadcasters, industry associations, and academia, which conducts regular audience surveys. In addition, the Programming Advisory Panel, with 140 members drawn from a cross-section of society, reviews RTHK output and advocates on its behalf, frequently lobbying the government for increased funding to enable the broadcaster to fulfil its public service mandate.

Yet over the past three years, these safeguards have been systematically disregarded.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: MNB1, MNB News, MNB Sport, MNB World

Radio: Mongolian Radio, P3 FM, Voice of Mongolia

State Media Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Under the Public Radio and Television Law of 2005, MNB functions as a non‑profit public service broadcaster. Its top governing body is the 15‑member National Council, appointed jointly by the President, the Parliament (Great State Hural), and the Government. A Director‑General, chosen by the Council, oversees day‑to‑day operations.

Source of funding and budget

Historically, MNB has been funded through a blend of state subsidies and household license fees. In 2018, state funding represented just over 58 percent of MNB’s MNT 18.7 billion (approx. US $7.8 million) budget; the remainder came from license fees and limited additional income. Later sources indicate a more balanced split: about 50 percent from the state and 48 percent from license fees, with a modest remainder from social advertising and grants. Households in Ulaanbaatar currently pay around MNT 1,100 (US$ 0.30) per month, with rural areas paying slightly less. No publicly available financial reports have emerged post‑2019, so the precise current budget remains a well‑guarded secret.

Editorial independence

Although the law enshrines editorial independence for MNB’s journalists and content creators, in reality the broadcaster is often accused of being heavily politicized. Political sway extends to appointments within the National Council and senior management, calling into question its autonomy.

During the 2024 parliamentary elections, MNB provided free airtime for candidates, yet monitoring revealed a skewed presentation that favored the ruling party, raising concerns about impartiality, according to the OSCE.

As of mid‑2025, no independent oversight framework has been established to safeguard or assess its editorial independence.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: TDM Ou Mun, Canal Macau, TDM Sport, TDM Information, TDM Entertainment, TDM Macau World

Radio: Radio Macau

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Fully government‑owned, TDM is under the umbrella of the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR). Its governing body—the Council of Administration—is appointed directly by the Chief Executive of Macau.

Source of funding and budget

TDM’s financial backbone remains heavily reliant on government subsidies. In 2020, it received approximately MOP 365 million (US $45.6 million) in public funding, alongside MOP 90.6 million (US $11.3 million) in self‑generated revenue.

Funding tapered slightly in subsequent years, with subsidies of over MOP 314 million (US$ 38.9 million) in 2022 and MOP 311 million (US$ 38.6 million) in 2023. A company report states that in 2024, TDM was awarded a total government subsidy of MOP 315 million (US$ 41.7 million).

Editorial independence

A recent audience survey from 2023 revealed that about 70 percent of Macau residents (over 422,400 people) tune into TDM’s TV channels, while around 30 percent (over 179,700 people) listen to Rádio Macau.

TDM once operated with a measure of editorial autonomy, but in recent years it has come under steadily intensifying censorship pressures from Beijing, channelled through the Macau SAR government. In the spring of 2021, the broadcaster’s executive committee introduced a new set of editorial guidelines explicitly prohibiting reporters from criticizing the authorities.

The implementation of these rules prompted a wave of resignations from newsroom staff, signalling the depth of internal dissent. Since then, journalists within TDM have consistently reported that censorship has become embedded in daily practice. Over the past two years, multiple accounts have surfaced of direct government instructions shaping the broadcaster’s editorial line.

At present, there is neither a domestic statute nor any independent oversight mechanism capable of assessing, or protecting, TDM’s editorial independence. This absence of structural protections leaves the organisation acutely vulnerable to political influence and limits its capacity to serve as a truly independent public service broadcaster.

August 2025

Through several incarnations—Voice of Free China, Radio Taipei International, and Voice of Asia—the station ultimately rebranded as Radio Taiwan International in the late 1990s, settling on its current name in 2002 to better reflect its national identity.

Today, RTI broadcasts globally in 14 languages, including Mandarin, Taiwanese Minnan, Hakka, Cantonese, English, Japanese, German, French, Russian, Spanish, Vietnamese, Thai, Indonesian, and Korean, and delivers its content across shortwave, internet streaming, podcasts, and social media platforms.

Media assets

Radio: Radio Taiwan International

State Media Matrix Typology

Independent State Funded and State Managed (ISFM)

Ownership and governance

RTI was instituted under the Radio Taiwan International Establishment Act and was initially under the purview of the Government Information Office, an entity dissolved in 2012, with its responsibilities redistributed to various ministries. Today, RTI is a government‑owned broadcaster, held accountable to Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture.

RTI’s leadership comprises a Board of Directors (11–15 members) and a Supervisory Board (3–5 members), all appointed by the government, with approximately half serving as government representatives. The Supervisory Board is singularly charged with overseeing RTI’s financial performance.

Cheryl Lai currently serves as the Chairperson of RTI and was officially reconfirmed in this role in February 2025 following a board meeting. Lai brings over 30 years of experience in media and cultural affairs across Taiwan and Hong Kong. Her career includes roles as Editor-in-Chief of the Central News Agency, Director of Cultural Affairs at Taiwan’s UK Representative Office, and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Taiwan News. She was also President of RTI from 2003 to 2006 and is a consultant for the Cultural Taiwan Foundation.

Source of funding and budget

Primarily financed through government subsidies, RTI also supplements its income by renting airtime, sometimes at the expense of editorial autonomy, as third-party producers wield full control over content in such arrangements.

According to figures submitted by the company to a certification body, its total annual revenue is estimated at approximately TWD 500 million. Government subsidies account for roughly 80–85% of this sum, with the remaining 15–20% derived from donations and service-related income. No specific data for 2024–2025, nor any projections for 2026 revenues, profits, or income, have been made public.

Editorial independence

While RTI occasionally faces criticism over perceived impartiality, it is generally regarded as enjoying substantial editorial autonomy. No credible evidence of direct governmental interference has surfaced in recent assessments.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: MBC TV

Radio: MBC Standard FM, MBC FM4U, Channel M

State Media Matrix Typology

Independent Public (IP)

Ownership and governance

MBC is a public broadcaster, with 70% of its shares vested in the Foundation for Broadcast Culture (FBC), a not-for-profit statutory body instituted by the National Assembly in December 1988 to preserve MBC’s autonomy, an institutional design reminiscent of the UK’s Channel 4 model.

The FBC monitors MBC’s performance, appoints its president, and comprises a nine-member board whose directors are chosen by the Korea Communications Commission (KCC).

Ongoing reforms of the country’s broadcast system are underway. Planned legal amendments foresee an increase of the FBC board from nine to 13 members, who would be recommended as follows: the National Assembly (5 members), the viewer committee (2 members), employees (2 members), academic societies (2 members), and bar associations (2 members).

Source of funding and budget

MBC sustains itself purely through advertising revenues, with no reliance on direct government subsidies. According to the latest available figures, revenue in 2022 totaled KRW 849 billion (US$ 665.9 million). Earlier figures were KRW 697.1 billion (US$ 590.8 million) in 2020 and KRW 780 billion (US$ 678.3 million) in 2021.

In 2023 and 2024, MBC posted revenues of KRW 743.6 billion (approximately US $572.0 million) and KRW 748.0 billion (approximately US $558.2 million), respectively. Net income came in at KRW 96.61 billion (around US $74.3 million) in 2023 and KRW 21.47 billion (about US $16.0 million) in 2024.

Editorial independence

​​MBC enjoys full editorial autonomy, with no legal obligation to echo state viewpoints, and no persuasive evidence of governmental sway despite occasional friction with high‑ranking officials over MBC’s critical reporting.

In recent years, MBC has doubled down on civic engagement and transparency. Its president is now chosen through a quasi-political, participatory mechanism that encourages public input. Moreover, MBC operates a Viewers Advisory platform, enabling citizens to lodge complaints or propose programming changes under its internal Broadcast Rulebook. Public oversight is further entrenched via the Viewers Committee (composed of academics, union reps, journalists, and activists) and a Viewers Autonomous Committee, both empowered to critique content and institutional policies.

August 2025