The distribution of models reveals important shifts in the past year. The State-Controlled (SC) model consolidated its position as the most widespread form of state media governance in Europe, with 31 outlets (27% of the total). This represents the second consecutive year that SC media outnumber all other models, a development first observed in 2024 when they overtook the Independent State Funded and State Managed (ISFM) category.

By contrast, the ISFM model, long considered the dominant type of independent public service systems in Europe, declined further to 26 outlets (22%), down from 27 in 2024 and 30 in 2023. Similarly, the Captured Public/State Managed (CaPu) category contracted to just 8 outlets (7%), compared with 9 in 2024 and 11 in 2023, suggesting a small but notable reduction in the number of public media outlets under direct political capture.

The Captured Private (CaPr) category remained stable at 23 outlets (20%), following a drop from 25 in 2023, underlining the persistence of politically influenced private media across the continent. At the same time, the Independent State Managed (ISM) model held steady at 10 outlets (9%), maintaining a small but stable segment of institutions with editorial independence under direct state management.

On a more positive note, Europe continues to be the global leader in Independent Public Media (IP), with 13 corporations (11%) operating across the region. Although the figure has not grown since 2024, it demonstrates that Europe remains the only region with a significant and enduring cluster of genuinely independent public service corporations. The Independent State Funded (ISF) category, however, shrank back to 5 outlets (4%) after a small rise in 2024.

Overall, the 2025 data confirm that Europe’s public media landscape is characterized by a slow erosion of independence, primarily driven by the expansion of state-controlled outlets and the continued weakening of state-funded but independent entities. Yet, the region remains unmatched globally for its concentration of independent public media institutions, which serve as a cornerstone for democratic resilience.

In 2025, editorial independence in Europe’s public media has continued to deteriorate, with several outlets downgraded in our typology. A notable case is Radio and Television of Montenegro (RTCG), which has now been classified as State Controlled (SC) following a series of government interventions that dismantled the broadcaster’s independence safeguards and undermined its role as a pluralistic media platform. Similarly, in Spain, Corporació Audiovisual de la Comunitat Valenciana (CACVSA), the public broadcaster in Valencia, and Ens Públic de Radiotelevisió de les Illes Balears (EPRTVIB), the broadcaster in the Balearic Islands, were also downgraded to SC after political authorities significantly tightened their control over editorial operations. These cases illustrate how fragile the institutional safeguards of public media remain in Europe, particularly in contexts where political polarization is acute and legal protections are weak or easily dismantled.

The situation in Spain’s regional public media has thus worsened dramatically. Out of the 15 regional broadcasters mapped in 2025, eight are now classified as State Controlled, compared to just one in 2022. This marks a rapid and concerning shift towards political instrumentalization of public broadcasters by regional governments. Much of this state control has been implemented by the conservative Partido Popular (PP) administrations, which have expanded their influence over regional broadcasters in communities where they govern. The tightening of editorial oversight by PP-led governments has further politicized regional public media, leaving them more vulnerable to partisan agendas and reducing their capacity to operate as independent institutions. This erosion not only undermines public trust in regional media but also contributes to the broader fragmentation of Spain’s media ecosystem, which has become more vulnerable to politicization than at any point in the past decade.

In Central Europe, Czech Television (ČT) has faced sustained political attacks in recent years, particularly from parties critical of its independent editorial stance. Although ČT has so far managed to resist direct government control and therefore has not been downgraded in our typology, the persistence of these attempts to undermine its governance and independence remains worrisome. The broadcaster’s ability to stave off capture illustrates the resilience of some European public media systems, but it also highlights the fragility of independence in environments where political elites increasingly view public service journalism as a target rather than a democratic asset.

By contrast, in Slovakia, the situation has deteriorated markedly since the return to power of Robert Fico’s Smer party. The public broadcaster, restructured and rebranded as STVR in 2024, increasingly functions as a state propaganda channel, amplifying government narratives. As a result, STVR was already downgraded to State Controlled (SC) in 2024, and its trajectory in 2025 confirms the persistence of this captured status. The case of Slovakia underscores how quickly public media institutions can be destabilized when political leaders move decisively to replace editorial independence with partisan control.

On the bright side, Poland has moved in the opposite direction. Following the 2023 elections and the subsequent reform agenda of the new government, public media outlets TVP and Polish Radio have been upgraded in our typology. The government has also initiated plans to sell Polska Press to relieve it from state ownership, aiming to restore pluralism in the publishing sector. While these reforms remain contested and face institutional resistance, they represent one of the most ambitious efforts in Europe to roll back media capture and rebuild independent public service broadcasting. However, the efforts to depoliticize the media remain very difficult after years of capture by the former PiS regime, which left deep-rooted structures and loyalists within the media system that continue to obstruct reform.

One trend that intensified across Europe is related to changes to funding models and mounting cost pressures that are reshaping public media—and, in several cases, sharpening political leverage over them. In Austria, ORF has moved through a major financing transition (from the device-based fee to a universal household contribution), but the shift has not ended the pressure: political debates around fee levels, exemptions, and efficiency mandates continue to squeeze room for investment in journalism and digital transformation, keeping ORF in a defensive posture. In Finland, Yle’s tax-based funding remains comparatively stable, yet real-terms budgets are tight as inflation, wage settlements, and platform costs outpace indexation, prompting savings programs and commissioning cuts that risk narrowing output. The picture is further darkened by the closure of Liechtenstein’s public broadcaster, Liechtensteinische Rundfunk (LRF), removing public service broadcasting from the country altogether.

In France, the government has revived plans to merge the main public media—including France Télévisions—into a single holding as a route to rationalize governance and cut costs. While advocates frame the merger as a digital-era modernization, unions and editorial staff warn that consolidation without ring-fenced, predictable funding could erode remit diversity and editorial autonomy.

Finally, the UK is entering the most consequential financing debate in decades: the BBC’s Charter renewal process (toward 2027) is now formally under way, with broad political consensus that the current license-fee model will be reworked. The direction is still open—ranging from a reformed license fee or household levy to forms of general taxation—but most scenarios point to a material change in the BBC’s funding model, with long-term implications for universality, scale, and independence.

Taken together, Europe’s trajectory is negative but the slide isn’t inevitable. Yet, the spread of state controlled models and tightening budgets show how fast gains can unravel. The decisive tests for 2026 will be whether governments lock in independent governance and predictable, and insulated funding in line with the European Media Freedom Act provisions to help public media fulfil their mission to serve the public, not the party in power.

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The media landscape in Eurasia continues to tighten under heavy state influence, with the share of government-dominated outlets rising by one percentage point to 98% of the 69 surveyed in 2025, despite the addition of five new outlets. This trend underscores the persistence of an autocratic environment and the erosion of progressive media.

Although the share of state-controlled (SC) organizations (media directly controlled by the government) has fallen slightly (from 83% to 79%) the number of captured private and public outlets (indirectly controlled by the government) has reached a record high of 13, representing a five-point increase in their overall share and effectively offsetting the decline in SC-classified media.

Independent public media remain extremely limited, represented only by two outlets, in Moldova and Ukraine: Teleradio-Moldova (TRM) and the Public Broadcasting Company of Ukraine (Suspilne). TRM was recently reclassified from Independent State-Funded/State-Managed Media (ISFM) to Independent State-Funded Media (ISF) because leadership appointments are increasingly made through independent mechanisms rather than state-influenced appointments. Still, Eurasia records the world’s second-lowest concentration of independent public media after Sub-Saharan Africa. This overwhelming government dominance restricts access to unbiased and neutral information sources, particularly foreign ones, for much of the region’s population.

The five newly identified media outlets added to the database, three in Uzbekistan, one in Kazakhstan, and one in Russia, share a common characteristic of subordination to government oversight.

Kazakhstan’s Qazcontent is a typical example of state-controlled media, with a board appointed by government officials and funding drawn almost entirely from state coffers. Editorially, it serves as a vehicle for state propaganda, reinforcing national values and disseminating official policies.

The other four outlets, Russia’s African Initiative and the three Uzbek outlets Mening Yurtim (MY5), Daryo.uz, and Radio Grand, are classified as captured media (either Captured Public (CaPu) or Captured Private (CaPr) in our typology).

Launched in 2023, African Initiative is another Russian government-controlled outlet created to promote propaganda abroad. While officially presented as a project to strengthen cultural ties between Russia and African audiences, including younger viewers, its activities align to a large extent with Moscow’s broader information strategy.

The Uzbek outlets, by contrast, are inward-looking and focused on domestic audiences. All are subject to government influence through editorial directives and structural leadership. MY5 and Daryo.uz are operated by state-owned corporations and target younger audiences with entertainment and educational programming, with Daryo.uz maintaining a particularly strong digital presence. Radio Grand, although formally registered as a private entity, retains links to the state through partial government ownership. Primarily a music and information broadcaster, it must, like all radio stations in Uzbekistan, strictly follow the guidelines issued by Uzkomnazorat, the country’s de facto media regulator, when covering political and social issues.

Media outlets across much of Eurasia have traditionally fallen within Moscow’s sphere of influence. Since the onset of Russia’s war in Ukraine, however, the picture has become more fragmented. In Belarus, for instance, media remain fully synchronized with Russian propaganda, while countries such as Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have stepped up their anti-Russia strategies by introducing bans or restrictions on Russian television channels and news content. By contrast, media systems in Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan present a more mixed picture: although domestic governments exercise strong control over local outlets, Russian narratives continue to circulate widely, particularly through cable, satellite, and online platforms. Unlike Moldova or Ukraine, however, Central Asian outlets remain heavily government-controlled, which reinforces the influence of state-driven agendas.

The broader trend of de-globalization—exacerbated by the United States’ retreat from international engagement under the Trump administration, particularly through cuts to funding for independent media organizations worldwide—has created further space for non-Western powers, including Russia, to shape global discourse. In the media sphere, this shift is visible both in the operation of an expanding network of Russian-backed outlets targeting international audiences (the launch of the African Initiative being the most recent example) and in the strengthening of strategic ties with other major powers, illustrated by the cooperation agreement between Russia’s state news agency TASS and China’s Xinhua.

Overall, the Eurasian public media landscape is likely to remain deeply divided, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. Much will depend on the trajectory of the conflict and the outcomes of political contests across the region, which may tilt the balance either against or in favor of Moscow. What is certain is that Russian state propaganda continues to work tirelessly to influence political processes in Eurasian countries, with significant implications for how the media operate. In such a politically charged environment, media freedom can be expected to remain strictly limited and severely constrained for the foreseeable future, reinforced by the tight grip that states maintain over most of the region’s media ecosystems.d

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At the same time, many Asian state-administered media organizations have seen their budgets severely cut, as governments scale back financial support and curtail official incentives for these organizations. Whether these measures reflect genuine efforts at sound fiscal governance or serve as a warning signal from governments unhappy with certain media narratives, the strain on budgets represents a troubling trend across the region.

Efficiency measures have also driven many domestic state-administered media institutions to seek additional funding from Chinese enterprises and to forge closer partnerships with Chinese state media. In particular, China’s expanding media presence and growing influence in leading Southeast Asian media companies has not only provided a lifeline for struggling outlets but has also contributed to shaping a more favorable image of China among Southeast Asian audiences.

Turning first to the encouraging developments, the progress achieved by Indonesia’s TVRI and RRI owes much to the determination of their media professionals, who have pushed both outlets to take a more active role in airing local and national debates, often on politically sensitive and controversial issues, as well as broader social concerns. Despite the absence of an independent commission or an ombudsman-style body to handle public complaints and protect editorial autonomy, both TVRI and RRI are pursuing ambitious digital transformation strategies, emphasizing credibility and adaptability in today’s era of information disruption. The two outlets were also commended for their joint efforts to counter disinformation and hoax campaigns during the 2024 General Election. In parallel, the Indonesian parliament has proposed a bill to merge TVRI, RRI, and ANTARA, the national news agency, into a single media holding, in an effort to accelerate innovation and consolidate resources.

Japan’s world-renowned national broadcaster, NHK, also operating a major English-language international television network, has managed to regain its editorial independence, with no documented cases of direct government intervention in its reporting uncovered since 2024. Like many other state-administered nationwide media companies in Asia, NHK remains highly vulnerable to political interference through board appointments and the pressures of self-censorship, particularly when covering major government scandals. Nevertheless, NHK has historically been regarded as a respected independent public broadcaster committed to providing balanced coverage of Japanese politics. Despite the positive developments in the past year, NHK’s relationship with government officials will require close monitoring.

Similar to NHK, South Korea’s KBS has long stood as a champion of independent public media in Asia throughout its nearly century-long existence. However, in 2024 the State Media Monitor downgraded KBS to the category of Captured State/Public Media (CaPu), citing significant government pressure on its financial autonomy and the cancellation of a major current affairs program under the politically appointed president, Park Min. The political resurgence of the Democratic Party and the electoral victory of its candidate, Lee Jae-myung, in the 2025 General Election reignited debates on KBS’s governance and led to the introduction of a reform bill. Passed in August 2025, the amendment to the Broadcasting Act paves the way for greater public participation in selecting KBS leadership and limits political influence in determining the composition of its new Board of Governors. All of these developments resulted in KBS being reclassified in 2025 as Independent Public (IP), the highest category of independence within the typology applied in this project.

Further improvements may soon materialize in Bangladesh. Following the collapse of former President Sheikh Hasina’s autocratic regime and her self-imposed exile to India, the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus established the Media Reform Commission in September 2024. The commission was given two primary mandates: to secure editorial autonomy for journalists at Bangladesh Television (BTV) and Bangladesh Betar, the country’s flagship public service media outlets, and to review all media-related policies enacted over the past 15 years. In March 2025, the commission also proposed merging BTV, Bangladesh Betar, and BSS, the national news agency, into a unified entity called the National Broadcasting Corporation, overseen by a single regulatory board. At the same time, reforms have begun within the existing media organizations, with new leadership teams drawn from experienced journalists and media professionals, while the creation of an independent oversight body is currently under debate in parliament.

In summary, this past year has witnessed a wave of positive developments across Asia’s state and public media. These shifts may suggest that government control over public media institutions is now facing heightened public scrutiny. At the same time, political interference in editorial independence has become more blatant, provoking widespread pushback against authoritarian leaders.

Nevertheless, a new and troubling trend has also emerged, with governments slashing financial contributions to state-administered media organizations. Officials often justify these measures as part of efficiency drives, introduced in response to global economic uncertainty and geopolitical tensions, including President Donald Trump’s tariff agenda and the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine. However, many media experts argue that such cuts are also intended to discourage journalists from pursuing coverage that is critical of ruling governments. Finally, such budget reductions may also reflect the pressures of a broader economic crisis, prompting governments to reassess the value of sustaining propaganda-driven media and, in turn, exposing a more pragmatic, yet instrumental, approach to the role of public media in consolidating political power.

In September 2024, the Nepalese government passed a bill to merge Nepal Television (NTV) and Radio Nepal into a new entity called Public Service Broadcasting Nepal (PSBN), which is described as an effort to “advance the communication industry as a knowledge-based industry” and to promote press freedom. However, instead of granting PSBN full autonomy, the legislation placed it under the direct control of the Ministry of Communications. As part of the restructuring, early retirement packages have been offered to employees of both legacy institutions while the overall organizational framework of PSBN is still under review. The creation of PSBN has also been framed as an efficiency measure, intended to reduce spending from the national budget on media.

Elsewhere in South Asia, a similar proposal was introduced in Sri Lanka in February 2024 to merge the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (SLRC) and the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC) into a single media holding, aimed at addressing financial inefficiencies and reducing service overlap amid operational losses incurred since 2022. However, by June 2025 the government shelved the plan, citing structural incompatibilities between the two organizations, and instead opted to keep SLBC and SLRC separate while pursuing a more unified strategic roadmap. Critics contend that the short-lived merger proposal was less about efficiency and more about exerting pressure on journalists to align more closely with official narratives.

Continuing this wave of austerity-driven restructuring, the Vietnamese government decided to disband Vietnam Digital Television (VTC) and fold its remaining assets into Vietnam Television (VTV), now the country’s sole national broadcaster. VTC had been recognized for offering more diverse programming, particularly in non-political areas such as environmental issues, sports, and niche reporting on rural livelihoods. However, with VTC now fully absorbed into VTV, which functions as the de facto propaganda arm of the Socialist Party, media activists have criticized the move as a narrowing of public discourse and a further intensification of state-driven propaganda.

The wave of austerity has also extended to some of Asia’s most independent public media institutions. In March 2025, Taiwan’s Yuan Parliament passed a budget-cutting amendment that targeted the country’s public media. As a result, PTS, the flagship television network, saw its budget reduced by 25 percent, while TaiwanPlus, the international digital streaming service under the Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS), faced a 50 percent cut. Media observers warn that such reductions not only threaten the quality and sustainability of Taiwan’s domestic public broadcasting but also undermine Taiwan’s ability to reach international audiences and counterbalance China’s expanding media influence.

These efficiency measures, combined with intense financial pressures on operating costs and the persistent threat of budget cuts, have caused many Asian media organizations to lose editorial autonomy. Without a sustainable funding base, critical news reporting becomes increasingly untenable, creating a potential make-or-break moment for public interest journalism in the region. In response, some media firms have sought international partnerships to attract foreign investment. Yet, as in many other sectors, Asian media companies are increasingly turning to Chinese investors and influence as they expand their networks, a shift that raises serious concerns for their independence.

Vietnam, home to one of the largest Chinese diaspora communities, hosts numerous local media outlets that provide news and programming in Chinese, including Voice of Ho Chi Minh’s People, Sai Gon Giai Phong, the Vietnam News Agency (VNA), and VTV. Most notably, in April 2025 VTV entered into a multi-disciplinary partnership with China Media Group (CMG) to collaborate on co-producing content focused on technology, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, and shared political and cultural milestones. The partnership is framed as a way to strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries and to promote people-to-people diplomacy.

Chinese influence has run deep in the Indochina Peninsula since the late 2010s, as demonstrated by the launch of Chinese-language news portals operated by the Lao Press in Foreign Languages on Chinese social media platforms WeChat and Weibo in 2019. Since 2018, the Chinese government has also been the primary benefactor of Lao National TV, providing equipment upgrades, technical assistance, and direct financial support that has accounted for as much as 40 percent of its annual budget.

Two other ASEAN member states, which clashed in border skirmishes in July 2025, Thailand and Cambodia, are also among the prime recipients of Chinese funding in their public media sectors. Thailand signed an agreement with the Chinese government in 2019 to facilitate news-sharing initiatives between Xinhua News Agency and 12 Thai media outlets, as part of the so-called “ASEAN–China Year of Media Exchange.” Thailand’s largest public media outlet, Thai PBS, faced backlash in 2023 when it allegedly removed an interview with Taiwan’s foreign minister under pressure from Beijing.

On the other hand, Cambodian outlets Fresh News and Nice TV have both reportedly received funding from Chinese central and local government sources to sustain their operations. The explicit support of Fresh News’s CEO, Lim Chea Vutha, for China is well known. With its large online audience, Fresh News has not only become one of the most widely viewed news sources in the country, but it has also developed deep ties to Chinese propaganda, regularly republishing content produced by Xinhua and CGTN in both English and Khmer. Lim has also drawn frequent criticism for his lavish, Beijing-funded trips to China. These cases underscore Cambodia’s heavy dependence on Chinese assistance and highlight its vulnerability as an amplifier of Chinese propaganda.

As Southeast Asia’s largest economy and most populous nation, Indonesia has partnered with China so closely that it mirrors the level of Chinese influence seen among journalists in parts of Africa. Metro TV, Indonesia’s leading television news network, has been broadcasting daily Mandarin-language news programs since 2000 to serve the country’s sizable Chinese Indonesian community. The content was originally produced by local journalists and only later translated and presented in Mandarin. However, in 2019 Metro TV signed an agreement with China Media Group (CMG) to publish and republish Chinese-produced content, following in the footsteps of The Jakarta Post, an English-language newspaper that circulates content from China Daily, and Antara, Indonesia’s official news agency, which entered into similar arrangements with China Global Television Network (CGTN) and Xinhua.

Freedom House has reported that many young Indonesian journalists have been sent to China for journalism training, organized trips, and educational programs. Upon returning, a number of them echo Beijing’s official narratives in a favorable light, including on sensitive issues such as human rights abuses in Xinjiang Province.

China’s overarching influence in the Southeast Asian state media landscape has also extended into Singapore. Despite being a wealthy and relatively liberal nation, Singapore’s largest media conglomerate, SPH Media Trust (SMT), entered into a partnership with Xinhua to deepen media collaboration and, in its own words, “to tell the China–Singapore development story.” Such partnerships could further narrow critical coverage of China and embed state-driven bias within Singapore’s media landscape.

The recent surge in Chinese media presence across Asia has not occurred in a vacuum. Rather, it reflects a broader trend in which more nations are being drawn into Beijing’s orbit through multilateral frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and even BRICS. Since the majority of state-administered media organizations in Asia remain under government control, the closer Asian leaders move toward China’s sphere of influence, the more normalized it may become to see Chinese-produced content flooding the region’s information space.

In conclusion, Asia’s state and public media landscape in 2025 is defined by a dual trajectory. On one hand, the reclassification of Indonesia’s TVRI and RRI, Japan’s NHK, and South Korea’s KBS demonstrates that editorial independence can be reclaimed when journalists and citizens push back against political interference. On the other, budget cuts, efficiency drives, and the growing reliance on Chinese partnerships point to a countervailing trend that threatens to deepen state control and external influence. While reforms such as those underway in Bangladesh suggest possible openings for more independent public service media, austerity measures and China’s expanding footprint across the region risk narrowing the space for pluralism and critical reporting. Taken together, these developments reveal a media environment in constant transition, where the struggle for independence is real but increasingly constrained by financial vulnerability and geopolitical pressure.

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This year’s review expanded the dataset to include four additional outlets in Tanzania and two in Gabon. It also reclassified Sidwaya, a public media outlet in Burkina Faso, from “independent state-funded and state-managed/owned media” (ISFM) to “state-controlled” (SC). The downgrade followed the collapse of proposed legislation aimed at strengthening the outlet’s governance, which would have afforded Sidwaya’s journalists greater institutional protection. As a result, only two editorially independent outlets (categorized as ISFM) remain in the region—both in Côte d’Ivoire: the Société Nouvelle de Presse et d’Édition de Côte d’Ivoire (SNPECI), a state-owned publishing house, and the Agence Ivoirienne de Presse (AIP), the official news agency.

The 2025 findings thus mark yet another step in the steady erosion of state media independence across Sub-Saharan Africa. Beyond that, this year’s findings identify a couple of trends that now shape the region more profoundly than ever.

One is the growing influence of Chinese media across Africa, which has been the subject of debate since President Xi Jinping’s outreach to African leaders under the Belt and Road Initiative. New evidence has further shown the scale and sophistication of the Chinese presence. Researchers from the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) have traced financial flows from Chinese state media organizations, such as CGTN, Xinhua, and China Daily, directed towards African outlets. These funds have been used to both disseminate Chinese news content and produce locally tailored material, often in collaboration with African media companies. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has likewise documented the rise of the Chinese television network StarTimes, now Africa’s second-largest digital TV provider after South Africa’s DSTV, with satellite installations in over 10,000 homes across 20 countries. In parallel, under the ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiative, an increasing number of young African journalists and media executives are being trained in China, with costs covered by Chinese media conglomerates. While such initiatives are framed as partnerships, concerns persist that this expanding digital footprint serves Chinese strategic interests at the expense of African media independence and local development priorities. The State Media Monitor has also documented a growing number of cases in which African media outlets receive support from, or enter into cooperation agreements with, Chinese state-controlled media.

A second significant trend is the fragility of recent gains in African public media, where apparent improvements in editorial objectivity and financial stability often rest on precarious political foundations. In South Africa, for instance, the public service broadcaster SABC, which operates four television channels and 18 radio stations, reported a 95% reduction in operational debt in FY 2024/2025 and earned praise for balanced coverage during the 2024 general election. Yet, interviews with SABC journalists reveal that many editors and newsroom staff remain closely connected to African National Congress officials, with editorial decisions still subject to political influence and behind-the-scenes bargaining. Financially, much of SABC’s recent revenue growth came from a one-off surge in advertising linked to the launch of its digital platform, SABC Plus OTT. Its primary statutory funding source, the television licence fee, continues to collapse, with fewer than 20% of households paying as of FY 2024/2025, underscoring sustained public distrust. A government proposal in October 2023 to replace the licence fee with a direct household levy was shelved ahead of the 2024 election.

In Nigeria, an overhaul of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA)’s executive board, bringing in locally experienced industry figures, has sparked cautious optimism over editorial reform. However, as the NTA chairman remains a presidential appointee, concerns over political influence persist. In March 2025, President Bola Tinubu appointed party officials to the role, prompting watchdogs and NGOs to warn that without an independent oversight commission, the NTA continues to serve primarily as a government mouthpiece.

The six new entries in this year’s State Media Monitor—Tanzania’s Sahara Media Group, Uhuru Media Group, IPP Media, and Azam Media Ltd, along with Gabon’s Société de presse et d’édition du Gabon (SONAPRESSE) and Gabon 24—are all either largely state-controlled or heavily influenced by government authorities in their editorial policies and news production. While the four Tanzanian outlets are, on paper, privately owned, in practice they maintain close ties to the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. In some cases, these connections are explicit, such as Uhuru Media Group, which is directly owned by the party, while others are deeply intertwined with state enterprises and business conglomerates, functioning in effect as informal government propaganda arms.

In Gabon, SONAPRESSE and Gabon 24 serve as key state media outlets. SONAPRESSE is owned by the state and operates under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Communication, while Gabon 24 falls under the tight control of the president’s office.

Overall, apparent gains in public media freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa, whether through structural reforms, increased funding, or more balanced coverage, should be viewed with caution. Political backroom dealings continue to erode public trust, and without robust legal safeguards such as transparent budgets, independent oversight bodies, and merit-based leadership appointments, these surface-level improvements are unlikely to translate soon into a genuinely free and independent public media environment.

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The State Media Monitor project observed no significant improvements in the independence of state and public media in the region over the past year. On the contrary, we added two more state-affiliated media firms in El Salvador—Grupo Samix and Grupo Órbita—both classified as captured public/state-managed media (CaPu). Owing to insufficient evidence of public ownership, we also removed Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala Broadcasting from SMM’s typology. Likewise, the Cuban union-run weekly Trabajadores, which has ceased offering publicly available news and now confines itself to internal union updates, was excluded from this year’s analysis.

Apart from spending cuts, and the persistent threat of them, across several public service media outlets, notably in Mexico, Bolivia, and Honduras, few emerging trends in the Latin America region were observed. In El Salvador, the backsliding of democracy accelerated following a constitutional amendment enabling President Nayib Bukele to remain in power for life. Independent journalism has become almost impossible, with all public media outlets repurposed to serve the government’s political agenda. In Cuba, the last remaining bastion of communism in the Western Hemisphere, media freedom remains under constant assault.

While Latin America retains a more diverse state and public media landscape than many other regions, political pressure and threats to independent journalism are mounting. Populist politicians in positions of power have openly targeted state and public media they cannot fully control, fuelling self-censorship and hastening the collapse of critical reporting.

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Out of the 84 media institutions assessed in this year’s report, only three are considered to maintain editorial independence: the Israeli public broadcasters IPBC and Galatz, and Sky News Arabia, a joint venture between the UK-based Sky Group and the Abu Dhabi Media Investment Corporation (ADMIC), a firm linked to the Emirati royal family.

However, the situation appears to be deteriorating further. Two of the region’s few independent outlets—IPBC and Galatz—are facing mounting political pressure amid the escalating conflict in Gaza. The Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has come under heightened international scrutiny, particularly from the UK, Canada, and several European states, which have signalled their support for recognising Palestinian statehood. In this context, Netanyahu’s administration has intensified its efforts to undermine the editorial independence of Israel’s public broadcasters.

In March 2024, the Knesset, the Israeli legislature, passed a new regulation empowering a government-appointed committee to scrutinize IPBC’s financial records and banning the organisation from producing films and documentaries. The move is widely seen as a means to coerce journalists into toeing the official line under threat of budget cuts. Similarly, officials have exerted pressure on Galatz, an IDF-run radio network, to adopt more government-friendly narratives in its coverage of the Gaza conflict. Nonetheless, both outlets have, thus far, held the line, demonstrating notable journalistic resilience. Their resistance has warranted their continued classification under the “Independent State-Funded and State-Managed” (ISFM) category in our typology.

In Iran, the last vestiges of editorial autonomy were effectively extinguished in 2025 when ISNA, the country’s only remaining semi-independent outlet, was brought entirely under state control, largely in response to its extensive reporting on Gaza. This development marks the final consolidation of Iran’s media environment under state dominance. The government’s tightening grip is further evidenced by the 2025 national budget, which dramatically increased allocations for state propaganda and ideological messaging.

Amid this bleak regional outlook, a few green shoots of reform have nonetheless emerged. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024 has sparked cautious optimism about the future of Syrian public media. The newly installed administration, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, appointed Hamza al-Mustafa, a figure with a reputation for independence and experience in media management, as Minister of Information. Furthermore, investigations have been launched into historic financial mismanagement at the Syrian Arab Publishing and Distributing Company and the Al Wahda Foundation, two of Syria’s major state-run media conglomerates. Whether these initial steps will translate into genuine liberalization of Syria’s long-captive media sector remains to be seen.

In conclusion, the public media landscape in the MENA region remains largely bleak, with no substantive improvement, and, in many cases, further deterioration, observed over the past year. Tight state control, opaque governance, and punitive censorship continue to define the region’s media ecology. Barring sweeping structural reforms, these trends are expected to persist in the immediate future.

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The government maintains a firm grip on state and public media, with over 84% of the 601 state-administered media companies in 170 countries covered by the State Media Monitor exhibiting a lack of editorial independence. This represents a slight increase of 1% compared to the previous year. The inclusion of 13 additional countries in the 2024 State Media Monitor edition has led to the discovery of an even greater extent of government control over state and public media outlets across the globe.

The state-controlled (SC) model, encompassing media outlets that are wholly owned and operated by the government, which has a big say in their editorial agenda, continues to be the dominant model globally. Our analysis indicates that approximately 65% of all state and public media outlets monitored in the project fall within this category. The SC model accounts for approximately 77% of the 505 state and public media outlets lacking editorial independence. The remaining 13% are represented by captured media, either private or public media that have been influenced by the government (for a detailed explanation of the differences between the various forms of editorial control by the government, refer to our Methodology and Matrix).

The dominance of government-controlled media is further reinforced when we consider the overall portfolios of assets they hold. Our analysis revealed that the 601 state and public media outlets monitored by the State Media Monitor collectively possess nearly 7,000 media assets, including television and radio channels, print publications, news agencies, and news portals.

The current state of state and public media can be further assessed by analyzing the number of media outlets that still maintain editorial independence. In 2024, a total of 96 state and public media outlets were editorially autonomous, representing a decrease of three outlets compared to the previous year. This is an even more significant decline when considering that we added 13 more countries to the analysis in 2024. Of those, only 18 media outlets were categorized as Independent Public (IP) media, representing the pinnacle of independence within the public media sector. A total of 13 of the aforementioned outlets are located in Europe, with nine of them situated in Western European countries. The four non-Western independent public media in Europe are RTP in Portugal, Czech Television, and the public broadcasters in Lithuania (LRT) and Slovenia (RTVSLO).

However, the future of independent public media in Europe remains uncertain. Attacks by political groups, particularly right-wing parties, on public service media have persisted. While the victory of the Labour Party in the UK elections in July 2024 is anticipated to be favorable for the BBC, challenges to the license-based funding model of the broadcaster persist as the corporation undergoes a significant restructuring of its operations. In a separate development, the victory of the far-right Freedom Party in the Austrian elections in September 2024 is anticipated to result in significant challenges for Austria’s public broadcaster ORF. Right-wing parties in Austria have previously indicated that, should they assume power, they will seek to reduce the budget of the ORF, which could have an adverse impact on its operational and editorial independence.

Europe is also witnessing a notable shift towards a state-controlled model, which is a first for the region. The number of media outlets in the state-controlled (SC) model in our Matrix, representing the form of absolute state-controlled media, has increased from 24 in 2023 to 31 in 2024. The government’s significant control over private media in countries like Hungary, Serbia, and Turkey further complicates the situation.

It is a troubling trend to observe the gradual decline of the public service model on a global scale. In five other regions of the world—Eurasia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Oceania—no independent public media outlets have been identified.

Concurrently, the state-controlled model is predominant in numerous regions worldwide, with its prevalence on the rise, albeit modestly. The SC model accounts for 86% and 83% of all state and public media in Sub-Saharan Africa and Eurasia, respectively. They are followed by Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and MENA (for more regional insights, read our Regional Overviews).

The majority of changes in our typology over the past year indicate an overwhelmingly negative trend. Of the 14 media outlets whose typology changed in 2024, only two indicate an improvement: Polska Press in Poland, a publisher that the newly elected government has released from its editorial control, and Corporación State de Radio y Televisión (CERTV) in the Dominican Republic, which has significantly enhanced its editorial coverage over the past year.

In contrast, over the past year, we have observed a series of reversals in terms of editorial independence in countries across the globe. In Slovakia, the public broadcaster STVR (formerly RTVS) has been captured by the new regime of Robert Fico. In Thailand, the Thai PBS has begun to succumb to censorship by the government. In South Korea, the public broadcaster KBS has been the target of an unprecedented concentrated attack by the government aimed at controlling its governance. A comparable pattern has emerged among regional television broadcasters in Spain, with public broadcasters in Catalonia (CCMA), Canaries (RTVC), Aragon (CARTV), and Ceuta (RTVCE) all experiencing a loss of editorial independence due to heightened control by regional governments.

State and Public Media: Where To Next?

There has been minimal improvement in the state and public media sectors over the past year. Indeed, there has been an observable trend towards increased government control, with numerous broadcasters experiencing direct influence on their editorial content from government pressures and intervention.

As global conflicts and wars persist, the government’s involvement in state media has grown, resulting in increasingly fierce competition between a growing number of propaganda narratives from a series of regimes. The competition for control of the narrative has sharpened further as a result of the elections that took place in more than 50 nations during 2024. In addition to governments, political actors and private businesses have also been vying for influence in this area. According to the State Media Monitor, less than a quarter of all countries experiencing elections in 2024 have independent state and public media outlets with editorial autonomy, which has posed significant risks to the integrity of the news ecosystem around these political processes.

Europe remains the most diverse media market in terms of state and public media, with the highest number of independent outlets globally. However, Europe is also witnessing an intensifying conflict between political forces seeking to dismantle and destabilize public service media in their efforts to gain control of these outlets, some of which enjoy high levels of public trust and support. Moreover, in addition to direct government control, numerous European countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, continue to experience high levels of media capture. In these instances, private companies that receive financial or other forms of support from the government exercise considerable influence over numerous privately owned media outlets, directing them to align with the government’s agenda.

In other parts of the world, state authorities continue to exert significant control over the state and public media landscape. In some countries, particularly nations across Sub-Saharan Africa, the lack of a functional media market leaves media companies vulnerable to state pressures and influence. In many countries in the MENA region, the government has consolidated its control over the largest media companies in operation. While Latin America and the Caribbean exhibit a more diverse state and public media landscape, the region is also impacted by the prevalence of state-controlled media, which represent 77% of all state and public media outlets surveyed in the region.

The competition for global information dominance is also intensifying, with governments ramping up their efforts to establish influential news outlets for disseminating their messages in the international communication landscape. A number of countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and Turkey, are investing significant resources in enhancing their news operations with the objective of reaching audiences outside their domestic markets. Their scope and reach are extensive and continue to expand, making them challenging to map and analyze in some cases.

China and Russia, the world’s authoritarian superpowers, have extensive state-run media operations that have expanded across the globe. We believe that their reach extends far beyond the scope of the State Media Monitor’s tracking capabilities. In addition to state-financed media, the two countries have also increased their networking efforts with the goal of forming alliances with media outlets in various countries. China, for instance, has been highly active in leveraging its media companies to extend its reach by entering into collaboration agreements or providing financial assistance to state media outlets across numerous countries in Africa and Southeast Asia, as evidenced by our analysis.

These developments indicate a further reinforcement of the government’s centrality within the global media ecosystem. In numerous countries across the globe, governments are transitioning from their traditional roles as centers of power and influence to a more direct control over the production of news. This shift has resulted in news production strategies being formulated within government offices, with state media and their journalists assuming the role of mere executors. These developments are likely to result in the further suppression of independent media and journalism, as well as a renewed emphasis on propaganda narratives that have a detrimental impact on the health of the infosphere in many of our societies.

Government control over state and public media

Editorial independence of state and public media

State Media Monitor Resources

Typology: see how we classify state and public media outlets (State Media Matrix)

Methodology: see how we collect data to be able to classify state and public media outlets

Regional overviews: see more detailed analysis about how state and public media perform in their region

Global list: find the state and public media you are interested in by checking checking our state and public media list

Read the key findings of the State Media Monitor in the past years

2023 Global Analysis of State and Public Media

2022 Global Analysis of State and Public Media

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