Media assets

Television: :1, :2, :Sport, :24

Radio: SRo1: Rádio Slovensko, SRo2: Rádio Regina, SRo3: Rádio Devín, SRo4: Rádio FM, SRo5: Rádio Patria, SRo6: Radio Slovakia International, SRo7: Rádio Pyramida, SRo8: Rádio Litera, SRo9: Rádio Junior

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

STVR is regulated by the Slovak Television and Radio Act (Law No. 157/2024), which came into effect on 1 July 2024. This act revoked the previous, more autonomous RTVS statute and established a new governance system granting decisive influence to the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Finance, and Parliament over the appointment of the STVR Board.

The nine-member STVR Board elects both the Director General and the STVR Ethics Committee, concentrating authority in a politically aligned body. The Board composition enables full control by the governing coalition: three members nominated by the Ministry of Culture, one by the Ministry of Financr and five by Parliament.

The appointment procedures fall short of transparency and openness obligations. For the four government-nominated positions, no public call or hearing took place, and the Ministry of Culture merely approved names proposed by an internal commission. Parliamentary appointments are formally debated but effectively limited to coalition-backed candidates, with opposition nominees consistently excluded.

The reform sparked protests among journalists, opposition parties, and civil society groups, with former RTVS director general Ľuboš Machaj calling it a “black day” for Slovak media. Media freedom organizations, including IPI and the European Federation of Journalists, criticized the move as incompatible with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).

The current Board is composed entirely of pro-government members. Among them:

• Lukáš Machala, Vice-Chair, serves simultaneously as Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Culture and is a close SNS ally.
• Peter Benčurík, a former spokesperson for oligarchic group Slavia Capital, has ties to SNS-linked networks.
• Jozef Krošlák, ex-spokesperson for authoritarian former PM Vladimír Mečiar.
• David Lindtner, former judge and legal advisor to PM Robert Fico, connected to Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák and representing multiple SMER affiliates in corruption cases.
• Igor Gallo, previously RTVS Board Chair during earlier politicisation, has links to SMER-linked oligarch Jozef Brhel.
• Eva Koprenová, a former SMER government spokesperson.

The remaining members, while not publicly affiliated, were approved through the coalition’s internal coordination process, ensuring full loyalty.

In 2025, the Board appointed Martina Flašíková, daughter of a SMER founder, as Director General. She previously ran a pro-government disinformation website established by her father, where partisan commentary regularly displaced factual reporting. Her election was widely interpreted as an openly political appointment, demonstrating the coalition’s intent to capture the broadcaster.

Earlier, in August 2024, Peter Nittnaus—a former manager under ex-RTVS chief Jaroslav Rezník—was appointed head of STVR’s news channel :24, reviving fears of editorial intimidation. Nittnaus was previously known for enforcing political pressure on journalists under SNS-led governments. These appointments were facilitated by the pro-government composition of the Board, which elected both Nittnaus and Flašíková without meaningful opposition.

Source of funding and budget

Until 2023, RTVS was financed by a mix of licence fees, advertising, and state subsidies. In July 2023, parliament abolished the licence fee, making the broadcaster fully dependent on allocations from the state budget.

For 2024, STVR’s budget was set at 0.12% of GDP, equivalent to about €131 million, down from the previous 0.17% under RTVS, a cut of around €55 million. The reduction caused significant financial strain, forcing discussions about cutting programming and potentially closing one television channel.

While STVR is formally entitled to 0.12% of GDP annually, observers have described this amount as “insufficient” and vulnerable to political manipulation. Additional ad hoc funding from the Ministry of Culture or through so-called “contracts with the state” remains possible, further entrenching dependence on government decisions, according to Media Capture Monitoring Report for Slovakia. Advertising is allowed, and new provisions suggest STVR could expand commercial slots compared to RTVS, although this remains under review.

Editorial independence

RTVS enjoyed a reputation for balanced and independent coverage until recent years, but political influence intensified after 2020, with investigative programming reduced and pressure on journalists mounting.

There were early indications of censorship under the interim leadership already in 2024, when several journalists resigned in protest at editorial interference. The trend intensified following Flašíková’s appointment. Her first decisions included cancelling the discussion programme hosted by respected journalist Michal Havran, an opinion writer for Denník SME, while retaining a parallel show by Jaroslav Daniška, a conservative commentator whose website had previously been labelled disinformational. This asymmetry underscored a deliberate editorial bias.

Flašíková also announced the hiring of a journalist dismissed from a private news channel after airing a pro-Russian interview, known for favourable coverage of coalition politicians, expressed intent to hire another journalist forced to leave an Austrian newspaper for homophobic remarks, and cancelled a fact-checking and disinformation-debunking programme, narrowing editorial diversity further. Collectively, these moves consolidate a right-wing, conservative, and pro-Russian editorial line, reflecting the ideological profile of the ruling parties.

Although Slovak law formally requires public service broadcasting to ensure balance and impartiality, enforcement now lies with the politically appointed STVR Board, which has also established a new Ethical Commission mirroring its own partisan structure. Key members include Eduard Chmelár, former advisor to PM Robert Fico, and Maroš Smolec, nationalist activist and former SMER–SNS candidate in regional elections. These appointments demonstrate the absence of any internal counterbalance to political control.

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) implementation act adopted in 2025 formally expands the powers of the Regulatory Authority for Media Services (RpMS) to oversee STVR. However, the RpMS already handled complaints and issued occasional bias rulings under RTVS, making the new powers largely symbolic. Their practical enforcement remains untested.

The transformation of RTVS into STVR has shifted Slovakia’s public broadcaster decisively into the State-Controlled (SC) category of the State Media Matrix. With its governance bodies fully politicized, its finances dependent on annual government allocations, and its newsroom subject to dismissals and censorship, STVR represents the most far-reaching example of political capture of Slovak public broadcasting since the 1990s.

October 2025

The article draws on MJRC’s research covering 606 public media organizations across 170 countries, noting that 85 % are now classified as captured or controlled — an increase from 84 % in 2024.

Read the full article here: Media Azi – Un nou studiu despre tendințe globale în mass-media.

The State Media Monitor 2025, published by the Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC), presents data from 170 countries, showing continued declines in public media independence worldwide.

See the PMA feature here.

The 2025 State Media Monitor reveals a further erosion of editorial independence in state and public media worldwide. Out of the 606 outlets surveyed, 512 (85%) are captured or controlled, compared to 505 out of 601 (84%) in 2024. This marginal decline underscores a continuing downward trajectory since monitoring began in 2021.

The State Controlled (SC) model remains the most widespread, accounting for 392 outlets in 2025, only slightly below last year’s 393. Most SC outlets are located in Asia (86), Sub-Saharan Africa (116), MENA (52), and Eurasia (54). By contrast, the number of Independent Public Media (IP)—the benchmark for editorial autonomy—remains stubbornly low. The total rose from 18 outlets in 2024 to 19 in 2025, representing just 3% of the global sample, with 13 based in Europe, 4 in Asia, and 2 in North America. (for a detailed explanation of the differences between the various forms of editorial control by the government, refer to our Methodology and Matrix).

Overall, the number of outlets displaying genuine editorial independence declined from 96 in 2024 to 94 in 2025, the lowest since the launch of the Monitor. The deterioration was marked by the loss of six outlets that had previously been ranked as independent. At the same time, Captured Private Media (CaPr) grew from 48 in 2024 to 53 in 2025, showing how governments increasingly rely on economic leverage to bend private ownership structures to their advantage. Captured Public or State Managed Media (CaPu) also increased slightly, from 64 in 2024 to 67 in 2025.

The most dramatic shift occurred in the United States, a country traditionally perceived as safer ground for editorially independent media. In a historical development, a North American outlet was downgraded to SC status. In early 2025, the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM)—the umbrella for Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and the Middle East Broadcasting Network—was brought directly under the control of President Trump’s administration. Funding freezes and management purges left most of these broadcasters dormant, with only VOA surviving at a third of its former staff capacity. In parallel, Congress froze funding for PBS, effectively suspending operations and putting its workforce on indefinite leave. This shift illustrates how quickly public media independence can collapse even in established democracies.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, conditions were not much better. The region counted 51 state-controlled outlets in 2025, roughly the same as in 2024, with only six media companies retaining some form of independence.

Elsewhere, patterns remained broadly consistent with the previous year. Europe continued to stand out as a relative stronghold of independence, with 54 outlets out of 116 maintaining editorial freedom, though losses in Spain demonstrate that even in Europe the trend is fragile. Sub-Saharan Africa offered the starkest imbalance: of 137 outlets surveyed, 116 were state controlled and only two displayed any degree of independence. MENA remained dominated by state influence, with 52 SC outlets, unchanged from 2024. Asia recorded a small improvement in the IP category, which rose from three to four outlets, but still had one of the highest concentrations of SC media globally with 86. Oceania remained the most balanced region, with four ISFM outlets, three ISF, and one SC, though its sample is small at only nine outlets in total.

Taken together, the results confirm a world in which independent public media are increasingly rare, captured media are on the rise, and the United States—long seen as a bastion of editorial independence—is no longer immune to the global trend of political interference and state control.

Cite this study

Dragomir, M. & Jasin, M. R. (2025). Independence Under Siege: The State Media Monitor 2025 Global Study. Media and Journalism Research Center: Tallinn/London/Santiago de Compostela.

Go to the study key findings and conclusions web page: click here.

Download the full study

Read the full study here.

The 2025 State Media Monitor reveals a further erosion of editorial independence in state and public media worldwide. Out of the 606 outlets surveyed, 512 (85%) are captured or controlled, compared to 505 out of 601 (84%) in 2024. This marginal decline underscores a continuing downward trajectory since monitoring began in 2021.

The State Controlled (SC) model remains the most widespread, accounting for 392 outlets in 2025, only slightly below last year’s 393. Most SC outlets are located in Asia (86), Sub-Saharan Africa (116), MENA (52), and Eurasia (54). By contrast, the number of Independent Public Media (IP)—the benchmark for editorial autonomy—remains stubbornly low. The total rose from 18 outlets in 2024 to 19 in 2025, representing just 3% of the global sample, with 13 based in Europe, 4 in Asia, and 2 in North America. (for a detailed explanation of the differences between the various forms of editorial control by the government, refer to our Methodology and Matrix).

Overall, the number of outlets displaying genuine editorial independence declined from 96 in 2024 to 94 in 2025, the lowest since the launch of the Monitor. The deterioration was marked by the loss of six outlets that had previously been ranked as independent. At the same time, Captured Private Media (CaPr) grew from 48 in 2024 to 53 in 2025, showing how governments increasingly rely on economic leverage to bend private ownership structures to their advantage. Captured Public or State Managed Media (CaPu) also increased slightly, from 64 in 2024 to 67 in 2025.

The most dramatic shift occurred in the United States, a country traditionally perceived as safer ground for editorially independent media. In a historical development, a North American outlet was downgraded to SC status. In early 2025, the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM)—the umbrella for Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and the Middle East Broadcasting Network—was brought directly under the control of President Trump’s administration. Funding freezes and management purges left most of these broadcasters dormant, with only VOA surviving at a third of its former staff capacity. In parallel, Congress froze funding for PBS, effectively suspending operations and putting its workforce on indefinite leave. This shift illustrates how quickly public media independence can collapse even in established democracies.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, conditions were not much better. The region counted 51 state-controlled outlets in 2025, roughly the same as in 2024, with only six media companies retaining some form of independence.

Elsewhere, patterns remained broadly consistent with the previous year. Europe continued to stand out as a relative stronghold of independence, with 54 outlets out of 116 maintaining editorial freedom, though losses in Spain demonstrate that even in Europe the trend is fragile. Sub-Saharan Africa offered the starkest imbalance: of 137 outlets surveyed, 116 were state controlled and only two displayed any degree of independence. MENA remained dominated by state influence, with 52 SC outlets, unchanged from 2024. Asia recorded a small improvement in the IP category, which rose from three to four outlets, but still had one of the highest concentrations of SC media globally with 86. Oceania remained the most balanced region, with four ISFM outlets, three ISF, and one SC, though its sample is small at only nine outlets in total.

Taken together, the results confirm a world in which independent public media are increasingly rare, captured media are on the rise, and the United States—long seen as a bastion of editorial independence—is no longer immune to the global trend of political interference and state control.

Government control of state and public media

Editorial Independence of State and Public Media

Despite the relentless assault on media independence recorded this year, the 2025 results also reveal important shifts, both positive and negative, across all regions. They show that editorial capture is not a one-way street and that changes in political context or governance can trigger rapid reclassifications within the State Media Matrix.

Several countries announced reform processes in 2025 that could, in principle, improve their media landscapes. Bangladesh, Syria, and Nigeria all launched initiatives to overhaul their public media systems following regime changes. Yet these plans remain fragile and largely aspirational. In places where institutions have been severely weakened, such as Syria, the prospect of building truly independent public media will be an especially arduous and uncertain task. Even in Bangladesh and Nigeria, where reforms appear more structured, entrenched political interests and unstable governance make the implementation of editorial safeguards far from guaranteed. These developments are important to note, but they should be treated with caution rather than celebrated as clear gains.

In Asia, the most notable improvements came from Indonesia, where both Television of the Republic of Indonesia (TVRI) and Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) were upgraded from State Controlled (SC) status to Independent State Funded and Managed (ISFM). These changes were driven by the appointment of seasoned media professionals to their boards and by ambitious digital transformation programmes that helped counter disinformation during the 2024 general election. In South Korea, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) regained its Independent Public Media (IP) ranking after major reforms to broadcasting laws strengthened its editorial safeguards. Similarly, Japan’s NHK improved its position, moving from the Captured Public (CaPu) category to Independent State Managed (ISM) status as part of a broader government commitment to strengthen independence in public broadcasting.

In Europe, the return of Donald Tusk’s liberal government in Poland in late 2023 translated into real improvements in 2025. Three of the country’s major outlets—Polish Television (TVP), Polish Radio, and the Polish Press Agency (PAP)—were upgraded, with TVP and Polish Radio now classified as ISFM, and PAP as ISM. This represents a remarkable turnaround after years of political capture under the previous administration. Yet despite these formal upgrades, the Polish case remains highly complex: the government faces the monumental task of rebuilding institutions that were hollowed out during years of politicisation, and genuine independence will not be easy to achieve. The case of Poland highlights both the possibility of recovery and the enormous structural challenges that follow capture.

Elsewhere in Europe, however, setbacks dominated. Spain witnessed the loss of independence in multiple regional broadcasters. Ens Públic de Radiotelevisió de les Illes Balears (EPRTVIB) and Corporació Audiovisual de la Comunitat Valenciana (CACVSA) were downgraded to SC, joining Catalonia’s CCMA, Radio Televisión Canaria (RTVC), and Corporación Aragonesa de Radio y Televisión (CARTV), all of which lost their independence in 2024. Although Radio Televisión Ceuta (RTVCE) regained ISFM status, the overall picture is of serious deterioration in Spain’s regional public media sector. Similarly, Montenegro’s RTCG fell back into SC, erasing the limited progress achieved in 2023, while Greece’s AMNA slid from ISFM to SC. These developments underscore the fragility of editorial autonomy even within EU member and candidate states.

Sub-Saharan Africa saw further expansion of captured private conglomerates, particularly in Tanzania, where Sahara Media Group, Uhuru Media Group, IPP Media, and Azam Media Ltd all shifted into the CaPr category, illustrating the growing reliance of private outlets on state patronage and concessions. In Burkina Faso, the leading public media house Sidwaya was downgraded to SC, underlining the country’s broader democratic backsliding following the coup that happened in 2023.

In Eurasia, Moldova’s Teleradio-Moldova (TRM) was reclassified from ISFM to ISF, indicating a cautious improvement as its governance board began implementing reforms designed to reduce direct government influence. But Central Asia showed further evidence of capture: Kazakhstan’s Qazcontent was downgraded to SC, while in Uzbekistan new outlets such as Mening Yurtim (MY5) and Daryo.uz were classified as CaPu, and Radio Grand as CaPr.

In Latin America, the overall picture remained mixed. The Dominican Republic’s CERTV gained independence in 2024, but Mexico’s Canal 22 slid into SC in 2025. In El Salvador, the consolidation of power under President Bukele extended to the private sector, with both Grupo Samix and Grupo Orbita now classified as CaPu, confirming the entanglement of private owners with government patronage.

Taken together, these changes show that the global picture of the public media landscape remains one of gradual deterioration, but also with pockets of resistance and even recovery. The reinstatement of independence in Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, and Poland illustrates that reforms are possible, especially when backed by political change and professionalised governance. At the same time, the setbacks in Spain, Montenegro, Greece, and, especially, in the United States underline how fragile independence remains, and how difficult it will be to rebuild trust and autonomy in systems that have been deeply damaged.

Several broader dynamics defined the global state and public media landscape in 2025, cutting across regions and typologies.

First, governments seem to be tightening their grip on outlets that report on sensitive geopolitical conflicts. Coverage of the war in Gaza has become the clearest flashpoint. In Israel, both IPBC and Galatz faced sustained political pressure from Prime Minister Netanyahu’s administration over their handling of the conflict. Although they have so far retained their classification as independent, their editorial space is under constant threat. These examples confirm a broader trend: whenever public broadcasters provide narratives that deviate from official state lines on international crises, they become immediate targets for political reprisal.

Second, budget cuts and financial restructuring are increasingly wielded as political tools. Governments present these steps as efficiency drives or fiscal prudence, but the effects are clear: weakened capacity, shrinking editorial independence, and greater susceptibility to executive influence. Taiwan’s Yuan Parliament slashed PTS’s budget by 25 percent; Nepal merged its public broadcasters into a new entity as a cost-saving measure; and the Israeli Knesset gave itself powers to audit IPBC’s finances.

The most dramatic case is the United States, where developments went far beyond technical funding debates. Under President Donald Trump’s second administration, the suspension of budgets for USAGM and PBS was not just an economic measure but part of a wider ideological offensive against public and independent media. The closures and layoffs that followed were designed to neutralize outlets seen as obstacles to the White House’s agenda, leaving most of USAGM’s landmark subsidiaries dormant and PBS effectively shuttered. At the same time, the administration intensified its attacks on private media companies and regulators, framing independent journalism as a partisan enemy rather than a democratic institution. This dual assault—disabling public service broadcasters while delegitimizing independent private outlets and oversight bodies—illustrates how quickly even long-established democracies can slide into an environment of systemic hostility to media independence.

Third, public media continue to be treated as political bargaining chips, reshaped after elections or regime changes. Where transitions led to reformist governments, as in Syria, Bangladesh, and Poland, new leaders moved to restructure governance boards and appoint professionals with journalistic credibility. Syria’s interim administration under President Ahmad al-Sharaa has promised sweeping structural reforms, including placing a respected media figure in charge of the Ministry of Information. Bangladesh’s caretaker government has set out plans to merge BTV, Bangladesh Betar, and BSS into a single National Broadcasting Corporation that would have its editorial independence guaranteed. Poland’s new leadership worked on cutting the political pressures on TVP, Polish Radio, and PAP following the end of the Law and Justice (PiS) party rule. Yet, in all three cases, entrenched patronage networks and politicized legacies mean that independence will be extremely difficult to entrench. Where political change moved in the opposite direction, the results were immediate and damaging: El Salvador’s President Bukele cemented control over both public and private broadcasters, while the Trump administration’s direct interventions effectively collapsed U.S. public media governance. The lesson from 2025 is that public media remain extraordinarily vulnerable to the direction of electoral politics, whether reformist or authoritarian.

Fourth, China’s influence continues to expand into a structural feature of global media. In Asia, six major ASEAN countries—Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Singapore—deepened partnerships with Xinhua and other Chinese state media, producing joint news content, training journalists in China, and rebroadcasting Beijing’s narratives domestically. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, media outlets opened Mandarin-language programmes, often with direct support from Chinese media companies. In Cambodia and Laos, governments actively relied on Chinese funding to prop up local state media operations, effectively outsourcing financial sustainability to Beijing. This pattern is striking: where local governments cut funding or impose financial constraints, Chinese partnerships increasingly fill the gap, entrenching foreign influence in editorial agendas and reducing the scope for independent reporting.

Other dynamics reinforced these trends. Europe remains home to the world’s largest cluster of independent outlets, yet the state-controlled model has consolidated as the single most common category, driven in the last year by regional broadcaster capture in Spain and political pressure in Slovakia and Montenegro. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Eurasia, the dominance of the state controlled and captured models remained overwhelming, with television and radio still the most effective control vectors. In MENA, the tiny number of independent outlets are under mounting siege, confirming the region’s reputation as one of the most repressive media environments worldwide.

Taken together, the 2025 data reveal a world where independence is chipped away not only by direct censorship or propaganda, but by financial manipulation, geopolitical confrontation, electoral politics, and foreign partnerships. Where reforms emerged, as in Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, and Poland, they remain fragile, contested, and easily reversible. The long-term trajectory continues to point towards attritional decline: independence is never secured once and for all, but must be defended against a widening array of pressures.

For more in-depth analysis, see the Regional Overviews here.

Conclusions: The Rise of a Government-Dominated Media Order

The 2025 State Media Monitor underscores a grim reality: globally, state and public media are edging ever closer to becoming extensions of government power. What were once exceptions—the direct steering of editorial agendas by political authorities—are increasingly the rule. Independent journalism survives, but mostly in fragile pockets, often under siege.

Political leaders are tightening their grip on coverage of sensitive conflicts, governments are using financial leverage to discipline broadcasters, public media are treated as bargaining chips after elections, and major global powers—most visibly China—are expanding their influence by filling funding gaps. Together these dynamics are producing a global information space dominated less by pluralistic journalism and more by propaganda clashes between states. In many regions, the very idea of public service broadcasting as a democratic institution is being hollowed out.

This trajectory carries two major dangers. The first is that as public media lose independence and credibility, citizens turn away from them. Audiences—especially younger ones—are already shifting toward social platforms, where information flows are unregulated and disinformation flourishes. The second is systemic: as governments pour resources into their own media and attack those of their rivals, the global media system risks becoming a battlefield of competing propaganda machines, with less space for fact-based journalism that serves the public interest.

Reversing this trend is already extraordinarily difficult. The conditions that sustain editorial independence—insulated and predictable funding, depoliticized governance, and robust legal safeguards—are being eroded in most regions. Single reforms or frameworks, like the European Media Freedom Act, at best can provide partial templates and a degree of leverage in specific jurisdictions. Globally, the defense of independent public media will depend on a patchwork of strategies: stronger international monitoring and solidarity networks, legal and institutional reforms tailored to local contexts, and, critically, sustained pressure from journalists and civil society to demand transparency, accountability, and professional standards. These efforts may not prevent capture and state dominance everywhere, but without them, the space for genuine public service journalism will continue to shrink.

The lesson of 2025 is sobering: independence is not a default condition but a contested achievement. If left undefended, it will be dismantled piece by piece until public media become indistinguishable from state propaganda.

Photo by Robin Jonathan Deutsch on Unsplash (used under Unsplash license)

State Media Monitor Resources

Typology: see how we classify state and public media outlets (State Media Matrix)

Methodology: see how we collect data to be able to classify state and public media outlets

Regional overviews: see more detailed analysis about how state and public media perform in their region

Global list: find the state and public media you are interested in by checking checking our state and public media list

Global study 2025: access to the full global study

Archive global studies: access to all the State Media Monitor annual global studies

Read the key findings of the State Media Monitor in the past years

2024 Global Analysis of State and Public Media

2023 Global Analysis of State and Public Media

2022 Global Analysis of State and Public Media

The distribution of models reveals important shifts in the past year. The State-Controlled (SC) model consolidated its position as the most widespread form of state media governance in Europe, with 31 outlets (27% of the total). This represents the second consecutive year that SC media outnumber all other models, a development first observed in 2024 when they overtook the Independent State Funded and State Managed (ISFM) category.

By contrast, the ISFM model, long considered the dominant type of independent public service systems in Europe, declined further to 26 outlets (22%), down from 27 in 2024 and 30 in 2023. Similarly, the Captured Public/State Managed (CaPu) category contracted to just 8 outlets (7%), compared with 9 in 2024 and 11 in 2023, suggesting a small but notable reduction in the number of public media outlets under direct political capture.

The Captured Private (CaPr) category remained stable at 23 outlets (20%), following a drop from 25 in 2023, underlining the persistence of politically influenced private media across the continent. At the same time, the Independent State Managed (ISM) model held steady at 10 outlets (9%), maintaining a small but stable segment of institutions with editorial independence under direct state management.

On a more positive note, Europe continues to be the global leader in Independent Public Media (IP), with 13 corporations (11%) operating across the region. Although the figure has not grown since 2024, it demonstrates that Europe remains the only region with a significant and enduring cluster of genuinely independent public service corporations. The Independent State Funded (ISF) category, however, shrank back to 5 outlets (4%) after a small rise in 2024.

Overall, the 2025 data confirm that Europe’s public media landscape is characterized by a slow erosion of independence, primarily driven by the expansion of state-controlled outlets and the continued weakening of state-funded but independent entities. Yet, the region remains unmatched globally for its concentration of independent public media institutions, which serve as a cornerstone for democratic resilience.

In 2025, editorial independence in Europe’s public media has continued to deteriorate, with several outlets downgraded in our typology. A notable case is Radio and Television of Montenegro (RTCG), which has now been classified as State Controlled (SC) following a series of government interventions that dismantled the broadcaster’s independence safeguards and undermined its role as a pluralistic media platform. Similarly, in Spain, Corporació Audiovisual de la Comunitat Valenciana (CACVSA), the public broadcaster in Valencia, and Ens Públic de Radiotelevisió de les Illes Balears (EPRTVIB), the broadcaster in the Balearic Islands, were also downgraded to SC after political authorities significantly tightened their control over editorial operations. These cases illustrate how fragile the institutional safeguards of public media remain in Europe, particularly in contexts where political polarization is acute and legal protections are weak or easily dismantled.

The situation in Spain’s regional public media has thus worsened dramatically. Out of the 15 regional broadcasters mapped in 2025, eight are now classified as State Controlled, compared to just one in 2022. This marks a rapid and concerning shift towards political instrumentalization of public broadcasters by regional governments. Much of this state control has been implemented by the conservative Partido Popular (PP) administrations, which have expanded their influence over regional broadcasters in communities where they govern. The tightening of editorial oversight by PP-led governments has further politicized regional public media, leaving them more vulnerable to partisan agendas and reducing their capacity to operate as independent institutions. This erosion not only undermines public trust in regional media but also contributes to the broader fragmentation of Spain’s media ecosystem, which has become more vulnerable to politicization than at any point in the past decade.

In Central Europe, Czech Television (ČT) has faced sustained political attacks in recent years, particularly from parties critical of its independent editorial stance. Although ČT has so far managed to resist direct government control and therefore has not been downgraded in our typology, the persistence of these attempts to undermine its governance and independence remains worrisome. The broadcaster’s ability to stave off capture illustrates the resilience of some European public media systems, but it also highlights the fragility of independence in environments where political elites increasingly view public service journalism as a target rather than a democratic asset.

By contrast, in Slovakia, the situation has deteriorated markedly since the return to power of Robert Fico’s Smer party. The public broadcaster, restructured and rebranded as STVR in 2024, increasingly functions as a state propaganda channel, amplifying government narratives. As a result, STVR was already downgraded to State Controlled (SC) in 2024, and its trajectory in 2025 confirms the persistence of this captured status. The case of Slovakia underscores how quickly public media institutions can be destabilized when political leaders move decisively to replace editorial independence with partisan control.

On the bright side, Poland has moved in the opposite direction. Following the 2023 elections and the subsequent reform agenda of the new government, public media outlets TVP and Polish Radio have been upgraded in our typology. The government has also initiated plans to sell Polska Press to relieve it from state ownership, aiming to restore pluralism in the publishing sector. While these reforms remain contested and face institutional resistance, they represent one of the most ambitious efforts in Europe to roll back media capture and rebuild independent public service broadcasting. However, the efforts to depoliticize the media remain very difficult after years of capture by the former PiS regime, which left deep-rooted structures and loyalists within the media system that continue to obstruct reform.

One trend that intensified across Europe is related to changes to funding models and mounting cost pressures that are reshaping public media—and, in several cases, sharpening political leverage over them. In Austria, ORF has moved through a major financing transition (from the device-based fee to a universal household contribution), but the shift has not ended the pressure: political debates around fee levels, exemptions, and efficiency mandates continue to squeeze room for investment in journalism and digital transformation, keeping ORF in a defensive posture. In Finland, Yle’s tax-based funding remains comparatively stable, yet real-terms budgets are tight as inflation, wage settlements, and platform costs outpace indexation, prompting savings programs and commissioning cuts that risk narrowing output. The picture is further darkened by the closure of Liechtenstein’s public broadcaster, Liechtensteinische Rundfunk (LRF), removing public service broadcasting from the country altogether.

In France, the government has revived plans to merge the main public media—including France Télévisions—into a single holding as a route to rationalize governance and cut costs. While advocates frame the merger as a digital-era modernization, unions and editorial staff warn that consolidation without ring-fenced, predictable funding could erode remit diversity and editorial autonomy.

Finally, the UK is entering the most consequential financing debate in decades: the BBC’s Charter renewal process (toward 2027) is now formally under way, with broad political consensus that the current license-fee model will be reworked. The direction is still open—ranging from a reformed license fee or household levy to forms of general taxation—but most scenarios point to a material change in the BBC’s funding model, with long-term implications for universality, scale, and independence.

Taken together, Europe’s trajectory is negative but the slide isn’t inevitable. Yet, the spread of state controlled models and tightening budgets show how fast gains can unravel. The decisive tests for 2026 will be whether governments lock in independent governance and predictable, and insulated funding in line with the European Media Freedom Act provisions to help public media fulfil their mission to serve the public, not the party in power.

Read Europe Overview 2024

Read Europe Overview 2023

Read Europe Overview 2022

Read Europe Overview 2021

Today, TRT operates a dozen television channels, most of which broadcast across the nation. Among these, TRT World stands out as it broadcasts internationally in English, catering to a global audience. Additionally, TRT owns radio channels with both a nationwide and local reach.

Media assets

Television: TRT1, TRT2, TRT Spor, TRT Cocuk, TRT Kurdi, TRT Arabi, TRT Muzik, TRT Belgesel, TRT Haber, TRT Turk, TRT Avaz, TRT World

Radio: National- Radyo 1, TRT FM, Radyo 3, TRT Nagme, TRT Turku, Voice of Turkey; Regional- Antalya Radyosu, Cukurova Radyosu, Erzurum Radyosu, Radyo GAP, Trabzon Radyosu, Kent Radyo Istanbul, Kent Radyo Ankara, Kent Radyo Izmir

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

The operations of TRT are governed by the Radio and Television Law, which delineates its objectives, powers, and responsibilities. The management of TRT is under the purview of the General Director (sometimes called Director General) and a multi-member board, which includes the General Director.

Previously, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), a Turkish state agency responsible for regulating radio and television broadcasters, held significant influence over the composition of TRT’s governing bodies. This was due to its legal authority to nominate candidates for the positions of General Director and Board members, from whom the government would then make appointments.

As of 2018, a presidential decree resulted in TRT being affiliated with the Presidential Communication Authority (the Directorate of Communications), and RTÜK being associated with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. This change formalized a closer institutional link between TRT and the Presidency.

In July 2025, Mehmet Zahid Sobacı was reappointed for a second four-year term as Director-General of TRT. He first took office in July 2021, replacing İbrahim Eren. 

Source of funding and budget

TRT’s funding model has long relied on a combination of earmarked taxes and government transfers, though the structure has shifted in recent years. Historically, revenues came from two main compulsory sources: a license fee collected through electricity bills and a so-called bandrol tax levied on electronic devices such as television and radio sets, and mobile phones. The electricity fee, which had been in place since 1984, was abolished in 2021 amid growing public anger over rising utility costs, leaving the broadcaster increasingly dependent on the bandrol tax and direct government allocations. According to analyses, this change tightened TRT’s reliance on state funding, with the bandrol tax and central budget transfers now constituting the overwhelming majority of its income.

According to media reports, TRT’s total revenues in 2021 amounted to TRY 5.6bn (US$ 488m), most of which was sourced from the government. In 2020, approximately 90% of TRT’s total budget was funded through the tax collected from electronic devices and the electricity bill.

TRT’s financial model has shifted decisively toward near-total reliance on compulsory fees and government support. In 2023, the broadcaster’s total revenue reached TRY 21.14 billion, of which an overwhelming 86.3% (TRY 18.24 billion) came from bandrol licensing fees on electronic devices. By contrast, advertising and other commercial sources accounted for only 13.7%, down from 17% in 2022. This marks a steep increase in dependence on taxpayer-derived income: in 2022, bandrol fees represented 80.1% of total revenue, already a dominant share but still lower than the 2023 figure.

Editorial independence

Despite constitutional provisions asserting its independence, TRT has consistently been subjected to intense political control throughout its existence. Defined as an “impartial public entity” by the radio and television law, TRT has continually faced pressure from authorities due to the government’s power to appoint its governing structures. This political pressure has significantly intensified since the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power two decades ago. The failed coup attempt in 2016 further exacerbated the situation, culminating in a 2018 presidential decree that placed the broadcaster under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Communications, a unit within the presidential authority.

Over the past decade, independent evaluations have consistently found that TRT’s editorial stance is heavily biased in favor of the government. A 2019 report from the European Union stated that TRT’s editorial policy, as a public service broadcaster, continued to show “a significant pro-government bias.” This bias became even more pronounced after TRT was placed under direct presidential control in 2018, further aligning the broadcaster’s editorial policy with the government’s agenda.

A member of the opposition, who also serves on the media regulator RTUK, stated in May 2023 that a quarter of the daily programming time on TRT is dedicated to disseminating government propaganda.

Legal provisions exist that mandate TRT’s editorial independence; however, they lack tangible safeguards to ensure this independence. Multiple sources suggest that the Erdoğan government exercises control over the broadcaster, indicating disregard for these legal provisions.

During the most recent research phase, no independent assessment or oversight mechanism was identified that could confirm the outlet’s editorial independence.

September 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Hurriyet, Milliyet, Posta, Hurriyet Daily News, Fanatik, Milliyet Sanat, Vatan

Television: Kanal D, CNN Turk, Teve2, Dream TV, Dream Turk, Euro D

Radio: Radyo D, CNN Turk Radio

News agency: Demiroren News Agency (DHA)

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Private (CaPr)

Ownership and governance

The Demirören family controls the conglomerate. After the death of founder Erdoğan Demirören in 2018, his son Yıldırım Demirören assumed the chairmanship of the holding. His siblings, Fikret Tayfun Demirören and Meltem Oktay, also hold significant shares, each controlling roughly 26% of Demirören Holding. The family has long maintained close personal and political ties with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Tevfik Kınık has served as CEO of Demirören Holding since 2019, though strategic control of media assets remains firmly with the family.

Source of funding and budget

Demirören’s finances remain opaque. While the group earns commercial revenue from circulation, advertising, and sponsorships, the sustainability of its media branch is widely attributed to state-mediated financing. A substantial portion of income comes from public advertising allocated by the Press Advertisement Institution (BİK) and other state agencies, as well as favorable credit arrangements.

The 2018 acquisition of Doğan Media Group, valued at approximately US$ 916 million, was financed almost entirely through a low-interest loan from Ziraat Bank. Allegations persist, most notably raised by exiled mafia boss Sedat Peker in 2021, that the loan remains largely unpaid, though the bank has refused to disclose repayment details.

In 2023, Hürriyet reported total revenues of TRY 741 million (approx. US$ 25 million), with circulation and printing accounting for more than half of this income. No comprehensive financial data is available for 2024 or forecasts for 2025–2026.

Editorial independence

All outlets within the Demirören Group are overtly supportive of the government, consistently amplifying the policies of President Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) while relentlessly criticizing the opposition. The group’s media routinely provides favourable coverage of government initiatives, often framing dissenting voices as destabilising or unpatriotic.

The editorial capture of the group became visible after the 2011 acquisition of Milliyet and Vatan. Both newspapers, which had previously published critical investigations and a diversity of political commentary, rapidly abandoned that role and adopted an openly pro-government line. The pattern repeated itself in 2018, when Demirören took over Doğan Media Group, which included Hürriyet — long regarded as Turkey’s most influential daily — as well as Posta and widely viewed television channels such as CNN Türk and Kanal D. The sale was widely described by local journalists as a turning point that dealt a major blow to pluralism in Turkey’s mainstream media, effectively silencing one of the last large critical voices.

Since then, CNN Türk in particular has become emblematic of the group’s editorial subordination to political power. In the run-up to the 2023 local elections, it and other Demirören outlets were accused of systematically distorting or downplaying statements by opposition parties, while providing wall-to-wall positive coverage of government candidates. Similar patterns were documented again in the first half of 2024, when opposition representatives complained that interviews were edited to their disadvantage or cancelled outright, reinforcing accusations of structural bias in election coverage.

The intimate ties between the Demirören family and the President have long facilitated direct political interference in newsroom decisions. Leaked recordings of phone calls between Erdoğan and Erdoğan Demirören, the founder of the group, revealed the President instructing the owners on how to frame sensitive stories. Such evidence of interference has never been publicly disavowed. Instead, successive editorial appointments at Hürriyet, Milliyet, and CNN Türk have further entrenched pro-government control, while critical columnists and reporters have either been dismissed or forced into self-censorship.

No independent oversight or self-regulatory mechanism exists to guarantee editorial independence within the group. On the contrary, a growing body of reports since 2022 documents systematic censorship practices, including the removal of articles critical of government policy and restrictions on coverage of corruption cases. This environment has contributed to what local media experts describe as one of the most extreme cases of media capture in Turkey’s recent history, consolidating Demirören’s outlets as instruments of government propaganda rather than independent journalism.

September 2025

Media assets

Television: RTS1, RTS2, RTS3, RTS Svet, RTS Nauka, RTS Drama, RTS Life, RTS Classic, RTS Kolo, RTS Trezor, RTS Music, RTS Poletarac

Radio: Radio Belgrade 1, Radio Belgrade 2, Radio Belgrade 3, Radio Belgrade 202, Radio Pletenica, Radio Rock and Roller, Radio Jukebox, Radio Vrteshka

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

RTS is state-owned. Its highest governing body is a management board. The board elects the General Manager (sometimes called Director General) of RTS and the station’s top editors. The nine members of the management board are appointed by the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM), the Serbian media regulator. REM’s own members are in turn chosen through processes heavily influenced by political appointments.

Dragan Bujošević remains the General Manager (Director General) of RTS. He has held the position since 2015. Critics point out that despite having reached retirement age, his term continues under decisions of the management bodies.

In June 2025, amendments were adopted to several media laws: the Law on Public Media Services, the Law on Electronic Media, and the Law on Public Information and Media. Among the most important changes is the establishment of an Audience Ombudsman, a formal channel for audience complaints regarding public broadcasters, which for the first time gives legal duty to respond to viewers’ concerns. Other amendments address REM’s appointment/dismissal procedures, its financial autonomy, and oversight mechanisms. However, observers caution that some amendments are more declarative than operational, and may not significantly strengthen editorial independence in practice. 

Source of funding and budget

In 2024, RTS collected about RSD 15.7 billion , which is roughly €134 million, but still ended the year with a loss of RSD 310 million (€2.6 million). Of that revenue in 2024, approximately RSD 11.2 billion (€95.8 million) came from RTV license fees (a fee for public media, included in the monthly electricity bill, paid by all households in Serbia, which was introduced in 2016). Advertising revenue contributed another €28 million. 

In 2023, RTS reported a total revenue of RSD 14.7billion (US$ 136m), RSD 10.4 billion generated by license fees, and RSD 3.4 billion by ad sales. According to data from a company report, the broadcaster’s costs amounted to RSD 15.1 billion.

Editorial independence

No legal provisions require RTS to produce propagandistic content about the Serbian government. Yet, through the management board, staffed with government loyalists, the government exerts significant influence in the editorial decision-making process at RTS. Journalists working for the broadcaster interviewed for this report in May 2024 said that editors are continuously subjected to pressures from government and party officials who have an important say in how the station’s news content is presented. The news content is biased in favor of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which has been in power since 2012, according to content analysis carried out by the Novi Sad School of Journalism.

During a series of street protests in May 2023, considered by observers to be the largest revolt against President Aleksandar Vučić, vast crowds of protesters encircled the RTS building, criticizing the station for being pro-government. Research conducted in recent years also found that RTS programmatically spreads sophisticated pro-Russia propaganda in its news programs. No domestic statute establishing RTS’ editorial independence has been identified.

RTS has a Programming Council composed of 15 members. Its role is to advise the station’s management on editorial matters. However, the council is not independent and hence fails to fulfill its role, as many of its members are appointed along political lines and have ties with the government.

In April 2025, more than fifty RTS journalists held an assembly in the broadcaster’s parking lot, demanding greater professional accountability and freedom of expression. Some of these employees were later summoned for questioning by security or intelligence bodies, raising concerns among journalist groups about intimidation or pressure.

The legal amendments of June 2025 — particularly the introduction of an Audience Ombudsman — are presented by the government as measures to increase accountability. However, watchdog groups argue that without genuine political independence in appointments to REM and the management board, such reforms are unlikely to change entrenched editorial bias.

September 2025