Its television portfolio includes Russia‑1 (the flagship and most-watched channel across Russia), Russia‑24 (a dedicated 24/7 news channel that delivers both national and international coverage), Russia‑K (devoted to cultural programming, arts, and highbrow content), Carousel (a children- and youth-focused channel, co-owned with Channel One), and RTR‑Planeta (an international broadcaster reaching audiences worldwide). VGTRK also operates five national radio stations—Radio Rossii, Mayak, Kultura, Vesti FM, and Yunost—alongside an extensive network of roughly 80–90 regional TV and radio outlets, making it the largest media corporation in Russia

Media assets

Television: National- Russia-1 (Россия-1), Russia-24 (Россия-24), Russia-K (Россия-К), Carousel (Карусель), RTR-Planeta (РТР-планета); Region-focused: 90 regional TV channels (including Moscow 24); Euronews on Russian language (Euronews на Русском языке)

Radio: Radio Kultura, Radio Mayak, Radio Rossii, Radio Yunost, Vesti FM

News portal: Vesti.ru

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

VGTRK is a federal state unitary enterprise, wholly owned by the Russian government.

Oleg Dobrodeev has been at the helm of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) since 2000, making him one of the longest-serving media executives in contemporary Russia. A career journalist and media manager, he rose to prominence in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet years, having co-founded the independent broadcaster NTV in the 1990s before moving into state media. Dobrodeev has been widely regarded as a loyal steward of government messaging, ensuring that VGTRK functions as both a cultural institution and a key instrument of state propaganda at home and abroad.

Source of funding and budget

VGTRK’s financial lifeline has always been the federal budget, with state subsidies covering the bulk of its operating costs. In the 2020 draft budget, the Ministry of Finance allocated RUB 24.2 billion (approximately US$ 336 million), raised to RUB 27.3 billion (US$ 369 million) in 2021. Between 2021 and 2024, cumulative transfers from the federal treasury amounted to some RUB 107 billion, equivalent to around US$ 1 billion at 2022 exchange rates.

The Russian federal budget for state media overall was set for roughly RUB 137-139 billion for 2024, with VGTRK’s subsidy planned at RUB 24.2–24.3 billion. This was a reduction from earlier projections. In December 2024, Russia did announce a sharp increase in state media funding for 2025, raising the total to RUB 139.6 billion. VGTRK was assigned RUB 22.4 billion for 2025, lower than in 2024, and about RUB 3.4 billion below some earlier forecasts.

Total state media spending is projected at RUB 96.6–97.7 billion for 2026 and RUB 96.6–98.5 billion in 2027, though the exact VGTRK share has not been specified yet.

Editorial independence

VGTRK has long been criticized for serving as a propaganda arm of the Kremlin. Its international channel, RTR-Planeta, has been suspended or banned in multiple countries, including Lithuania in 2018, for “inciting discord” and spreading biased information.

Former employees report that coverage decisions are frequently subject to direct guidance from government officials. Unlike true public broadcasters, VGTRK lacks internal statutes or independent oversight bodies to safeguard editorial independence. Its programming consistently aligns with state narratives, both domestically and abroad.

There is no internal statute or independent assessment and oversight mechanism in place to validate the editorial independence of the VGTRK’s media outlets.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: Pervyy kanal, Telecafe, Dom kino, Music One TV, Vremya, Dom kino Premium, Bober, Perviy Kanal Evraziya

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

The Russian state maintains a controlling interest in Channel One, owning 51 % of its shares through state‑controlled entities, primarily the Federal Agency for State Property Management, which holds nearly 39 %, with the remainder held by FSUE Itar‑Tass and FSUE Ostankino. This structure has been confirmed by expert assessments as of March 2023 and June 2024.

Konstantin Lvovich Ernst has served as Chief Executive Officer of Channel One since 1999, making him one of the longest-standing figures in Russian broadcasting. A former producer, he is widely credited with reshaping the channel’s entertainment programming in the 1990s and early 2000s, bringing in slick formats and cultivating a modern visual style that distinguished Channel One from its Soviet predecessors. Over the years, Ernst has consolidated his role as both cultural impresario and political gatekeeper, steering the channel’s editorial line in close alignment with the Kremlin. Internationally, he has been a controversial figure: praised at home for his creative acumen but sanctioned abroad for his role in disseminating pro-government narratives, particularly in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Source of funding and budget

Channel One’s funding traditionally stems from a blend of advertising revenue and state subsidies. In recent years, federal subsidies have come under a tightening squeeze, according to vocational observers in 2023–2024, reflecting ongoing financial pressure.

In 2019, revenues reached approximately RUB 27 billion, with a state subsidy of about RUB 2.5 billion. In 2020, the channel rebounded spectacularly, posting a net profit of RUB 6.3 billion, the best in the past decade. In 2021, revenue climbed to around RUB 28 billion, but net profit tumbled to RUB 581 million. In 2022, subsidies remained consistent at RUB 6.27 billion, though the profit trend continued to be volatile.

In December 2024, the Ministry of Finance set out forward allocations of RUB 6 billion for 2025 and RUB 4.6 billion for 2026. While these sums do not exceed the levels granted in earlier years, they represent a stabilization of state funding after a period of uncertainty. The fact that subsidies were earmarked two years in advance provides the broadcaster with a degree of financial predictability in an otherwise volatile market environment.

Editorial independence

Channel One is firmly under Kremlin editorial control and commonly seen as a vehicle for state messaging, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. Independent analyses and academic studies describe the channel as a tool of state propaganda, with pervasive censorship and no mechanisms for independent editorial oversight identified.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: NTV (НТВ), Match TV (Матч ТВ), TNT (ТНТ), TV-3 (ТВ-3), Friday! (Пятница!), NTV Style (НТВ-Стиль), NTV Law (НТВ-Право), NTV Series (НТВ-Сериал), NTV HIT (НТВ-Хит), Match Premier (Матч! Премьер), Match! Arena (Матч! Арена), Match! Game (Матч! Игра), Match! Planet (Матч! Планета), Match! Football 1 (Матч! Футбол 1), Match! Football 2, Match! Football 3, KHL TV, KHL TV HD, Match! Fight (Матч! Боец), Horse World (Конный мир), Match! Country (Матч! Страна), Saturday! (Суббота!), TNT4 (ТНТ4), 2×2, Kinohit, Kinokomediya, Kinomix, Kinopremiera, Kinosemya, Kinoseriya, Kinosvidaniye, Muzhskoe Kino, Nashe Novoe Kino, Indijskoe Kino, Rodnoe Kino, Kinouzhas, India, Kitchen TV, 365 Days TV, HDL, La Minor TV, Russian Night

Radio: Radio Energy, Autoradio, Humor FM (Юмор FM), Comedy Radio, Children’s Radio (Детское радио), Like FM, Radio Romantika, Relax FM, Radio Zenit

Publishing: Seven Days, Story Caravan

News portal: Rutube, Yappy, PREMIER, 101.ru, NTV-Plus, Match Premier

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

Gazprom Media’s ownership structure is labyrinthine and subtly embeds indirect state control. The company is officially owned by Gazprombank, itself a subsidiary of the state-owned energy titan Gazprom. The biggest shareholder in Gazprombank is Gazfond, a pension fund largely managed by Lider, a management company under Sogaz Insurance Group, which in turn is majority-owned by Rossiya Bank, known for its ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

As of mid-2025, Gazprom Media remains firmly under the stewardship of Alexander Zharov, whose tenure since 2020 has been marked by both domestic consolidation and international visibility. Zharov has positioned himself as a key figure in state-aligned cultural diplomacy, taking part in the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives and engaging in high-profile exchanges with partners from the Islamic world and India. At the same time, the group’s leadership has courted controversy: deputy CEO Tina Kandelaki, a prominent media personality, has drawn sanctions and travel bans for her outspoken pro-Kremlin stances. Together, this leadership mix underscores Gazprom Media’s dual role as both a cultural envoy of the Russian state and a lightning rod for international criticism.

Source of funding and budget

The holding’s financial backbone relies on advertising incomes and subscription revenues tied to its thematic and pay‑TV channels. In 2020, total revenues reached RUB 99.2 billion (US$1.38 billion), and in the first three quarters of 2021, the company pulled in RUB 84.2 billion, with ad sales accounting for over 72 % of that total.

A report from the Media and Journalism Research Center revealed significantly different figures in the Excheck.pro database. According to the aforementioned source, Gazprom Media reported revenue of RUB 383m in 2021.

Editorial independence

Media outlets under Gazprom Media are widely regarded as lacking editorial independence, often reflecting, and reinforcing, Kremlin narratives. Its flagship channel NTV has earned a reputation as “Russia’s most aggressive channel of disinformation,” leaning heavily towards state-aligned messaging.

To date, no internal statutes or external oversight mechanisms guaranteeing journalistic autonomy have been publicly documented.

August 2025

NMG holds a controlling interest in CTC Media, operator of a suite of popular entertainment networks. In 2016, it also took a stake in Viasat, a major provider of pay-TV channels, through Media Alliance, a joint venture with Discovery Networks. Media Alliance subsequently acquired Russian operations of more than 10 international channels, including Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, CNN, and Eurosport. This manoeuvre was prompted by 2014 legislation capping foreign ownership of Russian media firms at 20%, which compelled global broadcasters to partner with domestic players like NMG to retain market access.

Beyond television, NMG retains a stronghold in print and digital media through Izvestia, one of Russia’s most established newspapers. Around Izvestia it has built a comprehensive multimedia hub, the Izvestia MIC (Multimedia Information Centre), which integrates the Iz.ru news portal, the Izvestia television channel, the daily newspaper, and newsrooms serving NMG’s broadcast outlets (REN TV, Channel 5, and 78 TV). The Izvestia MIC also manages Business Petersburg, extending NMG’s footprint into regional business journalism.

In addition to its core media operations, NMG has ventured into technology, sales, and film production, sectors that provide both new revenue streams and further leverage within Russia’s tightly interwoven media–political landscape. These initiatives have become increasingly important as sanctions and international isolation restrict Russia’s media sector from foreign partnerships and technologies.

On April 9, 2025, NMG acquired Medialogia, one of Russia’s leading media-monitoring and analytics platforms. This move signals NMG’s strategic push to enhance its media analytics capabilities—an important tool for monitoring audience sentiment and editorial performance across its assets.

Media assets

Television: Channel 5, REN TV; CTC Media- CTC, Domashniy, Che TV, CTC Love, 3One; 78 Channel; Viasat

Publishing: Izvestia, Business Petersburg, Metro Petersburg, Sport-Express

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

NMG’s ownership structure underscores its strategic positioning at the nexus of Russia’s political and financial elite. It is a joint venture that brings together several state-controlled or Kremlin-linked entities, including Rossiya Bank, Surgutneftegas, SOGAZ, and Gazprom Media. According to experts and journalists interviewed for this report in March 2023 and June 2024, the group’s real clout is channelled through Yury Kovalchuk, a powerful financier and long-standing associate of President Vladimir Putin. Kovalchuk, who has been under U.S. Treasury sanctions since 2014 for his role in the annexation of Crimea, remains the figure most closely associated with NMG’s strategic direction.

Source of funding and budget

NMG finances its operations primarily through advertising revenues and the commercialization of content, including pay-TV subscriptions and syndication. To date, no evidence has emerged of direct state subsidies flowing into NMG-managed outlets, although their market dominance and political connections afford them advantages in advertising and distribution.

The Media and Journalism Research Center reported that NMG generated revenues of RUB 47.2bn (US$665m) in 2021. More recent disclosures and industry analyses suggest that revenues plateaued in 2023 due to sanctions-related constraints and advertising market contraction but rebounded in 2024 with a notable surge in domestic advertising, driven by increased state spending and corporate redirection away from foreign platforms. Preliminary figures cited by Russian business press in early 2025 indicate modest profit growth for the group, despite rising operational costs and the challenges of maintaining Western-licensed formats in the current sanctions environment. Forecasts for 2025–2026 anticipate stable income streams largely dependent on domestic advertising, subscription services, and the protection afforded by legislation limiting foreign competitors’ operations in Russia.

Editorial independence

NMG’s outlets are widely recognised as aligned with Kremlin narratives, a reflection of Kovalchuk’s influence and the political expectations placed upon the group. Several of its channels have faced bans in European jurisdictions, where regulators determined that their content functioned as vehicles for Russian state propaganda aimed at destabilizing societies.

There is no domestic statute, nor any independent oversight body, to guarantee editorial independence across NMG holdings. This absence has entrenched the perception of NMG’s outlets as instruments of soft power, tightly tethered to the political establishment.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: OTR

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

OTR was officially launched through Presidential Decree No. 455, signed on 17 April 2012 by President Dmitry Medvedev, with the explicit aim of founding an independent public-service broadcaster. A key oversight body, the Public Television Council, was meant to represent the public interest, with nominations drawn from Russia’s Public Chamber; management was barred from including sitting MPs or government officials.

By mid‑2012, however, then‑President Vladimir Putin approved the appointments to the Supervisory Board and named Anatoly Lysenko, President of the International TV Academy, as the channel’s first Director General. In practice, this structure has effectively placed OTR under state control, as modern analysts have noted that the President approves both the Supervisory Board members and the Director General.

Source of funding and budget

OTR is funded via a combination of state budget allocations and public donations, though it does not publish detailed financial statements. Early figures reveal significant state subsidies: approximately RUB 3 billion (~US$ 41.6 million) in 2020; rising to around RUB 4.9 billion in 2021; and approximately RUB 5.5 billion in 2022.

There remains no publicly available data on revenues, income, or profit for 2023–2025.

Editorial independence

Although conceived as a public-service broadcaster, OTR has seen its editorial independence curtailed, with programming largely confined to non-contentious, pro-government themes. Opposition figures are absent from its coverage, and its content often aligns with government narratives, particularly regarding the Ukraine conflict. No statutes or independent oversight mechanisms are in place to assess or safeguard the channel’s editorial autonomy.

August 2025

In July 2025, TASS and China’s Xinhua signed an agreement in Zhengzhou extending their partnership through 2030, pledging to expand joint delegations, media tours, and cultural programmes, marking 70 years of cooperation.

Media assets

News agency: TASS

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Functioning as a Federal State Unitary Enterprise, TASS is fully owned by the Russian federal government. Its leadership, Director General Andrey Kondrashov (appointed in 2023), is government-selected and answers directly to state authorities.

Source of funding and budget

In 2020, TASS received a state subsidy of approximately RUB 2.9 billion (US$ 40.3 million). In 2021, the allocation rose modestly to RUB 3.1 billion, and by 2022 subsidies had climbed to nearly RUB 4 billion, according to media reports.

As of late 2024, the Ministry of Finance had increased funding for all state media, including TASS, for 2025, raising allocations by RUB 45 billion to a total of RUB 139.6 billion. While granular numbers for TASS’s overall revenue, profit, or income that span 2024–2025 are not publicly disclosed, these state media allocations provide a window into its core financial backing.

Editorial independence

TASS’s editorial line remains tightly aligned with government narratives. The absence of independent oversight, no statutory protections or assessment mechanisms exist, means editorial independence is not institutionally supported. Academic and NGO research, as recently as March 2024, has reaffirmed that TASS’s coverage consistently reflects government guidelines.

During Soviet times, many of its journalists also served as informants, and this tradition of close alignment with state structures continues to shape the agency’s output. Content analyses conducted in March 2023 and again in February–March 2024 confirmed the agency’s role as a mouthpiece for official policy.

In July 2025, Mikhail Gusman, the long-serving First Deputy CEO of TASS, was abruptly dismissed following a controversy related to his appearance at the Shusha Global Media Forum in Nagorno-Karabakh. At the forum, Gusman appeared alongside Azerbaijani and Ukrainian journalists and publicly praised Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, which provoked significant backlash from Russian nationalist and pro-Kremlin circles. His remarks were seen as politically sensitive and controversial given the tense relations between Russia and Azerbaijan at the time.

The dismissal was officially ordered by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin but without an explicit reason stated. However, media reports and public reactions linked his firing directly to this controversy. Gusman had held the position since 1999 and was a prominent figure in Russian media, underscoring that his removal reflected both the political sensitivity of the agency’s messaging and its function as an instrument of state control in information dissemination.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: RT International, RT France, RT America, RT UK, RT Arabic, RT Documentary, RT Actualidad, RT Deutsch

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

RT is run by TV‑Novosti, a non-profit entity originally established by the now-defunct RIA Novosti, the state-owned news agency. RT also operates as the parent entity of Ruptly, which in turn owns the video platform Redfish and the digital portal Maffick.

Europe’s sweeping sanctions in late 2022, specifically the EU’s ninth package, targeted TV‑Novosti and its CEO, leading to frozen assets and forcing closures of RT offices across Europe. Notably, RT’s branches in France and Germany were shuttered or absorbed into operations based in Moscow.

In the wake of Western sanctions that shuttered European hubs, TV‑Novosti centralized news production in Moscow and invested more heavily in its Arabic-language service, including hiring new journalistic talent and expanding original content production.

Source of funding and budget

RT is financed mostly by subsidies from the Russian federal government. As reported, in 2024 RT’s expenses soared to a record RUB 31.7 billion (~US$390 million), a RUB 4.2 billion hike over 2023. Of that, RUB 28.6 billion came directly from state appropriations. Looking ahead, RT is slated to receive RUB 79 billion over the 2025–2027 period—underscoring continued heavy state backing.

Editorial independence

A wealth of research, including academic studies and NGO reports, paints a consistent picture of RT’s role in disseminating Kremlin-aligned narratives. Politico’s investigation, based on Oxford University interviews with ex‑RT journalists, shone a light on editorial processes, underscoring concerns over internal censorship and propagandistic content. To date, no internal charter or independent oversight has been identified to safeguard editorial autonomy. That remains unchanged.

August 2025

Rossiya Segodnya oversees a sprawling portfolio of news portals, many of which are tailored to international audiences. Chief among them is Sputnik News, which operates websites in over a dozen languages, alongside RIA News, the agency’s flagship portal. The group also runs outlets with targeted geopolitical missions, such as Baltnews (aimed at audiences in the Baltic states), Ukraina and RIA Novosti Crimea, both designed to shape narratives around contested Ukrainian territories. In addition, Rossiya Segodnya maintains specialized platforms covering niche sectors including real estate, education, and finance.

Media assets

News portals: Sputnik News, RIA Novosti, RIA Novosti Sport, RIA Rating, RIA Novosti Crimea, INOSMI, Baltnews Lithuania, Baltnews Latvia, Baltnews Estonia, Ukraina, Prime, Realty, Social Navigator, The Arctic, Russia Beyond the Headlines

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Rossiya Segodnya was established by presidential decree in December 2013, replacing RIA Novosti as part of a Kremlin strategy to consolidate and strengthen its digital news and international propaganda apparatus. The organization remains fully state-owned and operates under the direct authority of the Russian presidency.

The company’s management is appointed for its political reliability and loyalty to the Kremlin. Since its inception, Dmitry Kiselyov has served as the director-general. Widely seen as an unofficial spokesperson for President Vladimir Putin, Kiselyov is a controversial figure whose public statements, particularly his inflammatory remarks about the LGBT community and the United States, have attracted sustained criticism both domestically and abroad. As of mid-2025, Kiselyov continues to head the agency, despite persistent calls from Western governments and advocacy groups for sanctions against him personally.

Source of funding and budget

Rossiya Segodnya is one of the most generously financed of Russia’s state-run media holdings. Its budget is drawn almost entirely from federal subsidies.

In 2020, the agency received approximately RUB 6.7bn (around US$ 93m). In 2021, its subsidy rose to RUB 7.6bn. In 2022, the figure climbed further to RUB 9.3bn, according to media reports.

Independent Russian media monitoring groups reported that in 2023–2024, despite Russia’s war expenditures, Rossiya Segodnya remained a funding priority, receiving allocations among the top tier of state-owned broadcasters. In 2023, the agency’s financing remained more or less unchanged at RUB 9.4 billion, according to Debunk.

Preliminary budget data for 2025–2026 indicate that allocations will remain stable or increase modestly, ensuring the agency’s financial security at a time when other state entities have faced cutbacks.

Editorial independence

Rossiya Segodnya functions explicitly as a propaganda arm of the Kremlin. Its editorial line is crafted to advance Russian state interests, promote Moscow’s foreign policy positions, and discredit countries, institutions, and groups deemed hostile to the regime.

A wide body of evidence, from academic research to reports by international NGOs, underscores the agency’s role in orchestrating Kremlin propaganda campaigns. Its foreign-language portals, particularly Sputnik, have been repeatedly cited by European Union institutions and NATO for spreading false or misleading content, including narratives designed to sow division in Western democracies.

In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Kiselyov and Rossiya Segodnya have been described by Ukrainian and Western security agencies as threats to national and regional security. The EU and several Western governments have banned Sputnik content since 2022, a prohibition that has continued into 2025, limiting the group’s visibility in Europe but not curbing its influence in parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where it has ramped up operations.

To date, no domestic legislation and no independent oversight mechanisms exist to safeguard editorial independence at Rossiya Segodnya. Its coverage remains wholly aligned with Kremlin directives, with no institutional checks on content, governance, or accountability.

August 2025

Media assets

Television: Zvezda

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

Zvezda is a Russian state-owned television channel under the direct control of the Ministry of Defense. This institutional link is undisputed and has been repeatedly confirmed by experts and journalists monitoring the Russian media landscape, including interviews conducted for this project in March 2023 and June 2024. The channel’s governance is therefore inseparable from the state’s military establishment, with editorial and managerial appointments closely aligned with the ministry’s strategic communication objectives.

Source of funding and budget

Zvezda is financed predominantly through federal budget allocations, which function as annual subsidies. In 2020, the channel received approximately RUB 2 billion (around US$27.8 million). This support was slightly reduced in the following two years, with Zvezda obtaining RUB 1.8 billion in both 2021 and 2022, according to media reports. While more recent budgetary data for 2023–2025 is not yet publicly disclosed, Russian press coverage suggests that Zvezda’s state funding has remained stable, with no indication of significant cuts or restructuring in the face of broader fiscal tightening.

Editorial independence

Editorially, Zvezda stands out as one of the most zealous supporters of the Kremlin’s political and military line. In interviews conducted with Russian experts in March 2023 and June 2024, the channel was described as the most ardently loyal television outlet in the country, both in its unqualified endorsement of the authorities and in its combative stance against perceived adversaries of the Russian state. Its news style is characterized by highly assertive rhetoric, often crossing into overtly propagandistic framing when addressing opposition figures, Western governments, and critics of Russia’s military actions.

To date, no domestic statute and no independent assessment or oversight mechanism to validate the editorial independence of the Zvezda media outlets has been identified.

August 2025

The holding encompasses some of Russia’s most prominent online media brands, including Lenta.ru, Gazeta.Ru, Championat, the Rambler portal, Afisha, and dozens of other digital assets. This portfolio makes Rambler&Co a central player in shaping Russia’s online information environment, both through its news coverage and its entertainment and lifestyle platforms.

Media assets

News portals: Lenta.ru, Gazeta.ru, Afisha, Championat, Secret Mag, Live Journal

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

Rambler Media Group is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sberbank, Russia’s state-owned banking giant. Sberbank first entered the company in 2019, acquiring a 46% stake, and by 2020 had expanded its holding to 100% ownership, consolidating Rambler under its digital and e-commerce ecosystem.

For regulatory purposes, Rambler’s flagship outlets are registered under separate legal entities. For example, Gazeta.ru is published by АО «Газета.Ру» (Joint Stock Company Gazeta.Ru), and Lenta.ru is published by ООО «Лента.ру» (Lenta.ru LLC). Both companies are formally incorporated as distinct publishers but are integrated into Rambler&Co, the operational media arm of Rambler Media Group. This makes them indirectly controlled by Sberbank, which acts as the ultimate owner.

The media companies integrated in Rambler&Co are, however, controlled indirectly by various companies. Lenta.ru and Gazeta.ru, for example, were set up by the company MINS, which is 80% owned by Medianna, with the remainder in the hands of Sberentertainment, an admin vehicle, with four employees in 2024, established to run these companies.

The general director of Lenta.ru and Gazeta.ru is Tsyper Andrey Sergeevich, which the U.S.-based Anti-Corruption Foundation describes as a “Russian propagandist.”

For the full dossier on Rambler&Co and their companies, contact Media and Journalism Research Center.

Source of funding and budget

Rambler&Co derives the bulk of its income from advertising and commercial services, supported by Sberbank’s financial backing, which underwrites its media and technology operations.

In 2024, Gazeta.ru reported revenue of RUB 532.6 million (US$6.0 million) with a loss of RUB 26.73 million (US$0.3 million). In 2023, Lenta.ru had revenue of RUB 775.72 million (≈US$8.7 million) with a loss of RUB 3.9 million (US$44,000). The last reported revenue of Rambler&Co was in 2021: RUB 492.13 million (≈US$6.6 million).

For detailed financial results of Rambler&Co and their companies, contact Media and Journalism Research Center.

Editorial independence

Editorial autonomy has long been undermined within Rambler Media Group. In 2014, under former owner Alexander Mamut, Galina Timchenko, editor-in-chief of Lenta.ru, was dismissed after authorizing politically sensitive coverage. This decision led to a mass resignation of the newsroom, a landmark event in Russian media capture.

Following Sberbank’s takeover in 2019–2020, editorial control has tightened further. Both Lenta.ru and Gazeta.ru have been repeatedly cited by independent analysts (2023–2025) as key platforms for Kremlin-aligned propaganda.

No domestic statute or independent oversight body exists to safeguard the editorial independence of Rambler’s outlets. In practice, Rambler&Co functions as a state-aligned media holding, with its editorial agenda firmly subordinated to government priorities.

August 2025