Media assets

Television: :1, :2, :Sport, :24

Radio: SRo1: Rádio Slovensko, SRo2: Rádio Regina, SRo3: Rádio Devín, SRo4: Rádio FM, SRo5: Rádio Patria, SRo6: Radio Slovakia International, SRo7: Rádio Pyramida, SRo8: Rádio Litera, SRo9: Rádio Junior

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

STVR is regulated by the Slovak Television and Radio Act (Law No. 157/2024), which came into effect on 1 July 2024. This act revoked the previous, more autonomous RTVS statute and established a new governance system granting decisive influence to the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Finance, and Parliament over the appointment of the STVR Board.

The nine-member STVR Board elects both the Director General and the STVR Ethics Committee, concentrating authority in a politically aligned body. The Board composition enables full control by the governing coalition: three members nominated by the Ministry of Culture, one by the Ministry of Financr and five by Parliament.

The appointment procedures fall short of transparency and openness obligations. For the four government-nominated positions, no public call or hearing took place, and the Ministry of Culture merely approved names proposed by an internal commission. Parliamentary appointments are formally debated but effectively limited to coalition-backed candidates, with opposition nominees consistently excluded.

The reform sparked protests among journalists, opposition parties, and civil society groups, with former RTVS director general Ľuboš Machaj calling it a “black day” for Slovak media. Media freedom organizations, including IPI and the European Federation of Journalists, criticized the move as incompatible with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).

The current Board is composed entirely of pro-government members. Among them:

• Lukáš Machala, Vice-Chair, serves simultaneously as Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Culture and is a close SNS ally.
• Peter Benčurík, a former spokesperson for oligarchic group Slavia Capital, has ties to SNS-linked networks.
• Jozef Krošlák, ex-spokesperson for authoritarian former PM Vladimír Mečiar.
• David Lindtner, former judge and legal advisor to PM Robert Fico, connected to Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák and representing multiple SMER affiliates in corruption cases.
• Igor Gallo, previously RTVS Board Chair during earlier politicisation, has links to SMER-linked oligarch Jozef Brhel.
• Eva Koprenová, a former SMER government spokesperson.

The remaining members, while not publicly affiliated, were approved through the coalition’s internal coordination process, ensuring full loyalty.

In 2025, the Board appointed Martina Flašíková, daughter of a SMER founder, as Director General. She previously ran a pro-government disinformation website established by her father, where partisan commentary regularly displaced factual reporting. Her election was widely interpreted as an openly political appointment, demonstrating the coalition’s intent to capture the broadcaster.

Earlier, in August 2024, Peter Nittnaus—a former manager under ex-RTVS chief Jaroslav Rezník—was appointed head of STVR’s news channel :24, reviving fears of editorial intimidation. Nittnaus was previously known for enforcing political pressure on journalists under SNS-led governments. These appointments were facilitated by the pro-government composition of the Board, which elected both Nittnaus and Flašíková without meaningful opposition.

Source of funding and budget

Until 2023, RTVS was financed by a mix of licence fees, advertising, and state subsidies. In July 2023, parliament abolished the licence fee, making the broadcaster fully dependent on allocations from the state budget.

For 2024, STVR’s budget was set at 0.12% of GDP, equivalent to about €131 million, down from the previous 0.17% under RTVS, a cut of around €55 million. The reduction caused significant financial strain, forcing discussions about cutting programming and potentially closing one television channel.

While STVR is formally entitled to 0.12% of GDP annually, observers have described this amount as “insufficient” and vulnerable to political manipulation. Additional ad hoc funding from the Ministry of Culture or through so-called “contracts with the state” remains possible, further entrenching dependence on government decisions, according to Media Capture Monitoring Report for Slovakia. Advertising is allowed, and new provisions suggest STVR could expand commercial slots compared to RTVS, although this remains under review.

Editorial independence

RTVS enjoyed a reputation for balanced and independent coverage until recent years, but political influence intensified after 2020, with investigative programming reduced and pressure on journalists mounting.

There were early indications of censorship under the interim leadership already in 2024, when several journalists resigned in protest at editorial interference. The trend intensified following Flašíková’s appointment. Her first decisions included cancelling the discussion programme hosted by respected journalist Michal Havran, an opinion writer for Denník SME, while retaining a parallel show by Jaroslav Daniška, a conservative commentator whose website had previously been labelled disinformational. This asymmetry underscored a deliberate editorial bias.

Flašíková also announced the hiring of a journalist dismissed from a private news channel after airing a pro-Russian interview, known for favourable coverage of coalition politicians, expressed intent to hire another journalist forced to leave an Austrian newspaper for homophobic remarks, and cancelled a fact-checking and disinformation-debunking programme, narrowing editorial diversity further. Collectively, these moves consolidate a right-wing, conservative, and pro-Russian editorial line, reflecting the ideological profile of the ruling parties.

Although Slovak law formally requires public service broadcasting to ensure balance and impartiality, enforcement now lies with the politically appointed STVR Board, which has also established a new Ethical Commission mirroring its own partisan structure. Key members include Eduard Chmelár, former advisor to PM Robert Fico, and Maroš Smolec, nationalist activist and former SMER–SNS candidate in regional elections. These appointments demonstrate the absence of any internal counterbalance to political control.

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) implementation act adopted in 2025 formally expands the powers of the Regulatory Authority for Media Services (RpMS) to oversee STVR. However, the RpMS already handled complaints and issued occasional bias rulings under RTVS, making the new powers largely symbolic. Their practical enforcement remains untested.

The transformation of RTVS into STVR has shifted Slovakia’s public broadcaster decisively into the State-Controlled (SC) category of the State Media Matrix. With its governance bodies fully politicized, its finances dependent on annual government allocations, and its newsroom subject to dismissals and censorship, STVR represents the most far-reaching example of political capture of Slovak public broadcasting since the 1990s.

October 2025

Read the full study here.

The 2025 State Media Monitor reveals a further erosion of editorial independence in state and public media worldwide. Out of the 606 outlets surveyed, 512 (85%) are captured or controlled, compared to 505 out of 601 (84%) in 2024. This marginal decline underscores a continuing downward trajectory since monitoring began in 2021.

The State Controlled (SC) model remains the most widespread, accounting for 392 outlets in 2025, only slightly below last year’s 393. Most SC outlets are located in Asia (86), Sub-Saharan Africa (116), MENA (52), and Eurasia (54). By contrast, the number of Independent Public Media (IP)—the benchmark for editorial autonomy—remains stubbornly low. The total rose from 18 outlets in 2024 to 19 in 2025, representing just 3% of the global sample, with 13 based in Europe, 4 in Asia, and 2 in North America. (for a detailed explanation of the differences between the various forms of editorial control by the government, refer to our Methodology and Matrix).

Overall, the number of outlets displaying genuine editorial independence declined from 96 in 2024 to 94 in 2025, the lowest since the launch of the Monitor. The deterioration was marked by the loss of six outlets that had previously been ranked as independent. At the same time, Captured Private Media (CaPr) grew from 48 in 2024 to 53 in 2025, showing how governments increasingly rely on economic leverage to bend private ownership structures to their advantage. Captured Public or State Managed Media (CaPu) also increased slightly, from 64 in 2024 to 67 in 2025.

The most dramatic shift occurred in the United States, a country traditionally perceived as safer ground for editorially independent media. In a historical development, a North American outlet was downgraded to SC status. In early 2025, the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM)—the umbrella for Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and the Middle East Broadcasting Network—was brought directly under the control of President Trump’s administration. Funding freezes and management purges left most of these broadcasters dormant, with only VOA surviving at a third of its former staff capacity. In parallel, Congress froze funding for PBS, effectively suspending operations and putting its workforce on indefinite leave. This shift illustrates how quickly public media independence can collapse even in established democracies.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, conditions were not much better. The region counted 51 state-controlled outlets in 2025, roughly the same as in 2024, with only six media companies retaining some form of independence.

Elsewhere, patterns remained broadly consistent with the previous year. Europe continued to stand out as a relative stronghold of independence, with 54 outlets out of 116 maintaining editorial freedom, though losses in Spain demonstrate that even in Europe the trend is fragile. Sub-Saharan Africa offered the starkest imbalance: of 137 outlets surveyed, 116 were state controlled and only two displayed any degree of independence. MENA remained dominated by state influence, with 52 SC outlets, unchanged from 2024. Asia recorded a small improvement in the IP category, which rose from three to four outlets, but still had one of the highest concentrations of SC media globally with 86. Oceania remained the most balanced region, with four ISFM outlets, three ISF, and one SC, though its sample is small at only nine outlets in total.

Taken together, the results confirm a world in which independent public media are increasingly rare, captured media are on the rise, and the United States—long seen as a bastion of editorial independence—is no longer immune to the global trend of political interference and state control.

Government control of state and public media

Editorial Independence of State and Public Media

Despite the relentless assault on media independence recorded this year, the 2025 results also reveal important shifts, both positive and negative, across all regions. They show that editorial capture is not a one-way street and that changes in political context or governance can trigger rapid reclassifications within the State Media Matrix.

Several countries announced reform processes in 2025 that could, in principle, improve their media landscapes. Bangladesh, Syria, and Nigeria all launched initiatives to overhaul their public media systems following regime changes. Yet these plans remain fragile and largely aspirational. In places where institutions have been severely weakened, such as Syria, the prospect of building truly independent public media will be an especially arduous and uncertain task. Even in Bangladesh and Nigeria, where reforms appear more structured, entrenched political interests and unstable governance make the implementation of editorial safeguards far from guaranteed. These developments are important to note, but they should be treated with caution rather than celebrated as clear gains.

In Asia, the most notable improvements came from Indonesia, where both Television of the Republic of Indonesia (TVRI) and Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) were upgraded from State Controlled (SC) status to Independent State Funded and Managed (ISFM). These changes were driven by the appointment of seasoned media professionals to their boards and by ambitious digital transformation programmes that helped counter disinformation during the 2024 general election. In South Korea, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) regained its Independent Public Media (IP) ranking after major reforms to broadcasting laws strengthened its editorial safeguards. Similarly, Japan’s NHK improved its position, moving from the Captured Public (CaPu) category to Independent State Managed (ISM) status as part of a broader government commitment to strengthen independence in public broadcasting.

In Europe, the return of Donald Tusk’s liberal government in Poland in late 2023 translated into real improvements in 2025. Three of the country’s major outlets—Polish Television (TVP), Polish Radio, and the Polish Press Agency (PAP)—were upgraded, with TVP and Polish Radio now classified as ISFM, and PAP as ISM. This represents a remarkable turnaround after years of political capture under the previous administration. Yet despite these formal upgrades, the Polish case remains highly complex: the government faces the monumental task of rebuilding institutions that were hollowed out during years of politicisation, and genuine independence will not be easy to achieve. The case of Poland highlights both the possibility of recovery and the enormous structural challenges that follow capture.

Elsewhere in Europe, however, setbacks dominated. Spain witnessed the loss of independence in multiple regional broadcasters. Ens Públic de Radiotelevisió de les Illes Balears (EPRTVIB) and Corporació Audiovisual de la Comunitat Valenciana (CACVSA) were downgraded to SC, joining Catalonia’s CCMA, Radio Televisión Canaria (RTVC), and Corporación Aragonesa de Radio y Televisión (CARTV), all of which lost their independence in 2024. Although Radio Televisión Ceuta (RTVCE) regained ISFM status, the overall picture is of serious deterioration in Spain’s regional public media sector. Similarly, Montenegro’s RTCG fell back into SC, erasing the limited progress achieved in 2023, while Greece’s AMNA slid from ISFM to SC. These developments underscore the fragility of editorial autonomy even within EU member and candidate states.

Sub-Saharan Africa saw further expansion of captured private conglomerates, particularly in Tanzania, where Sahara Media Group, Uhuru Media Group, IPP Media, and Azam Media Ltd all shifted into the CaPr category, illustrating the growing reliance of private outlets on state patronage and concessions. In Burkina Faso, the leading public media house Sidwaya was downgraded to SC, underlining the country’s broader democratic backsliding following the coup that happened in 2023.

In Eurasia, Moldova’s Teleradio-Moldova (TRM) was reclassified from ISFM to ISF, indicating a cautious improvement as its governance board began implementing reforms designed to reduce direct government influence. But Central Asia showed further evidence of capture: Kazakhstan’s Qazcontent was downgraded to SC, while in Uzbekistan new outlets such as Mening Yurtim (MY5) and Daryo.uz were classified as CaPu, and Radio Grand as CaPr.

In Latin America, the overall picture remained mixed. The Dominican Republic’s CERTV gained independence in 2024, but Mexico’s Canal 22 slid into SC in 2025. In El Salvador, the consolidation of power under President Bukele extended to the private sector, with both Grupo Samix and Grupo Orbita now classified as CaPu, confirming the entanglement of private owners with government patronage.

Taken together, these changes show that the global picture of the public media landscape remains one of gradual deterioration, but also with pockets of resistance and even recovery. The reinstatement of independence in Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, and Poland illustrates that reforms are possible, especially when backed by political change and professionalised governance. At the same time, the setbacks in Spain, Montenegro, Greece, and, especially, in the United States underline how fragile independence remains, and how difficult it will be to rebuild trust and autonomy in systems that have been deeply damaged.

Several broader dynamics defined the global state and public media landscape in 2025, cutting across regions and typologies.

First, governments seem to be tightening their grip on outlets that report on sensitive geopolitical conflicts. Coverage of the war in Gaza has become the clearest flashpoint. In Israel, both IPBC and Galatz faced sustained political pressure from Prime Minister Netanyahu’s administration over their handling of the conflict. Although they have so far retained their classification as independent, their editorial space is under constant threat. These examples confirm a broader trend: whenever public broadcasters provide narratives that deviate from official state lines on international crises, they become immediate targets for political reprisal.

Second, budget cuts and financial restructuring are increasingly wielded as political tools. Governments present these steps as efficiency drives or fiscal prudence, but the effects are clear: weakened capacity, shrinking editorial independence, and greater susceptibility to executive influence. Taiwan’s Yuan Parliament slashed PTS’s budget by 25 percent; Nepal merged its public broadcasters into a new entity as a cost-saving measure; and the Israeli Knesset gave itself powers to audit IPBC’s finances.

The most dramatic case is the United States, where developments went far beyond technical funding debates. Under President Donald Trump’s second administration, the suspension of budgets for USAGM and PBS was not just an economic measure but part of a wider ideological offensive against public and independent media. The closures and layoffs that followed were designed to neutralize outlets seen as obstacles to the White House’s agenda, leaving most of USAGM’s landmark subsidiaries dormant and PBS effectively shuttered. At the same time, the administration intensified its attacks on private media companies and regulators, framing independent journalism as a partisan enemy rather than a democratic institution. This dual assault—disabling public service broadcasters while delegitimizing independent private outlets and oversight bodies—illustrates how quickly even long-established democracies can slide into an environment of systemic hostility to media independence.

Third, public media continue to be treated as political bargaining chips, reshaped after elections or regime changes. Where transitions led to reformist governments, as in Syria, Bangladesh, and Poland, new leaders moved to restructure governance boards and appoint professionals with journalistic credibility. Syria’s interim administration under President Ahmad al-Sharaa has promised sweeping structural reforms, including placing a respected media figure in charge of the Ministry of Information. Bangladesh’s caretaker government has set out plans to merge BTV, Bangladesh Betar, and BSS into a single National Broadcasting Corporation that would have its editorial independence guaranteed. Poland’s new leadership worked on cutting the political pressures on TVP, Polish Radio, and PAP following the end of the Law and Justice (PiS) party rule. Yet, in all three cases, entrenched patronage networks and politicized legacies mean that independence will be extremely difficult to entrench. Where political change moved in the opposite direction, the results were immediate and damaging: El Salvador’s President Bukele cemented control over both public and private broadcasters, while the Trump administration’s direct interventions effectively collapsed U.S. public media governance. The lesson from 2025 is that public media remain extraordinarily vulnerable to the direction of electoral politics, whether reformist or authoritarian.

Fourth, China’s influence continues to expand into a structural feature of global media. In Asia, six major ASEAN countries—Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Singapore—deepened partnerships with Xinhua and other Chinese state media, producing joint news content, training journalists in China, and rebroadcasting Beijing’s narratives domestically. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, media outlets opened Mandarin-language programmes, often with direct support from Chinese media companies. In Cambodia and Laos, governments actively relied on Chinese funding to prop up local state media operations, effectively outsourcing financial sustainability to Beijing. This pattern is striking: where local governments cut funding or impose financial constraints, Chinese partnerships increasingly fill the gap, entrenching foreign influence in editorial agendas and reducing the scope for independent reporting.

Other dynamics reinforced these trends. Europe remains home to the world’s largest cluster of independent outlets, yet the state-controlled model has consolidated as the single most common category, driven in the last year by regional broadcaster capture in Spain and political pressure in Slovakia and Montenegro. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Eurasia, the dominance of the state controlled and captured models remained overwhelming, with television and radio still the most effective control vectors. In MENA, the tiny number of independent outlets are under mounting siege, confirming the region’s reputation as one of the most repressive media environments worldwide.

Taken together, the 2025 data reveal a world where independence is chipped away not only by direct censorship or propaganda, but by financial manipulation, geopolitical confrontation, electoral politics, and foreign partnerships. Where reforms emerged, as in Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, and Poland, they remain fragile, contested, and easily reversible. The long-term trajectory continues to point towards attritional decline: independence is never secured once and for all, but must be defended against a widening array of pressures.

For more in-depth analysis, see the Regional Overviews here.

Conclusions: The Rise of a Government-Dominated Media Order

The 2025 State Media Monitor underscores a grim reality: globally, state and public media are edging ever closer to becoming extensions of government power. What were once exceptions—the direct steering of editorial agendas by political authorities—are increasingly the rule. Independent journalism survives, but mostly in fragile pockets, often under siege.

Political leaders are tightening their grip on coverage of sensitive conflicts, governments are using financial leverage to discipline broadcasters, public media are treated as bargaining chips after elections, and major global powers—most visibly China—are expanding their influence by filling funding gaps. Together these dynamics are producing a global information space dominated less by pluralistic journalism and more by propaganda clashes between states. In many regions, the very idea of public service broadcasting as a democratic institution is being hollowed out.

This trajectory carries two major dangers. The first is that as public media lose independence and credibility, citizens turn away from them. Audiences—especially younger ones—are already shifting toward social platforms, where information flows are unregulated and disinformation flourishes. The second is systemic: as governments pour resources into their own media and attack those of their rivals, the global media system risks becoming a battlefield of competing propaganda machines, with less space for fact-based journalism that serves the public interest.

Reversing this trend is already extraordinarily difficult. The conditions that sustain editorial independence—insulated and predictable funding, depoliticized governance, and robust legal safeguards—are being eroded in most regions. Single reforms or frameworks, like the European Media Freedom Act, at best can provide partial templates and a degree of leverage in specific jurisdictions. Globally, the defense of independent public media will depend on a patchwork of strategies: stronger international monitoring and solidarity networks, legal and institutional reforms tailored to local contexts, and, critically, sustained pressure from journalists and civil society to demand transparency, accountability, and professional standards. These efforts may not prevent capture and state dominance everywhere, but without them, the space for genuine public service journalism will continue to shrink.

The lesson of 2025 is sobering: independence is not a default condition but a contested achievement. If left undefended, it will be dismantled piece by piece until public media become indistinguishable from state propaganda.

Photo by Robin Jonathan Deutsch on Unsplash (used under Unsplash license)

State Media Monitor Resources

Typology: see how we classify state and public media outlets (State Media Matrix)

Methodology: see how we collect data to be able to classify state and public media outlets

Regional overviews: see more detailed analysis about how state and public media perform in their region

Global list: find the state and public media you are interested in by checking checking our state and public media list

Global study 2025: access to the full global study

Archive global studies: access to all the State Media Monitor annual global studies

Read the key findings of the State Media Monitor in the past years

2024 Global Analysis of State and Public Media

2023 Global Analysis of State and Public Media

2022 Global Analysis of State and Public Media

Today, TRT operates a dozen television channels, most of which broadcast across the nation. Among these, TRT World stands out as it broadcasts internationally in English, catering to a global audience. Additionally, TRT owns radio channels with both a nationwide and local reach.

Media assets

Television: TRT1, TRT2, TRT Spor, TRT Cocuk, TRT Kurdi, TRT Arabi, TRT Muzik, TRT Belgesel, TRT Haber, TRT Turk, TRT Avaz, TRT World

Radio: National- Radyo 1, TRT FM, Radyo 3, TRT Nagme, TRT Turku, Voice of Turkey; Regional- Antalya Radyosu, Cukurova Radyosu, Erzurum Radyosu, Radyo GAP, Trabzon Radyosu, Kent Radyo Istanbul, Kent Radyo Ankara, Kent Radyo Izmir

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

The operations of TRT are governed by the Radio and Television Law, which delineates its objectives, powers, and responsibilities. The management of TRT is under the purview of the General Director (sometimes called Director General) and a multi-member board, which includes the General Director.

Previously, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), a Turkish state agency responsible for regulating radio and television broadcasters, held significant influence over the composition of TRT’s governing bodies. This was due to its legal authority to nominate candidates for the positions of General Director and Board members, from whom the government would then make appointments.

As of 2018, a presidential decree resulted in TRT being affiliated with the Presidential Communication Authority (the Directorate of Communications), and RTÜK being associated with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. This change formalized a closer institutional link between TRT and the Presidency.

In July 2025, Mehmet Zahid Sobacı was reappointed for a second four-year term as Director-General of TRT. He first took office in July 2021, replacing İbrahim Eren. 

Source of funding and budget

TRT’s funding model has long relied on a combination of earmarked taxes and government transfers, though the structure has shifted in recent years. Historically, revenues came from two main compulsory sources: a license fee collected through electricity bills and a so-called bandrol tax levied on electronic devices such as television and radio sets, and mobile phones. The electricity fee, which had been in place since 1984, was abolished in 2021 amid growing public anger over rising utility costs, leaving the broadcaster increasingly dependent on the bandrol tax and direct government allocations. According to analyses, this change tightened TRT’s reliance on state funding, with the bandrol tax and central budget transfers now constituting the overwhelming majority of its income.

According to media reports, TRT’s total revenues in 2021 amounted to TRY 5.6bn (US$ 488m), most of which was sourced from the government. In 2020, approximately 90% of TRT’s total budget was funded through the tax collected from electronic devices and the electricity bill.

TRT’s financial model has shifted decisively toward near-total reliance on compulsory fees and government support. In 2023, the broadcaster’s total revenue reached TRY 21.14 billion, of which an overwhelming 86.3% (TRY 18.24 billion) came from bandrol licensing fees on electronic devices. By contrast, advertising and other commercial sources accounted for only 13.7%, down from 17% in 2022. This marks a steep increase in dependence on taxpayer-derived income: in 2022, bandrol fees represented 80.1% of total revenue, already a dominant share but still lower than the 2023 figure.

Editorial independence

Despite constitutional provisions asserting its independence, TRT has consistently been subjected to intense political control throughout its existence. Defined as an “impartial public entity” by the radio and television law, TRT has continually faced pressure from authorities due to the government’s power to appoint its governing structures. This political pressure has significantly intensified since the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power two decades ago. The failed coup attempt in 2016 further exacerbated the situation, culminating in a 2018 presidential decree that placed the broadcaster under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Communications, a unit within the presidential authority.

Over the past decade, independent evaluations have consistently found that TRT’s editorial stance is heavily biased in favor of the government. A 2019 report from the European Union stated that TRT’s editorial policy, as a public service broadcaster, continued to show “a significant pro-government bias.” This bias became even more pronounced after TRT was placed under direct presidential control in 2018, further aligning the broadcaster’s editorial policy with the government’s agenda.

A member of the opposition, who also serves on the media regulator RTUK, stated in May 2023 that a quarter of the daily programming time on TRT is dedicated to disseminating government propaganda.

Legal provisions exist that mandate TRT’s editorial independence; however, they lack tangible safeguards to ensure this independence. Multiple sources suggest that the Erdoğan government exercises control over the broadcaster, indicating disregard for these legal provisions.

During the most recent research phase, no independent assessment or oversight mechanism was identified that could confirm the outlet’s editorial independence.

September 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Hurriyet, Milliyet, Posta, Hurriyet Daily News, Fanatik, Milliyet Sanat, Vatan

Television: Kanal D, CNN Turk, Teve2, Dream TV, Dream Turk, Euro D

Radio: Radyo D, CNN Turk Radio

News agency: Demiroren News Agency (DHA)

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Private (CaPr)

Ownership and governance

The Demirören family controls the conglomerate. After the death of founder Erdoğan Demirören in 2018, his son Yıldırım Demirören assumed the chairmanship of the holding. His siblings, Fikret Tayfun Demirören and Meltem Oktay, also hold significant shares, each controlling roughly 26% of Demirören Holding. The family has long maintained close personal and political ties with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Tevfik Kınık has served as CEO of Demirören Holding since 2019, though strategic control of media assets remains firmly with the family.

Source of funding and budget

Demirören’s finances remain opaque. While the group earns commercial revenue from circulation, advertising, and sponsorships, the sustainability of its media branch is widely attributed to state-mediated financing. A substantial portion of income comes from public advertising allocated by the Press Advertisement Institution (BİK) and other state agencies, as well as favorable credit arrangements.

The 2018 acquisition of Doğan Media Group, valued at approximately US$ 916 million, was financed almost entirely through a low-interest loan from Ziraat Bank. Allegations persist, most notably raised by exiled mafia boss Sedat Peker in 2021, that the loan remains largely unpaid, though the bank has refused to disclose repayment details.

In 2023, Hürriyet reported total revenues of TRY 741 million (approx. US$ 25 million), with circulation and printing accounting for more than half of this income. No comprehensive financial data is available for 2024 or forecasts for 2025–2026.

Editorial independence

All outlets within the Demirören Group are overtly supportive of the government, consistently amplifying the policies of President Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) while relentlessly criticizing the opposition. The group’s media routinely provides favourable coverage of government initiatives, often framing dissenting voices as destabilising or unpatriotic.

The editorial capture of the group became visible after the 2011 acquisition of Milliyet and Vatan. Both newspapers, which had previously published critical investigations and a diversity of political commentary, rapidly abandoned that role and adopted an openly pro-government line. The pattern repeated itself in 2018, when Demirören took over Doğan Media Group, which included Hürriyet — long regarded as Turkey’s most influential daily — as well as Posta and widely viewed television channels such as CNN Türk and Kanal D. The sale was widely described by local journalists as a turning point that dealt a major blow to pluralism in Turkey’s mainstream media, effectively silencing one of the last large critical voices.

Since then, CNN Türk in particular has become emblematic of the group’s editorial subordination to political power. In the run-up to the 2023 local elections, it and other Demirören outlets were accused of systematically distorting or downplaying statements by opposition parties, while providing wall-to-wall positive coverage of government candidates. Similar patterns were documented again in the first half of 2024, when opposition representatives complained that interviews were edited to their disadvantage or cancelled outright, reinforcing accusations of structural bias in election coverage.

The intimate ties between the Demirören family and the President have long facilitated direct political interference in newsroom decisions. Leaked recordings of phone calls between Erdoğan and Erdoğan Demirören, the founder of the group, revealed the President instructing the owners on how to frame sensitive stories. Such evidence of interference has never been publicly disavowed. Instead, successive editorial appointments at Hürriyet, Milliyet, and CNN Türk have further entrenched pro-government control, while critical columnists and reporters have either been dismissed or forced into self-censorship.

No independent oversight or self-regulatory mechanism exists to guarantee editorial independence within the group. On the contrary, a growing body of reports since 2022 documents systematic censorship practices, including the removal of articles critical of government policy and restrictions on coverage of corruption cases. This environment has contributed to what local media experts describe as one of the most extreme cases of media capture in Turkey’s recent history, consolidating Demirören’s outlets as instruments of government propaganda rather than independent journalism.

September 2025

Media assets

Television: RTS1, RTS2, RTS3, RTS Svet, RTS Nauka, RTS Drama, RTS Life, RTS Classic, RTS Kolo, RTS Trezor, RTS Music, RTS Poletarac

Radio: Radio Belgrade 1, Radio Belgrade 2, Radio Belgrade 3, Radio Belgrade 202, Radio Pletenica, Radio Rock and Roller, Radio Jukebox, Radio Vrteshka

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and governance

RTS is state-owned. Its highest governing body is a management board. The board elects the General Manager (sometimes called Director General) of RTS and the station’s top editors. The nine members of the management board are appointed by the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM), the Serbian media regulator. REM’s own members are in turn chosen through processes heavily influenced by political appointments.

Dragan Bujošević remains the General Manager (Director General) of RTS. He has held the position since 2015. Critics point out that despite having reached retirement age, his term continues under decisions of the management bodies.

In June 2025, amendments were adopted to several media laws: the Law on Public Media Services, the Law on Electronic Media, and the Law on Public Information and Media. Among the most important changes is the establishment of an Audience Ombudsman, a formal channel for audience complaints regarding public broadcasters, which for the first time gives legal duty to respond to viewers’ concerns. Other amendments address REM’s appointment/dismissal procedures, its financial autonomy, and oversight mechanisms. However, observers caution that some amendments are more declarative than operational, and may not significantly strengthen editorial independence in practice. 

Source of funding and budget

In 2024, RTS collected about RSD 15.7 billion , which is roughly €134 million, but still ended the year with a loss of RSD 310 million (€2.6 million). Of that revenue in 2024, approximately RSD 11.2 billion (€95.8 million) came from RTV license fees (a fee for public media, included in the monthly electricity bill, paid by all households in Serbia, which was introduced in 2016). Advertising revenue contributed another €28 million. 

In 2023, RTS reported a total revenue of RSD 14.7billion (US$ 136m), RSD 10.4 billion generated by license fees, and RSD 3.4 billion by ad sales. According to data from a company report, the broadcaster’s costs amounted to RSD 15.1 billion.

Editorial independence

No legal provisions require RTS to produce propagandistic content about the Serbian government. Yet, through the management board, staffed with government loyalists, the government exerts significant influence in the editorial decision-making process at RTS. Journalists working for the broadcaster interviewed for this report in May 2024 said that editors are continuously subjected to pressures from government and party officials who have an important say in how the station’s news content is presented. The news content is biased in favor of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which has been in power since 2012, according to content analysis carried out by the Novi Sad School of Journalism.

During a series of street protests in May 2023, considered by observers to be the largest revolt against President Aleksandar Vučić, vast crowds of protesters encircled the RTS building, criticizing the station for being pro-government. Research conducted in recent years also found that RTS programmatically spreads sophisticated pro-Russia propaganda in its news programs. No domestic statute establishing RTS’ editorial independence has been identified.

RTS has a Programming Council composed of 15 members. Its role is to advise the station’s management on editorial matters. However, the council is not independent and hence fails to fulfill its role, as many of its members are appointed along political lines and have ties with the government.

In April 2025, more than fifty RTS journalists held an assembly in the broadcaster’s parking lot, demanding greater professional accountability and freedom of expression. Some of these employees were later summoned for questioning by security or intelligence bodies, raising concerns among journalist groups about intimidation or pressure.

The legal amendments of June 2025 — particularly the introduction of an Audience Ombudsman — are presented by the government as measures to increase accountability. However, watchdog groups argue that without genuine political independence in appointments to REM and the management board, such reforms are unlikely to change entrenched editorial bias.

September 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Newspapers- Yeni Şafak; Magazines- Derin Tarih, Skyroad, Z Raporu, Lokma, Nihayet, CINS, Genc motto, Bilge cocuk, Bilge minik, Gercek Hayat, Post Öykü

Television: TV Net

News portal: GZT, Arkitekt, mecra

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Private (CaPr)

Ownership and governance

Albayrak Medya is controlled by the Albayrak family, a conglomerate whose business interests stretch far beyond media into construction, transportation, logistics, tourism, and defence. The six Albayrak brothers – Ahmet, Nuri, Bayram, Kazım, Mustafa, and Muzaffer – maintain collective ownership. Their relationship with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is longstanding and close; one of the brothers attended high school with him, and the two families maintain visible social and political ties.

The board of directors is composed entirely of family members. No outside stakeholders hold significant shares or executive positions. In practice, this creates a closed governance structure where editorial and business decisions remain firmly under the family’s control. As of 2024, there is no evidence of changes in ownership. Leadership positions have occasionally shifted among family members, but no transparent information is available about a professionalised CEO or independent management structure.

Source of funding and budget

Albayrak Medya does not publish financial accounts, and no audited reports are available for 2024 or projections for 2025–2026. Nevertheless, multiple independent reports and interviews with journalists confirm that the group’s media operations are subsidised by profits from its parent conglomerate’s construction and logistics businesses.

The holding has benefitted significantly from state contracts. Estimates published in 2021 indicated that the group secured public tenders worth more than TRY 7 billion (approx. USD 562 million at the 2021 average exchange rate) over 11 years. Local experts interviewed in 2024 noted that these contracts have continued in recent years, particularly in infrastructure and urban transport. In parallel, Yeni Şafak and other Albayrak media outlets are major recipients of state advertising through the Press Advertisement Agency (Basın İlan Kurumu), which acts as a crucial source of operating revenue.

Editorial independence

The editorial line of Albayrak Medya outlets is unambiguously aligned with the Erdoğan administration. Yeni Şafak and TV NET consistently support government policy, while opposition parties are covered in a critical and often hostile tone. This positioning has earned the group a reputation as one of the most loyal private media holdings in Turkey.

Ownership interference in editorial matters is systematic. Journalists working for the group report that hiring and firing decisions are based primarily on loyalty to the owners and their political allies. In September 2023, a number of reporters were dismissed abruptly without explanation, an incident that reinforced perceptions of political interference in newsroom management. Local sources interviewed for this report in 2024 confirmed that such interventions remain common.

There is no statute, charter, or internal oversight body guaranteeing editorial independence within Albayrak Medya. The most recent assessments confirm that no independent mechanism exists to shield journalists from political or owner influence.

September 2025

Media assets

Television: Rаdio television of Vojvodina 1, Radio television of Vojvodina 2

Radio: Radio Novi Sad 1 (Serbian), Radio Novi Sad 2 (Hungarian), Radio Novi Sad 3 (Croatian, Slovak, Rusyn, Romanian and Romany)

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)

Ownership and Governance

RTV is a state-owned public service broadcaster, established by the Republic of Serbia. It is governed under the same framework as the national public broadcaster, RTS, and supervised by the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM). The broadcaster’s management board is appointed through this system, ensuring direct state involvement in oversight. In practice, this has allowed significant government influence over institutional leadership, financing, and editorial direction.

As of 2025, the General Director (CEO equivalent) is Goran Karadžić, who has overseen attempts to end the prolonged reliance on acting editors. In March 2025, Karadžić announced that competitions would be held to appoint permanent editors-in-chief and program directors across all units, requiring candidates to submit detailed program development plans. This marked a break with a period of interim management that had weakened editorial independence. Current program editors include Nenad Ćaćić, heading the First Television Program, and Andrea Juhas, in charge of the Second Television Program.

Source of funding and budget

Like RTS, RTV is financed through a mandatory public service fee, state budget transfers, and limited commercial income. The subscription fee, collected through electricity bills, was raised in July 2024 from RSD 299 (€2.55) to RSD 349 (€2.98) per household to cover rising operating costs. ). Revenues from the fee are split: in Vojvodina, 70% goes to RTV, with the remainder to RTS, while contributions from outside Vojvodina are channelled exclusively to RTS.

Editorial independence

RTV’s role as a minority-language broadcaster remains one of its most important contributions to the Serbian media system, providing services in Hungarian, Slovak, Croatian, Rusyn, Romanian, and Romany, in addition to Serbian. This strengthens its inclusiveness and regional legitimacy.

However, editorial independence is frequently questioned. Monitoring reports note that RTV, like RTS, often devotes significant airtime to “pseudo-events” generated by government offices or ruling party actors, reducing space for critical or investigative journalism. ). Studies by Serbian media organizations in 2024 documented continuous political pressure on editorial staff, with management boards populated by government loyalists shaping editorial lines.

The March 2025 decision to formalize editorial leadership positions through open competition was widely welcomed as a step toward stabilizing newsroom governance. Yet trade unions and staff continue to demand structural reforms, fairer pay coefficients, and compliance with the recommendations of the State Audit Institution, issues that remain unresolved.

September 2025

Media assets

Publishing: Newspapers- Sabah, Fotomac, Takvim, Daily Sabah, Yeni Asir, Daily Sabah; Magazines- Bebeğim ve Biz, China Today, Cosmopolitan, Cosmopolitan Bride, Esquire, Forbes Türkiye, Harper’s Bazaar, HomeArt, House Beautiful, Lacivert, Otohaber, Para, Sofra Şamdan Plus, Vogue Türkiye

Television: ATV, a Haber, a News, a Para, a Spor, ATV Europe, minika, a2, Vav TV

Radio: A Haber Radio, A Spor Radio, Radio Turkuvaz, Vav Radio

State Media Matrix Typology

Captured Private (CaPr)

Ownership and governance

Zirve Holding, under control of Ömer Faruk Kalyoncu of the Kalyon Group, fully owns Turkuvaz Medya. The Kalyon Group is a conglomerate operating in construction, energy, and infrastructure sectors. Zirve Holding was established in September 2013 with the objective of acquiring media outlets.

Turkuvaz Media was established using funds acquired from bribes contributed by pro-government businessmen in Turkey, reportedly at the behest of President Erdoğan. These funds were ostensibly solicited by the presidency as a prerequisite for securing future government contracts. According to journalists who have spent a decade investigating the group we spoke with in March 2023, existing media outlets under Turkuvaz’s control, including newspapers such as Takvim and Yeni Asir, were transferred to Turkuvaz through various deals and arrangements.

The owner of Turkuvaz Medya is recognized as a steadfast ally of President Erdogan. In 2013, Erdogan, who was then the Prime Minister, personally orchestrated the sale of numerous media outlets owned by Calik Holding. These were sold to oligarchs closely aligned with the government, who were guaranteed public contracts in return for their agreement to these purchases. The media outlets managed by Turkuvaz Medya were included in this transaction. 

Despite being privately owned, Turkuvaz Medya operates under stringent government control, specifically under the Presidency’s supervision. For instance, Berat Albayrak, the former Minister of Energy and Erdoğan’s son-in-law, held the position of vice-chairman at Turkuvaz Medya for a significant period. Additionally, the President’s frequent attendance at family events of Turkuvaz’s owner underscores the close-knit relationship between the President and the supportive oligarchy.

Turkuvaz is also reported to have provided logistical support for the initiation of Eha Medya, a news portal established in 2018 by the Turkish intelligence services. This platform is designed to promote the perspectives and positions of President Erdoğan.

Source of funding and budget

Turkuvaz Medya does not publicly disclose its detailed funding sources. Nevertheless, local journalists who closely monitor state expenditure within the Turkish media have reported that the media outlets managed by the holding company receive considerable state funding. A significant portion of this support comes from advertising, provided either by the central government or by local municipalities under the control of the AKP. Additionally, Turkuvaz’s media outlets generate substantial revenue through commercial advertising.

Editorial independence

Most media articles and reports often label outlets under Turkuvaz Medya as “pro-government” due to their consistently favorable coverage of the government and critical stance toward the opposition. Local journalists suggest that Turkuvaz’s media outlets are tightly controlled by individuals loyal to the Presidency. For instance, some columnists at Sabah also serve as advisers to the President.

The most recent research round for this report has failed to identify any statute that guarantees the editorial independence of Turkuvaz media outlets. Nor was any independent assessment or oversight mechanism identified that could confirm such independence.

September 2025

MTVA merged Duna Médiaszolgáltató, which managed the public broadcasters Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television, and Duna Television, with the Hungarian News Agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda, MTI). With around 2,500 employees, MTVA remains Hungary’s largest media company, overseeing multiple television and radio channels as well as a news portal operated by MTI. 

Media assets

Television: MTV (M1 HD, M2 HD, M3, M4 Sport, M5), Duna TV, Duna World

Radio: MR (Kossuth Rádió, Petőfi Rádió, Bartók Rádió, Nemzetiségi Adások, Parlamenti Adások, Dankó Rádió, M4 Sport)

News agency: Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI)

News portal: Hirado

State Media Matrix Typology

State-Controlled (SC)

Ownership and governance

After Fidesz, the party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, won the 2010 elections, the government made significant legal changes that fundamentally transformed Hungary’s public media. A law passed in December 2010 created the Media Services and Support Trust Fund (MTVA), an entity responsible for managing Hungary’s formerly separate public broadcasting and news agency entities, including Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television, Duna TV, and the national news agency MTI.

The institutions in MTVA are overseen by the Media Council, which is part of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH). The Council is the regulatory authority for broadcasting and audiovisual media in Hungary. It is composed of five members elected by the Hungarian Parliament for nine-year terms. Members are nominated by Parliament’s Committee on Cultural Affairs and elected by a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The Media Council’s responsibilities include licensing broadcasters, monitoring compliance with media law, and, crucially, appointing and supervising the leaders of MTVA and Duna Médiaszolgáltató.

The Orban government claimed that the new structure of MTVA was intended to improve efficiency. However, this new governance structure gave the government easier access and greater power to control the country’s public media at once.

The Director of MTVA is Dániel Papp who has served as Director General of MTVA since 2018 and continues in this role as of mid-2025, overseeing Hungary’s public service media system. His tenure has been marked by close alignment with the Orbán government’s media policy, drawing international criticism over editorial independence.

Source of funding and budget

MTVA is primarily funded by the government and has a substantial budget by local standards. In 2019, MTVA received HUF 83.2bn (€270m) from the state budget. For comparison, the Hungarian state allocated approximately HUF 250bn to higher education in the same year, mostly state-run. In 2022, MTVA operated with a budget of HUF 130bn (€340m) from a state allocation, according to data from the independent news outlet Direkt36. A later report (2024) indicated that the MTVA budget was cut to HUF 126.6 billion. 

According to the broadcaster, MTVA received over HUF 100bn (€259m) in 2023 and finished the year with a deficit of HUF 4.6bn (€11.9m). In 2024, the government allocated HUF 142bn (€360m) for MTVA.

According to an NMHH document, in 2025, the Hungarian Parliament approved a budget of HUF 165.6 billion (€420 million) for MTVA, marking a substantial increase from 2024.

Editorial independence

After a new law was implemented in 2010, all public media in Hungary were unified under MTVA. Following this change, the Hungarian public broadcaster quickly came to reflect the views of the government. The new management dismissed independent journalists and significantly altered the editorial direction to align with government viewpoints. The law also granted the Hungarian News Agency (MTI) the “exclusive right” to create content for Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television, and Duna Television, a departure from these institutions’ autonomy over their programming before 2010.

There has been extensive evidence of editorial pressure over the past decade, including bans on certain topics such as human-rights issues. Reports indicated that editors at MTVA received “lists of sensitive topics” from government officials, requiring coverage to be carefully planned in line with political interests.

Leaked internal documents and email correspondence revealed how government intervention has shaped content production at MTI, exposing the detailed workings of a systemic self-censorship mechanism.

Independent monitoring and EU-funded research have consistently found that Hungarian public media content has shown a clear pro-government bias since the restructuring of 2010.

The situation has not improved in recent years. Human Rights Watch reported in early 2024 that more than 1,600 journalists and media workers have been dismissed from MTVA since 2010 and replaced with politically loyal staff, a process that has entrenched editorial control). In October 2024, thousands protested outside MTVA headquarters demanding an end to what they described as “state media propaganda.”

There is still no domestic statute and no independent oversight mechanism that would guarantee or validate MTVA’s editorial independence.

September 2025

As of 2025, Belsat, the Belarusian-language channel created under TVP in 2007 to counter state propaganda from the Lukashenko regime, underwent a major restructuring. Following prolonged budget disputes and the dismissal of its founding director Agnieszka Romaszewska-Guzy in March 2024, the channel was folded into a new international broadcasting structure managed by TVP World. The new arrangement placed Belsat alongside Russian-language (Vot Tak) and Ukrainian-language (Slava TV) editorial offices, each allocated six hours of daily programming. Accordingly, from 2025 onwards, Belsat will no longer be featured as a separate entity in the State Media Monitor typology, but as part of TVP’s consolidated international broadcasting portfolio.

Media assets

Television: National- TVP1, TVP2, TVP3 (TVP3 Białystok, TVP3 Bydgoszcz, TVP3 Gdańsk, TVP3 Gorzów Wielkopolski, TVP3 Katowice, TVP3 Kielce, TVP3 Kraków, TVP3 Lublin, TVP3 Łódź, TVP3 Olsztyn, TVP3 Opole, TVP3 Poznań, TVP3 Rzeszów, TVP3 Szczecin, TVP3 Warszawa, TVP3 Wrocław), TVP Info, TVP Historia, TVP Kultura, TVP Rozrywka, TVP Seriale, TVP Sport, TVP ABC, TVP Parlament; International- TVP Polonia, TVP World-Belsat TV, TVP Wilno

News portal: PolandIn

State Media Matrix Typology

Independent State Funded and State Managed/Owned (ISFM)

Ownership and governance

Public broadcasting in Poland—including TVP and Polish Radio—is regulated by the Broadcasting Act of 1992, amended over time. TVP functions as a state-owned joint-stock company under the control of the State Treasury, with governance structures shaped in consultation with the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT).

In 2015, the Sejm passed the Small Media Act, amending the 1992 Broadcasting Act. The amendments brought changes to the appointment procedure of the public service media governance structures. Under the new amendments, members of the Board of Management, including the President of the Board of Management and members of the Supervisory Board, were to be appointed by the Minister of the Treasury, instead of the KRRiT as was previously the case. In essence, these legal changes gave the government extraordinary powers to directly appoint the governance structures of the public media (TVP and Polish Radio), resulting in an immediate negative impact on the editorial independence of the Polish public media.

The legal changes received strong criticism from international institutions and the European Union. Thorbjørn Jagland, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, expressed concern about the new law’s impact on the independence of public media. At the time, Dunja Miljatović, OSCE Representative on the Freedom of the Media, criticized the government’s direct control over the governance structures of Polish public media.

In 2016, in response to criticism from European institutions, the PiS-dominated Sejm passed a new law establishing the National Media Council (RMN). This council was made responsible for appointing the governing bodies of TVP, Polish Radio, and the Polish Press Agency (PAP). However, three of the newly appointed council members were Law and Justice (PiS) party lawmakers, which allowed the government to maintain significant control over the governing structures of Polish public media. Before this, the government had already removed unwanted employees from public media and appointed their people to lead these institutions.

After the opposition parties won enough seats in the elections on October 15, 2023, to take power from the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, significant changes have occurred in the country’s public service media.

The new coalition, comprising the centrist Civic Coalition (KO), center-right Third Way (Trzecia Droga), and The Left (Lewica), led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, began reforming the public media in the country in the fall of 2023. Their goal was to transform these institutions into independent, impartial, and pluralistic news outlets. However, their attempts have been blocked by former Polish President Andrzej Duda, who represented the interests of the PiS party.

In late December 2023, Duda vetoed a bill related to state media subsidies that the coalition put forward, labeling their actions as “illegal” seizure of public media. In response, the culture minister announced on December 27, 2023, that TVP, Polish Radio, and the news agency PAP would be placed into liquidation, a move aimed at taking back control of public service media from the former ruling PiS party. This decision came after the management of TVP, loyal to PiS, was replaced before Christmas 2023. In April 2024, a court confirmed that TVP was in a state of liquidation (and multiple subsequent rulings in 2024–2025 reaffirmed the liquidator’s authority).

During the December 2023 transition the Supervisory Board appointed Tomasz Sygut as President/CEO of TVP, a move later upheld as legally valid by Warsaw courts (Dec 2024–Feb 2025 rulings). In parallel, the PiS-backed National Media Council tried to counter-appoint Maciej Łopiński on 25 December 2023, which the Culture Ministry declared void. In October 2024 the Sejm dismissed RMN chair Krzysztof Czabański over conflict-of-interest concerns; in December 2024 Wojciech Król (KO) was appointed to RMN and elected chair on 12 December 2024. These steps are tied to aligning appointments with EMFA Article 5 safeguards now under public consultation in Poland.

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), in effect as of August 2025, has binding standards on transparent, merit-based appointments and editorial safeguards in public service media that create an external compliance benchmark. RSF, EBU and MFRR submissions to Poland’s 2024 consultation emphasized civil-society roles in supervisory and management boards and called for de-politicized governance procedures.

Source of funding and budget

TVP is funded through a combination of a license fee (a fee imposed on Polish households to support public broadcasting in the country), government subsidies, and advertising. According to the License Fees Act of 2005, the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), Poland’s media regulator, determines the level of the fee every year, not later than June 30th.

Typically, the license fee is meant to cover over 50% of the broadcaster’s budget. However, a poorly designed system for collecting the license fee (where postal workers are expected to collect money from each household in person) combined with people’s unwillingness to pay the fee (either because they dislike the station or are generally averse to spending money) has resulted in a situation where government subsidies have become TVP’s main source of funding in recent years. The government regularly uses funds from the state budget to fill the financial gaps caused by the low collection of license fees.

Some 60% of the total revenue generated through license fees is supposed to go to TVP, with the rest reserved for Polskie Radio (Polish Radio), the country’s public service radio channel.

In 2018, for example, TVP saw its revenues from sales advertising increase by nearly 14% year on year to PLN 908m (€211m), which accounted for 47% of the broadcaster’s total budget. The license fee contributed PLN 385.5m to TVP, while the government approved PLN 593.5m in state subsidy to compensate the broadcaster for the losses incurred from uncollected license fees. That means the government subsidy accounted for approximately 30% of TVP’s budget in 2018.

In its 2019 annual report, TVP stated that the license fee had generated approximately PLN 1.45bn (€330m) in revenue. However, the state covered a significant portion of that sum, resulting in a total of PLN 1bn (€250m) awarded to the station. This adjustment was made because the initially projected amount was not fully attained.

In February 2020, after intense debates, the lower house of Poland’s parliament, the Sejm, approved a state subsidy of PLN 2bn (€470m) for the public media. Approximately 60% of this subsidy was allocated to TVP, increasing the share of state subsidy to over 50% of the station’s total budget. Local experts reported that only 8% of Polish households paid the license fee in 2020. Experts criticized the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party, arguing that the generous state subsidy is used by PiS to ensure favorable political coverage on TVP’s channels.

In conclusion, although it represents less than 50% of TVP’s budget in some years, the state subsidy has been used by the government as a potent tool to control the public media in Poland.

In February 2022, former Polish President Andrzej Duda signed the 2022 budget act, granting a state subsidy of €500m to the Polish public media, with €400m of that going to TVP. In November 2022, the PiS party pushed for approval in parliament of an increase by around PLN 800m (€171m) in TVP’s budget, raising it to over PLN 2bn (€428m). Opposition MPs criticized the decision, stating that it is intended to secure funding for the electoral campaign.

In March 2024, KRRiT suspended transfers from the license-fee system amid the governance dispute; courts later confirmed KRRiT could hold license-fee proceeds in escrow while litigation ran. In response to September 2024 floods, KRRiT approved the 2025 split of projected license-fee income— some PLN 308m for TVP and PLN 148m each for Polish Radio and regional radios—unlocking the October 2024 instalment; meanwhile, since December 2023 public media have relied mostly on state-budget tranches, with TVP’s 2024 inflows from the state roughly in the PLN 1.06–1.9bn range depending on counting methodology and timing of tranches. The Culture Ministry later confirmed PLN 2.341bn total public-media transfers in 2024.

Looking ahead, the government has floated the idea of abolishing the household license fee and replacing it with a 0.09% of GDP tax (PLN 3.5 bn/year) as a stable appropriation.

Editorial independence

The Broadcasting Act enshrines the responsibilities of Poland’s public service media, TVP and Polish Radio. The act requires the public media to provide services, including information, journalism, culture, entertainment, education, and sports services, that demonstrate pluralism, impartiality, balance, autonomy, innovation, high quality, and integrity. However, these requirements are vaguely worded and have no impact on the broadcasters’ editorial independence, as they are routinely ignored. There is no independent/oversight mechanism validating TVP’s editorial independence.

However, the government exerted significant influence over the editorial affairs of the Polish public media (TVP and Polish Radio) for many. Legal changes adopted in 2015 and 2016 further solidified this control by granting the government total power over the outlets’ employment structures. The immediate effects were evident as most independent journalists from both TVP and Polish Radio were dismissed shortly after the 2015 legal amendments were passed.

Journalists supportive of the PiS party were employed, transforming TVP and Polish Radio into openly pro-government media outlets. For many years, numerous reports from media NGOs, independent journalists, and experts have criticized the increased government control over the editorial independence of the Polish public media. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has stated that the Polish public media serve as “government propaganda mouthpieces.”

During the PiS’ regime, politicians from the PiS party were chosen for top management positions at the station. This has had a negative impact on the station’s news coverage. For instance, with Jacek Kurski, a PiS politician, leading TVP, the station’s news reports became overly supportive of the government and critical of the opposition. After a period away from the director position, Kurski was re-appointed as head of TVP in July 2020. PiS argued that preceding governments also exploited public media, reinforcing that PiS treated TVP as a state-controlled media outlet.

After the October 2023 elections, the new Donald Tusk-led coalition moved to dismantle this system, liquidated existing management, and relaunched TVP’s flagship news with a stated commitment to impartiality. Symbolically, on 20 December 2023, TVP Info went off air, and the following day the new “19:30” bulletin promised to end propaganda and restore factual reporting.

Although TVP’s independence remains fragile—with political battles over appointments, oversight, and funding still shaping its operations—the broadcaster is no longer under the overt political control it experienced during the PiS era. Since the leadership changes and reforms of late 2023–2024, its news coverage has become more balanced. For this reason, in our State Media Monitor taxonomy, we have reclassified TVP as Independent State Funded and State Managed/Owned (ISFM).

September 2025